ARZOLA VS. ESTRADA

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The court reviewed the child custody order, the child support and relocation decisions, and the attorney fees award all for abuse of discretion, citing Wallace v. Wallace, 112 Nev. 1015, 1019, 922 P.2d 541, 543 (1996); Romano v. Romano, 138 Nev., Adv. Op. 1, 501 P.3d 980, 985 (2022); Flynn v. Flynn, 120 Nev. 436, 440, 92 P.3d 1224, 1227 (2004); and Miller v. Wilfong, 121 Nev. 619, 622, 119 P.3d 727, 729 (2005). Factual findings will not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence, and the court will not reweigh evidence or assess credibility. Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 149, 152, 161 P.3d 239, 242, 244 (2007). Custody. The court rejected all four custody challenges. First, Ida's contention that this was a custody modification requiring Alfonso to meet a modification burden was waived under Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown, 97 Nev. 49, 52, 623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981), and failed on the merits because NRS 125C.0015(2) provides that where a court has not made a custody determination, each parent has joint physical custody until otherwise ordered; the court cited Rosie M. v. Ignacio A., 138 Nev., Adv. Op. 49, 512 P.3d 758, 763 (2022). Second, invoking Bluestein v. Bluestein, 131 Nev. 106, 109, 345 P.3d 1044, 1046 (2015), the court reaffirmed that the best interest of the child under NRS 125C.0035(4) is the primary consideration and that the 40-percent time guideline "shall serve as a tool," so the district court's discretion in designating custody was not abused. Third, the failure to consider joint physical custody where neither party sought it was barred by the invited-error doctrine under Pearson v. Pearson, 110 Nev. 293, 297, 871 P.2d 343, 345 (1994), and was not the sole basis for the decision. Fourth, the district court made extensive best-interest findings supported by substantial evidence, finding NRS 125C.0035(4)(c), (d), (e), and (f) favored Alfonso and (g) neutral-leaning-Alfonso; the court applied NRCP 61 in noting Ida failed to show any error affected the outcome. Relocation. Ida's relocation argument failed for three reasons: it was waived under Old Aztec Mine; NRS 125C.007 by its plain language applies to a relocating parent, and Ida cited no authority applying it to a relocating child where an out-of-state parent seeks an initial custody determination, invoking Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006); and even assuming a relocation analysis applied - a distinct inquiry under Schwartz v. Schwartz, 107 Nev. 378, 382, 812 P.2d 1268, 1270 (1991), with factors overlapping the best-interest factors, see Monahan v. Hogan, 138 Nev., Adv. Op. 7, 507 P.3d 588, 592 (Ct. App. 2022) - Ida did not show what factor would have changed the result. Child support. Both parents have a duty to provide for a child's maintenance under NRS 125B.020, and the applicable percentage is set by NAC 425.140, with a discretionary downward deviation available under NAC 425.150(1). The court identified relevant deviation factors: cost of transportation for parenting time, relative income of both households, and the obligor's ability to pay, NAC 425.150(1)(e), (f), (h). The district court found "no adjustment evidence was provided pursuant to NAC 425.150," but its own findings - Alfonso's approximately $250,000 annual income and partnership, family-provided child care, Ida's community-college enrollment, and the markedly greater income of Alfonso - demonstrated ample adjustment evidence. The court held the failure to consider deviation was an abuse of discretion, reversed, and remanded to apply the deviation factors. Attorney fees and costs. Attorney fees require authorization by rule, statute, or contract. Henry Prods., Inc. v. Tarmu, 114 Nev. 1017, 1020, 967 P.2d 444, 446 (1998). A district court must make specific findings and provide an adequate explanation for appellate review, Davis v. Ewalefo, 131 Nev. 445, 452, 352 P.3d 1139, 1143 (2015), and failure to state a basis is arbitrary and capricious and thus an abuse of discretion, Henry Prods., 114 Nev. at 1020, 967 P.2d at 446. In family law cases, the court must consider the Brunzell factors, Brunzell v. Golden Gate Nat'l Bank, 85 Nev. 345, 349, 455 P.2d 31, 33 (1969), along with any disparity in income under Wright v. Osburn, 114 Nev. 1367, 1370, 970 P.2d 1071, 1073 (1998); Miller, 121 Nev. at 623, 119 P.3d at 730. Alfonso's memo relied on NRS 125C.0075 (inapplicable absent the wrongful or criminal activity it addresses) and NRS 18.010(2)(b) (requiring findings, not made here, that a claim was brought "without reasonable ground or to harass the prevailing party"). He analyzed Brunzell but did not address income disparity as required by Miller, despite Ida raising Miller in opposition. The district court cited no legal basis, did not reference Brunzell or Wright, made no NRS 18.010(2)(b) findings, and treated fees as if mandatory though NRS 18.010(2) is discretionary. Costs under NRS 18.020 are mandatory only in enumerated cases, none apparently applicable, and the unapportioned award prevented meaningful review, see Jitnan v. Oliver, 127 Nev. 424, 433, 254 P.3d 623, 629 (2011). Alfonso's appellate reliance on NRS 125C.250 was waived under Old Aztec Mine and, in any event, failed to address Miller's income-disparity requirement, see Edwards, 122 Nev. at 330 n.38, 130 P.3d at 1288 n.38. The court reversed the fees and costs award.

