BUCHANAN VS. BREWER (CHILD CUSTODY)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

• -Child custody determinations, including a decision denying a motion for relocation, are reviewed for abuse of discretion, which occurs when the decision is not supported by substantial evidence or is clearly erroneous.
• -NRS 125C.007 (and NRS 125C.006 and NRS 125C.0065) apply only where physical custody has been established pursuant to a prior order, judgment, or decree; where no such order exists, a district court may nonetheless use the statutory relocation framework as a guide.
• -Where no standing custody order exists, the district court must determine whether the moving parent established a sensible, good faith reason for the move, then apply the Druckman/Schwartz relocation factors, and must base its decision on the child's best interest.
• -The party who wishes to relocate bears the burden of proving that relocation is in the child's best interest.
• -When the best-interest factors stand in equipoise, the relocating parent has not met the burden of demonstrating that relocation is in the child's best interest.
• -A reviewing court is not at liberty to reweigh the evidence on appeal, and Nevada does not mandate that any best-interest factor be given controlling weight, leaving the weighting to the district court's discretion.

Practitioner summary

The Court of Appeals reviewed the district court's child custody and relocation determination for abuse of discretion. Flynn v. Flynn, 120 Nev. 486, 92 P.3d 1224 (2004); Johnson v. Bennett, 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 35, 575 P.3d 1023 (Ct. App. 2025). "An abuse of discretion occurs when a district court's decision is not supported by substantial evidence or is clearly erroneous." Johnson, 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 35, 575 P.3d at 1027 (citing Bautista v. Picone, 134 Nev. 334, 419 P.3d 157 (2018)). The reviewing court "is not at liberty to weigh the evidence anew," and conflicting evidence is construed with all favorable inferences drawn toward the prevailing party. Quintero v. McDonald, 116 Nev. 1181, 14 P.3d 522 (2000) (citing Yamaha Motor Co. v. Arnoult, 114 Nev. 233, 955 P.2d 661 (1998)). The court reiterated that a pending motion to relocate must be considered when making an initial permanent custody determination. McGuinness v. McGuinness, 114 Nev. 1431, 970 P.2d 1074 (1998). Both the relocation request and the initial permanent custody determination must be grounded in the child's best interest. Druckman v. Ruscitti, 130 Nev. 468, 327 P.3d 511 (2014); NRS 125C.0035(1). The court quoted Soldo-Allesio v. Ferguson, 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 9, 565 P.3d 842 (Ct. App. 2025), noting that the best-interest inquiry is "designed to place the child's welfare and developmental needs at the forefront of all child custody decisions." A court "cannot adequately evaluate a child's best interest in the custody determination without considering the circumstances of the relocation request." Druckman, 130 Nev. at 474, 327 P.3d at 515. The relocating party bears the burden of proving relocation is in the child's best interest. Johnson, 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 35, 575 P.3d at 1031. The court identified a statutory-applicability point: NRS 125C.007 did not govern Madison's relocation request because there was no prior permanent custody order, as NRS 125C.006 and NRS 125C.0065 apply only where physical custody "has been established pursuant to an order, judgment or decree." See Druckman, 130 Nev. at 472-73, 327 P.3d at 514 (holding NRS 125C.200, the predecessor to NRS 125C.007, applies only where there is a prior custody determination). Nonetheless, the district court properly used NRS 125C.007 as guidance, consistent with Druckman's recognition that the statutory relocation framework may be used "as a guide in instances where no custodial order exists and the parents dispute . . . relocation." See also NRS 125C.0065(1). Where no standing custody order exists, the district court must first determine whether the moving parent established a "sensible, good faith reason for the move." Druckman, 130 Nev. at 473, 327 P.3d at 515. If satisfied, the court then applies the multi-factor analysis set out in Druckman and Schwartz v. Schwartz, 107 Nev. 378, 812 P.2d 1268 (1991), addressing (1) improvement to quality of life for child and custodial parent; (2) whether the custodial parent's motives are honorable; (3) compliance with substitute visitation orders; (4) whether the noncustodial parent's opposition motives are honorable; and (5) whether a realistic opportunity exists to preserve the noncustodial parent's relationship through a parenting-time schedule. Applying this framework, the district court found Madison's relocation reason sensible and in good faith (her marriage and her mother-in-law's cancer diagnosis), and that she did not seek to deprive Corey of parenting time. See NRS 125C.007(1)(a); Druckman; Schwartz. It found Corey's opposition honorable and not financially motivated, and did not doubt Madison would comply with custody orders. However, applying the best-interest factors of NRS 125C.0035(4), the district court found the factors in equipoise: both parents were equally likely to allow associations (NRS 125C.0035(4)(c)); the conflict level was low and the parties cooperated (NRS 125C.0035(4)(d), (e)); Corey's past drug use did not rise to addiction and his recovery efforts were commendable (NRS 125C.0035(4)(f)); both parents met A.B.'s physical needs and had good relationships with A.B. (NRS 125C.0035(4)(g), (h)); and the sibling-relationship factor did not weigh in Madison's favor because she raised it only recently, though the parenting agreement and cooperation provided opportunity to bond (NRS 125C.0035(4)(i)). Because the best-interest factors stood equal, the district court concluded Madison failed to meet her burden to show relocation was in A.B.'s best interest. NRS 125C.007(1), (3); Johnson, 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 35, 575 P.3d at 1031. The court specifically found that the tenuousness of A.B.'s new relationship with Madison's husband and his family did not outweigh the strength of A.B.'s established relationships and support network in Las Vegas. The Court of Appeals held these findings were supported by substantial evidence. Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 161 P.3d 239 (2007); Druckman, 130 Nev. at 474, 327 P.3d at 515. Addressing Madison's challenge to the weighing of evidence, the court held it could not reweigh evidence on appeal. Grosjean v. Imperial Palace, Inc., 125 Nev. 349, 212 P.3d 1068 (2009); Roberts v. Andrino, No. 89438, 2025 WL 3119014 (Nev. Nov. 4, 2025) (Order of Affirmance) (recognizing Nevada does not mandate controlling weight for any factor and allows the district court discretion in weighting factors). The court concluded Madison failed to overcome the presumption that the district court properly exercised its discretion. Flynn, 120 Nev. at 440, 92 P.3d at 1226-27. In a footnote, the court noted it considered Madison's arguments concerning the NRS 125C.007(2) factors and harmless error but concluded they provided no basis for relief given the abuse-of-discretion conclusion.

