F-Law

The canon

The lines Nevada family law turns on.

The passages practitioners actually drop into briefs - each one verbatim from the published opinion and verified against the opinion text, with its citation and, where our library has the case, a link to the full brief. Copy any of them with the citation attached.

Retirement division

We reject appellant's contentions and hold that a nonvested pension interest acquired during marriage is community property and that it is not error to permit the nonemployee spouse to elect to receive those benefits when the employed spouse is first eligible to retire.

Gemma v. Gemma, 105 Nev. 458, 778 P.2d 429 (1989) · 105 Nev. at 459

A nonvested pension earned during marriage is community property; the nonemployee spouse may elect to receive benefits at first retirement eligibility.

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Under this rule, we explained, the community interest is represented by a fraction, the numerator of which is the time the parties were married, the denominator is the total time worked before full retirement benefits may be received.

Fondi v. Fondi, 106 Nev. 856, 802 P.2d 1264 (1990) · 106 Nev. at 859

Defines the coverture (time rule) fraction for computing the community's interest in a pension.

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The "wait and see" approach means that the share received by the pension holder's spouse should be based on the value of the pension that would ultimately be received by the pension holding spouse and not on the pension received if the pension holding spouse were to retire at the time of the divorce.

Sertic v. Sertic, 111 Nev. 1192, 901 P.2d 148 (1995) · 111 Nev. at 1195

Defines the wait-and-see approach to valuing the community share of a pension.

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Accordingly, social security benefits, or the payments used to derive those benefits, cannot be divided in a property settlement agreement. Further, they cannot be given any consideration in "offsetting" one spouse's community property interest in the other spouse's retirement benefits.

Wolff v. Wolff, 112 Nev. 1355, 929 P.2d 916 (1996) · 112 Nev. at 1363

Social Security is not divisible community property and may not even be considered as an offset.

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We hold that, unless specifically set forth in the divorce decree, an allocation of a community property interest in the employee spouse's pension plan does not also entitle the nonemployee spouse to survivor benefits.

Henson v. Henson, 130 Nev. 814, 334 P.3d 933 (2014)

Survivor benefits must be expressly awarded in the decree; a community property allocation does not imply them.

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We therefore hold that while Gemma permits a district court to order pension payments at first eligibility, it does not mandate such an order. NRS 125.155 clarifies that a district court may deny or reduce such payments if the employee spouse has not yet retired.

Kilgore v. Kilgore, 135 Nev. 357, 449 P.3d 843 (2019)

Courts have discretion under NRS 125.155 to deny or reduce PERS payments sought before the employee spouse retires.

Community property

In such a case, the statutes clearly mandate that all property acquired by the parties until the formal dissolution of the marriage is community property.

Forrest v. Forrest, 99 Nev. 602, 668 P.2d 275 (1983) · 99 Nev. at 607

The community continues through informal separation until formal dissolution of the marriage.

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Additionally, this court has recognized that the community is entitled to a pro rata ownership share in property which community funds have helped to acquire.

Malmquist v. Malmquist, 106 Nev. 231, 792 P.2d 372 (1990) · 106 Nev. at 238

The principle underlying apportionment of community and separate interests in a residence acquired with mixed funds.

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Custody

Accordingly, we take this opportunity to revisit the Murphy standard and now conclude that a modification of primary physical custody is warranted only when (1) there has been a substantial change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the child, and (2) the child's best interest is served by the modification.

Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 161 P.3d 239 (2007) · 123 Nev. at 150

The two-prong standard for modifying primary physical custody.

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Therefore, to approximate an equal timeshare but allow for necessary flexibility, we hold that each parent must have physical custody of the child at least 40 percent of the time to constitute joint physical custody.

Rivero v. Rivero, 125 Nev. 410, 216 P.3d 213 (2009) · 125 Nev. at 425-26

The 40-percent timeshare threshold defining joint physical custody in Nevada.

Crucially, the decree or order must tie the child's best interest, as informed by specific, relevant findings respecting the NRS 125.480(4) and any other relevant factors, to the custody determination made.

Davis v. Ewalefo, 131 Nev. 445, 352 P.3d 1139 (2015)

A custody order must connect express best-interest findings to the determination reached.

Attorney fees

The wife must be afforded her day in court without destroying her financial position. This would imply that she should be able to meet her adversary in the courtroom on an equal basis.

Sargeant v. Sargeant, 88 Nev. 223, 495 P.2d 618 (1972) · 88 Nev. at 227

The basis for awarding attorney fees in divorce so a spouse can litigate on equal footing without depleting her estate.

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Every quotation is reproduced verbatim from the published opinion and was verified against the opinion text; contexts are neutral one-line descriptions, not commentary. A quotation is not the whole holding - read the opinion before citing it. Quotations from opinions published as advance opinions carry the citation without a Nevada Reports pinpoint.