In plain language

Alfonso Estrada, an attorney living in Los Angeles, and Ida Arzola, who worked in Las Vegas, had a child together, A.E., born in May 2019. After the relationship ended, both parents went to court seeking primary physical custody - the arrangement where one parent has the child most of the time. Alfonso asked for primary custody; Ida asked for primary custody and also for child support (regular payments from one parent to help cover the child's needs). While the case was pending, the court set up a temporary schedule of joint physical custody, with the parents exchanging the child in Barstow, California, each week. During that temporary period, Alfonso was ordered to pay Ida $1,583 per month in support plus $5,000 in attorney fees, reflecting that Alfonso earns roughly ten times what Ida makes. After a two-day trial, the district court changed course. It awarded primary physical custody to Alfonso, ordered that the child's "habitual residence" stay in Nevada, and directed Ida to pay Alfonso $400 per month in child support. It also ruled that Alfonso, as the "prevailing party," could recover attorney fees, and later ordered Ida to pay Alfonso $40,000 in combined fees and costs. Ida appealed. The Court of Appeals split its decision into three parts. On custody, the court sided with Alfonso and left the custody award in place. It rejected Ida's argument that Alfonso had to meet a higher legal bar to "modify" custody, explaining that because no prior custody order existed, this was an initial determination, not a modification. It rejected her argument that the arrangement should have been called joint custody, noting that the best interest of the child is the main consideration and that percentage of time is only one factor. It rejected her argument that the court should have considered joint custody even though neither parent asked for it, in part because Ida herself never requested joint custody as an alternative. And it found the court's detailed analysis of the best-interest factors was supported by the evidence. On the relocation argument, the court declined to overturn the custody order. Ida had not raised the relocation issue in the lower court, cited no legal authority showing the relocation statute applied to her situation, and did not show that considering relocation factors would have changed the result. On child support, the court agreed with Ida. The district court had said "no adjustment evidence was provided" that would justify lowering Ida's payment - but its own findings described a large income gap (Alfonso earning about $250,000 a year while Ida attended community college), plus travel costs and Ida's limited ability to pay. Because that evidence supported considering a downward adjustment, the Court of Appeals reversed the support order and sent it back for the district court to apply the deviation factors. On attorney fees and costs, the court also agreed with Ida. The district court had awarded fees based only on Alfonso being the "prevailing party," without citing a legal basis, without making required findings, and without addressing the income disparity between the parties. The statutes Alfonso relied on did not fit the situation, and the order lumped fees and costs together without saying how much was which, making it impossible to review. The Court of Appeals reversed that award and sent it back as well.