ADAMS VS. LEE (CHILD CUSTODY)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The Court of Appeals reviewed the denial of a motion to modify custody for an abuse of discretion. Myers v. Haskins, 138 Nev. 553, 556, 513 P.3d 527, 531 (Ct. App. 2022); see also Wallace v. Wallace, 112 Nev. 1015, 1019, 922 P.2d 541, 543 (1996) (treating a parenting-time decision as a custody determination). An abuse of discretion occurs only when "no reasonable judge could reach a similar conclusion under the same circumstances." In re Guardianship of Rubin, 137 Nev. 288, 294, 491 P.3d 1, 6 (2021) (quoting Leavitt v. Siems, 130 Nev. 503, 509, 330 P.3d 1, 5 (2014)). An abuse of discretion also occurs "when a district court's decision is not supported by substantial evidence or is clearly erroneous." Bautista v. Picone, 134 Nev. 334, 336, 419 P.3d 157, 159 (2018). Factual findings are upheld if supported by substantial evidence — "evidence that a reasonable person may accept as adequate to sustain a judgment." Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 149, 161 P.3d 239, 242 (2007). The governing framework requires a prima facie showing that "(1) there has been a substantial change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the child, and (2) the child's best interest is served by the modification." Romano v. Romano, 138 Nev. 1, 3, 501 P.3d 980, 982 (2022), abrogated in part on other grounds by Killebrew v. State ex rel. Donohue, 139 Nev. 401, 535 P.3d 1167 (2023). The changed-circumstances prong "is based on the principle of res judicata and prevents persons dissatisfied with custody decrees [from filing] immediate, repetitive, serial motions until the right circumstances or the right judge allows them to achieve a different result, based on essentially the same facts." Ellis, 123 Nev. at 151, 161 P.3d at 243. The district court may review the facts and evidence underpinning prior custody determinations in deciding whether modification is in the child's best interest. Nance v. Ferraro, 134 Nev. 152, 153, 418 P.3d 679, 681 (Ct. App. 2018). Applying this framework, the court held that the district court considered Adams's arguments, testimony, and admitted evidence and found no substantial change in circumstances, resting on findings that Adams had recently lacked contact with the children, that any benefit from California services was speculative, and that Lee had addressed the educational and medical concerns. A dispositive procedural point drove much of the analysis: Adams filed a certificate stating she was not requesting transcripts, despite a supreme court notice advising her she could request them (and, if granted in forma pauperis status, could waive costs) under NRAP 9. Because Adams did not provide the evidentiary hearing transcript, the court applied the presumption that the missing transcript supports the district court's decision. See NRAP 9(a)(1), (7); Cuzze v. Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. of Nev., 123 Nev. 598, 603, 172 P.3d 131, 135 (2007). The court also denied Adams's June 26, 2026, motion to correct the record, noting she had been given the opportunity to request the transcript before briefing and elected not to do so. Because Adams failed to make a sufficient showing of a substantial change in circumstances, the district court was not required to make findings under the NRS 125C.0035(4) best interest factors. See Romano, 138 Nev. at 3, 501 P.3d at 982. The court nonetheless noted the district court summarily found modification would not be in the children's best interest given Adams's lack of contact with the children from July 2024 until March 21, 2025. On the evidentiary rulings, the court reviewed for abuse of discretion, Abid v. Abid, 133 Nev. 770, 772, 406 P.3d 476, 478 (2017), again applied the Cuzze presumption due to the missing transcript, and found Adams offered no cogent argument as to why the district court abused its discretion, citing Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006). On due process, the court applied the principle that "[p]rocedural due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard." Callie v. Bowling, 123 Nev. 181, 183, 160 P.3d 878, 879 (2007); cf. Wallace, 112 Nev. at 1020, 922 P.2d at 544 (due process violated where a party had no notice the court would consider the specific issue of parenting time). The court reiterated that in custody matters "the sole consideration of the court is the child's best interest," Blanco v. Blanco, 129 Nev. 723, 730, 311 P.3d 1170, 1174 (2013); see also NRS 125C.0035(1), and that such matters are preferably decided on their merits. The court found the district court's pre-hearing order gave Adams notice that Lee would testify; that the district court relied mostly on Adams's and Lee's testimony; that the record's lack of a transcript left it unclear whether Adams preserved her objection, see Parodi v. Washoe Med. Ctr., Inc., 111 Nev. 365, 368, 892 P.2d 588, 590 (1995); and that Adams had an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, satisfying due process, see Mesi v. Mesi, 136 Nev. 748, 750, 478 P.3d 366, 369 (2020). The court further held that, even assuming error, Adams failed to show prejudice, applying the harmless-error standard from Wyeth v. Rowatt, 126 Nev. 446, 465, 244 P.3d 765, 778 (2010).

In plain language

This case is a dispute between two parents, Sandra Adams and Anthony Lee, over custody of their three young children, born in 2016, 2018, and 2020. The background: In April 2021, a California court decided that both parents would share "joint legal custody" (the authority to make major decisions about the children), but that Lee would have "primary physical custody" (the children live mainly with him). The California order also gave Adams supervised parenting time and gave Lee the authority to make decisions about the children's education. In February 2022, Lee registered that California order in the Nevada court, which the Nevada court approved in April 2022. In 2024, after both parents challenged the arrangement, the Nevada court held a hearing and kept the existing setup in place. It found there had not been a "substantial change in circumstances" — the legal threshold a parent must cross before a court will even consider changing a custody order. The court noted several concerns about Adams's parenting time, including that she had only two in-person visits with the children in the prior 16 months, that children had to be removed from the supervised-visit center during those visits, and that she had previously been dropped from the supervised video-call program for missing scheduled calls. In May 2025, Adams filed a new motion asking for full custody. She argued the children were not enrolled in school, had struggled in school before, and were being medically neglected, and that Lee was not communicating with her and was trying to turn the children against her. She said that if she had custody, the children would be in therapy, in school, have their medical needs met, and bond with their other siblings. Lee responded that the children missed school due to illness, that one child now had an educational support plan and therapy/speech services, and that an incident involving a child's eye had already been investigated by Child Protective Services and law enforcement and the case was closed. After another evidentiary hearing, the district court again denied Adams's motion. It found she had not shown a substantial change in circumstances: she had not been in contact with the children from July 2024 until March 2025, her claim that California offered better resources was speculative, and Lee had already addressed the education and medical concerns. The court kept Adams's parenting time supervised but said the parents could later agree in writing to remove supervision if visits went well, or Adams could file a new motion. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed — meaning it upheld the district court's decision. A key reason was practical: Adams filed a certificate stating she was not requesting transcripts of the evidentiary hearing. Without a transcript of what was said at that hearing, the appellate court explained that it is required to assume the missing record supports the lower court's decision, and it cannot meaningfully review arguments about the evidence. The court also rejected Adams's argument that her due process rights were violated when Lee, Lee's mother, and a court department manager testified, noting that a pre-hearing order had told the parties they would have an opportunity to be heard, that Adams had a chance to cross-examine the witnesses, and that she had not shown any harm.