BENTON VS. CLOUTIER (FAMILY)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The Court of Appeals reviewed the district court's interpretation of caselaw de novo, citing LVMPD v. Blackjack Bonding, 131 Nev. 80, 85, 343 P.3d 608, 612 (2015). The court set out the governing framework for dividing jointly held real property between unmarried cotenants. Under NRS 111.065(1), joint tenancy in real property may be created by transfer from a sole owner to himself or herself and others. Any joint tenant may bring a partition action under NRS 39.010. Under Sack v. Tomlin, 110 Nev. 204, 213, 871 P.2d 298, 304 (1994), cotenants are presumed to share property equally "unless circumstances indicate otherwise," and "[u]nequal contributions toward acquisition of property by cotenants who are not related and show no donative intent can rebut the presumption of equal shares." If rebutted, fractional shares are based on each party's contribution. Langevin v. York, 111 Nev. 1481, 907 P.2d 981 (1995), extended the Sack presumptions to joint tenants. The court relied principally on Howard v. Hughes, 134 Nev. 664, 667-68, 427 P.3d 1045, 1048-49 (2018), in which the Nevada Supreme Court applied the Sack and Langevin presumptions to unmarried joint tenants and held that "the initial presumption that cotenants share equally must first be successfully rebutted through evidence of lack of relatedness or donative intent, prior to the court dividing the property or proceeds in proportion to each party's contributions." The court described Howard's approved burden-shifting structure: (1) begin with the presumption that joint tenants share equally; (2) the party seeking unequal division may rebut that presumption with evidence such as paying the entire purchase price; (3) once rebutted, that party is presumed to be full owner and the burden shifts to the opposing party to prove the parties were related or that the owner possessed sufficient donative intent; and the Howard district court found "clear and convincing evidence of [appellant's] donative intent at the time of the transfer." Applying this framework, the court found two problems. First, although the district court made findings about the parties' respective contributions and the lack of donative intent, it did not expressly analyze the parties' interests under the Sack/Langevin/Howard burden-shifting framework, and it referenced a presumption only insofar as it found Benton "did not meet the presumption that the parties intended to share equally in the value of [the property.]" Because the parties held the property as joint tenants, the district court was required to begin with the presumption of equal sharing per Howard, 134 Nev. at 667-68, 427 P.3d at 1048. The court could not discern whether the presumptions and burdens were properly applied, requiring reversal under Soido-Allesio v. Ferguson, 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 9, 565 P.3d 842, 850 (Ct. App. 2025), which explains that an error is reversible if "we cannot conclude that the result would have been the same if the error had not occurred." Second, the court held the district court applied the wrong standard of proof — preponderance of the evidence rather than clear and convincing evidence. Cloutier conceded the wrong standard was used but argued harmless error. The court rejected the harmlessness argument, noting that Howard referenced the district court's application of the clear and convincing standard, 134 Nev. at 668, 427 P.3d at 1048-49, and citing Graham v. Graham, 104 Nev. 472, 474, 760 P.2d 772, 773 (1988) (conveyance of title creates a presumption of intent to gift, overcome only by clear and convincing evidence), and Monzo v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. (In re Irrevocable Trust Agreement of 1979), 130 Nev. 597, 607, 331 P.3d 881, 888 (2014). Because clear and convincing evidence "is beyond a mere preponderance of the evidence," Albert H. Wohlers & Co. v. Bartgis, 114 Nev. 1249, 1260 n.4, 969 P.2d 949, 957 n.4 (1998), and because it was not clear the district court would have reached the same conclusion under the correct standard, reversal was warranted. The court cited In re Guardianship of B.A.A.R., 136 Nev. 494, 500, 474 P.3d 838, 844 (Ct. App. 2020), and Wyeth v. Rowatt, 126 Nev. 446, 465, 244 P.3d 765, 778 (2010), on the harmless-error standard. The court did not separately address the parties' remaining arguments, concluding they did not present a basis for relief or need not be addressed given the resolution.

In plain language

Robert Benton and Jacqueline Cloutier were never married but were in a relationship and had two children together. In July 2016, Cloutier bought a house at 475 S. Chesapeake Way from Benton's parents, taking the deed and mortgage in her name alone. The couple lived in the home together. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Cloutier — a cosmetologist who was struggling financially — refinanced the house. As part of that 2021 refinance, the property was transferred from Cloutier's name alone into both parties' names as unmarried joint tenants (a form of co-ownership). Cloutier pulled out about $98,831.65 from the refinance, and Benton received roughly half of that money (about $49,415). The parties later transferred the home into a jointly held trust, the "JnB Trust," with both of them named as trustees. When the relationship ended, Cloutier went to court in September 2023 asking, among other things, to have the property divided. The two disagreed about how much each one owned. Benton said that because they held the home as joint tenants, Cloutier had to prove that she did not intend to give him an equal share. He pointed to mortgage payments he said he made and money he transferred to Cloutier, and argued he was entitled to an equal half. Cloutier said she made the down payment and most of the mortgage payments, that she only added Benton to qualify for the refinance, and that she therefore deserved the property. After a hearing, the district court found that Cloutier's mortgage contributions far exceeded Benton's and that Benton had not shown Cloutier intended to give him half the equity. Using a "preponderance of the evidence" standard (meaning more likely than not), the court awarded Cloutier almost 96 percent and Benton the rest. The Court of Appeals reversed. It explained that under Nevada law, when people own property as joint tenants, a court must start with the presumption that they share equally, and then work through a specific step-by-step (burden-shifting) framework to decide if that presumption is overcome. The appeals court could not tell from the district court's order whether it had followed that framework correctly. The appeals court also held that the district court used the wrong standard of proof: the law requires "clear and convincing evidence" — a higher bar than preponderance — to overcome the presumptions on jointly held property. Even though Cloutier argued the mistake didn't matter because she had presented strong enough evidence anyway, the court concluded it could not say the outcome would have been the same under the correct standard. The case was sent back to the district court to redo the analysis properly.