ANDERSON VS. MORALES

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The Court of Appeals reviewed the district court's child support order for an abuse of discretion. Edgington v. Edgington, 119 Nev. 577, 588, 80 P.3d 1282, 1290 (2003). A district court abuses its discretion when its findings are not supported by substantial evidence, Miller v. Miller, 134 Nev. 120, 125, 412 P.3d 1081, 1085 (2018), meaning evidence that a reasonable person may accept as adequate to sustain a judgment, Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 149, 161 P.3d 239, 242 (2007). Modifiability of the agreed support amount. Anderson contended that the April 2021 stipulation - which he characterized as contingent on his relocation to Oregon and intended to apply until his support duty terminated - rendered his obligation nonmodifiable based on a change in income. The court rejected the premise. Although parents may stipulate to a child support order, child support implicates public policy and the child's best interest, and the district court "always has the power to modify an existing child support order, either upward or downward, notwithstanding the parties' agreement to the contrary." Fernandez v. Fernandez, 126 Nev. 28, 34, 222 P.3d 1031, 1035 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court noted that while the supreme court has considered whether equitable estoppel may enforce an agreement to make support nonmodifiable, see id. at 39, 222 P.3d at 1038, Anderson never raised equitable estoppel below or on appeal and therefore waived it. Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown, 97 Nev. 49, 52, 623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981); Powell v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 127 Nev. 156, 161 n.3, 252 P.3d 668, 672 n.3 (2011). Changed circumstances. A district court may modify support upon a showing of changed circumstances. Rivero v. Rivero, 125 Nev. 410, 431, 216 P.3d 213, 228 (2009), overruled on other grounds by Romano v. Romano, 138 Nev. 1, 6, 501 P.3d 980, 984 (2022), abrogated on other grounds by Killebrew v. State ex rel. Donohue, 139 Nev., Adv. Op. 43, 535 P.3d 1167, 1171 (2023). A change of 20 percent or more in gross monthly income "shall be deemed to constitute changed circumstances requiring a review." NRS 125B.145(4). Anderson argued that substantial evidence did not support the finding that his April 2021 monthly income was $0, pointing to tax documentation showing approximately $150,000 in 2021 income (including unemployment benefits and earnings from employment before and after his unemployment) and an updated FDF reflecting gross monthly income of $5,958.33. The court reasoned that at the April 2021 hearing Anderson had represented that he was unemployed and would owe only $138 absent agreement - the amount appropriate for a parent earning less than $805 per month under the low-income schedule. See NAC 425.145; Child Support Obligation of Low-Income Payers. His pre- and post-hearing earnings were not part of the settlement negotiation because he was unemployed at the time and his later earnings derived from subsequently secured employment. When Anderson secured employment, his income rose from the implied $0-$805 range to approximately $6,000 at the time of Morales's motion - far more than a 20-percent change since the order modifying the decree. The court held the district court's finding on the change in income was supported by substantial evidence. Ellis, 123 Nev. at 149, 161 P.3d at 242. Downward deviation and application of the formula. The obligor parent's base child support obligation is determined under the NAC Chapter 425 guidelines. NAC 425.115(1), (3); NAC 425.140. The district court may adjust the base obligation "in accordance with the specific needs of the child and the economic circumstances of the parties based upon [certain enumerated] factors and specific findings of fact." NAC 425.150(1). The parties presented evidence of their financial situations, incomes, the costs of care and support for the children, and Anderson's parenting-time transportation costs. Having considered that evidence, the district court denied a downward deviation, a decision the Court of Appeals held was within its discretion and supported by substantial evidence. NAC 425.150(1); Ellis, 123 Nev. at 149, 161 P.3d at 242. Because the district court correctly applied NAC 425.140's formula, the court found no abuse of discretion. Edgington, 119 Nev. at 588, 80 P.3d at 1290. Denial of reconsideration. Anderson challenged the order denying reconsideration but did not separately address it, relying instead on the same arguments the court had rejected. The court, noting that appellate courts may consider arguments asserted in a motion for reconsideration where the district court entertained it on the merits and it is properly part of the appellate record, held he failed to demonstrate that relief was warranted. Arnold v. Kip, 123 Nev. 410, 417, 168 P.3d 1050, 1054 (2007).

In plain language

Travis Anderson and Kerstin Morales divorced in December 2019. Under their joint divorce petition, the district court gave Morales primary physical custody of their three minor children and ordered Anderson to pay $1,400 per month in child support. In 2021, Anderson became unemployed and asked the court to lower his payments. At an April 2021 hearing, the parties agreed to reduce his obligation to $350 per child per month, and the court entered an order reflecting that agreement. During that hearing, Anderson emphasized that he was unemployed and that, absent an agreement otherwise, he would only owe $138 per month under a schedule used for low-income parents. In August 2022, Morales asked the court to raise the payments again, arguing that Anderson had found work and that his income had risen by more than 20 percent since the 2021 order. Nevada law treats a 20-percent-or-greater change in income as a reason to review a child support order. Anderson opposed the request, arguing mainly that his support could not be changed because of an income change. He said the 2021 agreement was tied to his moving to Oregon (which he did) and was meant to last until his duty to pay support ended. He also argued that, if the court did modify support, it should order a lower amount than the standard formula would produce. The district court modified Anderson's obligation to $1,320 per month for the two children who were still minors (his obligation for the third child had ended when she turned 18 and graduated high school). The court found that the 2021 agreement was not contingent on Anderson relocating and was not meant to apply forever, and that there was no basis to depart from the child support formula. Anderson asked the court to reconsider, raising for the first time claims that Morales's financial disclosure form contained mistakes and that the court had wrongly found his April 2021 monthly income to be $0. The court denied reconsideration, saying the transcript of the April 2021 hearing supported its decision and that any mistakes in Morales's form were inadvertent clerical errors. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It explained that, as a matter of public policy, a district court always retains the power to modify child support, upward or downward, even when parents have agreed otherwise, so long as the legal criteria are met. Anderson had not argued that a legal doctrine called equitable estoppel should prevent modification, so the court treated that possibility as waived. The court also concluded that the record supported the finding that Anderson's income had risen by far more than 20 percent - from between $0 and $805 per month at the time of the 2021 agreement to roughly $6,000 when Morales moved to modify. Finally, the court held that the district court acted within its discretion in declining to lower the amount below the formula and in correctly applying the formula. Because Anderson relied on the same arguments to challenge the denial of reconsideration, that challenge failed too.