BLOUNT VS. BLOUNT (CHILD CUSTODY)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

This is a matter of first impression interpreting NRS 125A.465, Nevada's UCCJEA registration provision. The court applied de facto plain-meaning statutory construction, citing Washoe Med. Ctr. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 122 Nev. 1298, 1302, 148 P.3d 790, 792-93 (2006), and Stockmeier v. Psychological Review Panel, 122 Nev. 534, 539, 135 P.3d 807, 810 (2006). The statutory framework: NRS 125A.465(1) permits registration of a foreign child custody determination upon compliance with statutory requirements, including service of notice on "any parent or person acting as a parent who has been awarded custody or visitation in the child custody determination sought to be registered." NRS 125A.465(1)(c); see also NRS 125A.465(4). The notice must inform the recipient of the 20-day window and the consequences of failing to contest. NRS 125A.465(5). NRS 125A.465(6) requires a contesting party to "request a hearing within 20 days after service of the notice." If no timely hearing is requested, "the registration is confirmed as a matter of law." NRS 125A.465(7). Confirmation "precludes further contest of the order with respect to any matter that could have been asserted at the time of registration." NRS 125A.465(8). The UCCJEA applies to tribes pursuant to NRS 125A.215(2)-(3). The court found the statutory language plain and unambiguous and bolstered its reading with the UCCJEA official commentary (UCCJEA § 305 cmt., 9 pt. IA U.L.A. 550 (2019)), which describes registration as "a simple registration procedure that can be used to predetermine the enforceability of a custody determination" and cross-references the parallel UIFSA provision (UIFSA § 605 cmt., 9 pt. IB U.L.A. 347). The court surveyed sister-jurisdiction authority strictly applying the 20-day deadline, including In re T.C. v. A.C., No. CN05-03786, 2013 WL 8290632 (Del. Fam. Ct. Dec. 18, 2013); Shue v. McAuley, No. 1649, 2017 WL 4117882 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Sept. 15, 2017); and Cook v. Arimitsu, 907 N.W.2d 233 (Minn. Ct. App. 2018). The court distinguished cases that declined to apply analogous deadlines: Washington v. Thompson, 6 S.W.3d 82 (Ark. 1999) (defective notice), and Largent v. Largent, 192 P.3d 130 (Wyo. 2008) (relief under rules paralleling NRCP 55 and NRCP 60). Justin and Stephanie did not allege defective notice content or seek NRCP 55/60 relief below, and the court declined to consider arguments not raised below per Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown, 97 Nev. 49, 52, 623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981). Majority UIFSA authority strictly applying analogous deadlines was also cited: In re Marriage of Sawyer, 271 Cal. Rptr. 3d 627 (Ct. App. 2020); Dep't of Human Res. v. Mitchell, 12 A.3d 179 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011); Tepper v. Hoch, 536 S.E.2d 654 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000); Smith v. Hall, 707 N.W.2d 247 (N.D. 2005). Significantly, the court distinguished Friedman v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 127 Nev. 842, 852, 264 P.3d 1161, 1168 (2011), and similar authority (Holly C. v. Tohono O'odham Nation, 452 P.3d 725 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2019); Miller v. Mills, 64 So. 3d 1023 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011); Blanchette v. Blanchette, 476 S.W.3d 273 (Mo. 2015)), noting those cases either did not involve or did not address the 20-day registration deadline. Thus, the principle that UCCJEA jurisdiction cannot be created by consent, estoppel, or waiver does not override the statutory time bar in NRS 125A.465. Application: Justin's challenge filed on day 24 was untimely; Stephanie's challenge filed in August 2020 was also untimely, and in any event Stephanie was not entitled to notice under NRS 125A.465(1)(c) and (4) because the Tribal Court had not awarded her custody or visitation. The three principal appellate arguments - lack of UCCJEA jurisdiction, a superseding order, and defective notice in the issuing court - are precisely the grounds enumerated in NRS 125A.465(6) and thus "could have been asserted at the time of registration" within the meaning of NRS 125A.465(8). The court reserved judgment on potential interplay between NRS 125A.465 and NRS 127.160 (rights and duties of adopted children and adoptive parents) and NRS 127.171 (post-adoption visitation by relatives), noting the parties did not raise these statutes. The court also observed that the UCCJEA does "not govern adoption proceedings" under NRS 125A.205. The court affirmed on alternative grounds pursuant to Rosenstein v. Steele, 103 Nev. 571, 575, 747 P.2d 230, 233 (1987). The court further noted, citing Ozawa v. Vision Airlines, Inc., 125 Nev. 556, 563, 216 P.3d 788, 793 (2009), that it could have treated appellants' failure to respond to Paula's waiver argument as a confession of error, but reached the merits consistent with the policy preference articulated in Huckabay Props., Inc. v. NC Auto Parts, LLC, 130 Nev. 196, 202, 322 P.3d 429, 433 (2014).

In plain language

This case involves a custody fight between a father (Justin Blount), his wife (Stephanie Blount), and the children's paternal grandmother (Paula Blount). The children's biological mother, who was a member of the Hualapai Tribe, had originally been awarded temporary custody by the Tribal Court in Arizona. After she passed away, the Tribal Court returned custody to Justin, and the children moved to Nevada with him and Stephanie in 2017. In 2019, a Nevada court entered a decree of adoption declaring Justin and Stephanie the children's legal parents. The grandmother, Paula, then went back to the Tribal Court in late 2019 seeking grandparent visitation. After a hearing that Justin did not attend, the Tribal Court entered an order in January 2020 granting joint custody to Paula and Justin. Paula then sought to "register" that Tribal Court order in Nevada - a procedure under Nevada law that makes an out-of-state custody order enforceable here. Justin's attorney was served with notice of the registration request on April 6, 2020. Under Nevada's version of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), a person who wants to fight registration of an out-of-state custody order has 20 days to request a hearing. Justin filed his challenge on day 24 - four days late. Stephanie filed hers months later. The district court confirmed the Tribal Court order, and Justin and Stephanie appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that the 20-day deadline in NRS 125A.465 means what it says: if you don't challenge registration within 20 days of receiving notice, the foreign order is automatically registered "as a matter of law," and you lose the ability to raise challenges that you could have raised during that 20-day window. Because Justin and Stephanie missed the deadline, the court did not reach the merits of their objections to the Tribal Court order - including their arguments that the Tribal Court lacked jurisdiction, that another order superseded it, and that proper notice was not given. The court also noted that Stephanie was not legally entitled to notice of the registration request because the Tribal Court had never awarded her custody or visitation. The court expressly noted that the 2019 Nevada adoption decree was not before it on appeal and that the UCCJEA does "not govern adoption proceedings." The court acknowledged that other Nevada statutes addressing adoption and post-adoption visitation could potentially conflict with the registration statute, but because the parties did not raise those statutes, the court expressed no opinion on the issue.