ADAMS VS. ADAMS (CHILD CUSTODY)

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The father appealed an order modifying the divorce decree to transfer custody of the parties' young daughter from him back to the mother. The court reaffirmed the standard from Murphy v. Murphy, 84 Nev. 710, 711, 447 P.2d 664, 665 (1968): a change of custody is warranted only when (1) the circumstances of the parents have been materially altered, and (2) the child's welfare would be substantially enhanced by the change. Although a district judge has wide discretion in custody matters, Cosner v. Cosner, 78 Nev. 242, 371 P.2d 278 (1962), that discretion must operate within the Murphy standard. The district court found the father had been a fit custodian and that the mother's physical and mental condition had changed, stating she should be given 'a last chance,' but made no finding that the child's welfare would be substantially enhanced by the change. Reviewing the record - which showed the child had benefited from the stability of the father's and stepmother's home after the mother's history of suicide attempts and barbiturate use - the court found no evidence to support such a finding. The 'tender years' doctrine of Peavey v. Peavey, 85 Nev. 571, 460 P.2d 110 (1969), was not controlling because it had been overcome when custody was awarded to the father; thereafter, modification was governed by Murphy. Recognizing that repetitive custody changes do not contribute to a child's security or emotional stability, the court reversed and remanded for a prompt full custody hearing under the Murphy standards, with custody to remain with the mother pending disposition.

In plain language

When the Adamses divorced, the mother was given custody of their only child, a daughter. During a period when the mother struggled with serious emotional health problems - she attempted suicide and used barbiturates over a long period, and on one occasion the child had to be rushed to the hospital after taking some of the mother's barbiturates - the father moved to change custody, and in September 1967 the court awarded custody to him. That order said the custody question could be revisited in six months. In the spring of 1968 the mother moved to regain custody, and in June 1968 the court returned the child to her. The father appealed, arguing the evidence did not show the child's welfare would be substantially improved by the change back to the mother. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It restated the controlling standard for changing custody: a change is warranted only when (1) the circumstances of the parents have been materially altered, AND (2) the child's welfare would be substantially enhanced by the change. While trial judges have broad discretion in custody cases, that discretion must operate within this standard. Here, the trial court made findings that the father had been a fit custodian and that the mother's physical and mental condition had improved, and it said she deserved 'a last chance' to be a fit parent. But the trial court never found - and the Supreme Court could not find in the record - that the child's welfare would be substantially enhanced by moving her back to the mother. In fact, the evidence showed the child had improved and gained stability and security while living with her father and stepmother. The court noted the 'tender years' doctrine (favoring mothers for young children absent unfitness) did not control, because it had already been overcome when custody was given to the father; from then on, any change had to meet the two-part standard. Recognizing that repeated custody changes harm a child's stability, the court reversed and sent the case back for a prompt, full custody hearing under the correct standard, allowing the child to remain with the mother in the meantime.