BLAICH VS. BLAICH (CHILD CUSTODY)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The court conducts de novo review of the district court's conclusions of law. SIIS v. United Exposition Services Co., 109 Nev. 28, 30, 846 P.2d 294, 295 (1993). It first held that Christine's reply memorandum was timely under EDCR 5.25(d) because it was filed more than five days before the scheduled hearing, so the district court erred in striking it as a fugitive document. On the merits, the court held that NRS 125A.350 applies to a parent sharing joint custody who seeks to move out of state, and that the district court erred in concluding it could not address the relocation motion without first awarding the moving parent primary physical custody. That approach conflated the change-of-custody best-interest standard under NRS 125.510(2) with the relocation analysis. Following McGuinness v. McGuinness, 114 Nev. 1431, 970 P.2d 1074 (1998), the court held that all motions to relocate must be analyzed under Schwartz v. Schwartz, 107 Nev. 378, 812 P.2d 1268 (1991), and its progeny, regardless of the nature of the custody arrangement. Under that framework, the moving parent must make a threshold showing of a sensible, good-faith reason (an 'actual advantage'), after which the court weighs the Schwartz factors, focusing on the availability of reasonable alternative visitation; if reasonable alternative visitation is possible, the burden shifts to the noncustodial parent to show concrete, material reasons the move is contrary to the child's best interests. Jones v. Jones, 110 Nev. 1253, 1263, 1266, 885 P.2d 563, 570, 572 (1994). A district court may not deny removal solely to maintain the existing visitation pattern. Gandee v. Gandee, 111 Nev. 754, 761, 895 P.2d 1285, 1289 (1995); Trent v. Trent, 111 Nev. 309, 315, 890 P.2d 1309, 1312 (1995). The court concluded Christine appeared to have made the required showings and that the district court failed to apply the correct law, reversed, and remanded for reevaluation of both parents' motions.

In plain language

Christine and Stephen Blaich divorced and shared joint legal and physical custody of their daughter, McKenzie. Christine received a job offer in Dallas, Texas, that she believed would advance her career and improve life for her and McKenzie. When Stephen refused to consent to the move, Christine asked the district court for permission to relocate. Stephen countered by asking for primary physical custody. The district court denied Christine's relocation motion and gave Stephen primary physical custody, reasoning that Christine first had to prove it was in the child's best interest for her to have primary custody before it would even consider the move. It also struck Christine's reply brief as untimely. The Supreme Court reversed. First, it held Christine's reply was timely under the local rule (EDCR 5.25(d)), because it was filed more than five days before the scheduled hearing, so the district court erred in striking it. Second, and more importantly, the Court held that Nevada's relocation statute (NRS 125A.350) applies to parents who share joint custody, not just to parents with primary physical custody. The district court was wrong to require Christine to win primary custody before it would consider her request to move. The Court explained that all relocation motions must be analyzed under the Schwartz framework and its follow-on cases (like Jones and Trent), regardless of the custody arrangement. That framework asks whether the moving parent has a sensible, good-faith reason to move and then focuses on whether reasonable alternate visitation is possible; a court may not deny a move solely to preserve the existing visitation pattern. The Court found Christine appeared to have made the required showings (career advancement, a better environment, honorable motives, and a workable alternate visitation plan), and criticized the practice of using NRS 125A.350 to 'chain' custodial parents, most often women, to Nevada. Because the district court applied the wrong legal standard, the Court reversed and remanded for reevaluation under the proper standard.