In plain language

Madison Buchanan and Corey Brewer were never married but had a child together, A.B., born in June 2020 in Las Vegas. After their romantic relationship ended in July 2022, they informally shared joint legal and physical custody of A.B. without a court order. Circumstances changed when Madison's now-husband accepted a job in Reno in June 2024 to be closer to his mother, who had been diagnosed with cancer. Madison then accepted her own job in Reno with an earlier start date, moving up her planned relocation to the end of October 2024. In response, Corey filed an amended complaint seeking joint legal and physical custody. Madison asked the court to set a temporary custody schedule and to allow her to relocate with A.B. to Reno. The parties went through mediation and agreed on some matters — they agreed to share joint legal custody and worked out schedules for holidays, vacations, and school breaks. But they could not agree on physical custody and relocation, so the district court held a trial where both parents testified. The testimony covered how they had shared custody, Corey's past drug use and his recovery efforts, the family support networks in both Las Vegas and Reno, Madison's better-paying Reno job and belief that Reno had better schools, and Madison's pregnancy and the chance for A.B. to spend more time with siblings. The district court decided that both parents were essentially equal when it came to what was best for A.B. Because the parent who wants to move must prove that moving is in the child's best interest, and because the court found the best-interest factors were evenly balanced (a "tie"), Madison did not carry that burden. The court denied her request to move and gave Corey primary physical custody. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reviewed the decision under an "abuse of discretion" standard — meaning it would not overturn the district court simply because it might have decided differently, but only if the decision lacked support in the evidence or was clearly wrong. The appeals court explained that because there was no prior permanent custody order in this case, the relocation statute the district court cited did not technically govern, but the district court was permitted to use that framework as a guide. The court found that the district court had properly considered whether Madison had a good reason to move (it found she did), and then weighed the child's best interest using the statutory best-interest factors. Because the district court's findings were supported by substantial evidence, and because the appeals court is not allowed to re-weigh the evidence itself, it affirmed the district court's decision.