BUCK VS. BUCK

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

Standard of review. The court reviewed the district court's property characterization and disposition for abuse of discretion. Kogod v. Cioffi-Kogod, 135 Nev. 64, 75, 439 P.3d 397, 406 (2019). "An abuse of discretion occurs when a district court's decision is not supported by substantial evidence or is clearly erroneous." Bautista v. Picone, 134 Nev. 334, 336, 419 P.3d 157, 159 (2018). Substantial evidence is evidence "a sensible person may accept as adequate to sustain a judgment." Williams v. Williams, 120 Nev. 559, 566, 97 P.3d 1124, 1129 (2004). Community property presumption and commingling (Tomnitz, Roping 1, Roping 2). Property acquired during marriage is presumed community property, rebuttable only by clear and convincing evidence. Pascua v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC, 135 Nev. 29, 32, 434 P.3d 287, 289-90 (2019). Once separate funds are commingled with community funds, the separate-property claimant bears the burden to rebut the presumption that all funds in the account are community. Malmquist v. Malmquist, 106 Nev. 231, 245, 792 P.2d 372, 381 (1990). The community presumption "gains strength when any claimed separate property has been extensively intermingled with community property." Lucini v. Lucini, 97 Nev. 213, 215, 626 P.2d 269, 271 (1981). The court found substantial evidence that the parties' joint accounts were significantly commingled - reflecting transfers from separately titled accounts, community credit-card cash advances, payroll deposits of marital wages, and community cash infusions - and that down payments for all three properties came from joint accounts. Reginald's tracing evidence was insufficient. See Robison v. Robison, 100 Nev. 668, 670, 691 P.2d 451, 453 (1984). The court rejected Reginald's argument that Billie had judicially admitted Tomnitz was his separate property in her pretrial memorandum, citing Reyburn Lawn & Landscape Designers, Inc. v. Plaster Dev. Co., 127 Nev. 331, 343, 255 P.3d 268, 276 (2011), and Allen v. Webb, 87 Nev. 261, 266, 485 P.2d 677, 680 (1971). Malmquist apportionment (Ocean Harbor, Horizon, Durango). Malmquist supplies the formula for "apportion[ing] the community and separate property shares in the appreciation of a separate property residence obtained with a separate property loan prior to marriage." 106 Nev. at 238, 792 P.2d at 376. The court found substantial evidence supporting (i) the district court's use of net sale proceeds and the proper number of community payments for Ocean Harbor; (ii) a $33,845.93 community improvement figure for Horizon, excluding maintenance, tax, interest, insurance, and inflation adjustments; and (iii) attribution of the second installment payment on Durango to the community because it was paid from the joint account. The parties' invitation to revisit Kerley v. Kerley, 111 Nev. 462, 893 P.2d 358 (1995), was declined; its progeny supports Malmquist apportionment of gifted properties acquired during marriage where community contributions are made. See Kerley v. Kerley, 112 Nev. 36, 37, 910 P.2d 279, 280 (1996). The disposition standard from Schwartz v. Schwartz, 126 Nev. 87, 90, 225 P.3d 1273, 1275 (2010) (quoting Wolff v. Wolff, 112 Nev. 1355, 1359, 929 P.2d 96, 919 (1996)), supported deference. Unequal disposition of 401(k). Under NRS 125.150(1)(b), an equal division of community property is required absent a "compelling reason." Kogod, 135 Nev. at 75, 439 P.3d at 406. Dissipation or waste qualifies as a compelling reason. Id.; Lofgren v. Lofgren, 112 Nev. 1282, 1283, 926 P.2d 296, 297 (1996). Substantial evidence showed Reginald used community funds and depleted his own 401(k) to support a new family before the decree, supporting unequal disposition awarding Billie her full 401(k). Kogod, 135 Nev. at 77, 439 P.3d at 407. Inter-spousal quitclaim deeds (cross-appeal). A spouse-to-spouse conveyance of real property creates a presumption of gift, rebuttable only by clear and convincing evidence; the contributing spouse bears the burden. Kerley, 112 Nev. at 37, 910 P.2d at 280. The community-property presumption can be overcome by a valid deed describing a different ownership form. Forrest v. Forrest, 99 Nev. 602, 605, 668 P.2d 275, 278 (1983). The district court properly treated the quitclaimed properties as Reginald's separate property gifts. The court distinguished In re Marriage of Haines, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 673, 684, 689 (Ct. App. 1995), noting record evidence that both parties had sophisticated real-estate knowledge and used quitclaim deeds to insulate marital assets from civil attachment, and the absence of duress. Spousal support. Reviewed for abuse of discretion. Schwartz, 126 Nev. at 90, 225 P.3d at 1275. Substantial evidence - parties' similar ages, occupations, tax records, and independent ability to meet individual needs - supported denial. See Applebaum v. Applebaum, 93 Nev. 382, 386, 566 P.2d 85, 88 (1977). Cut-off date for valuation. The entry of a written divorce decree dissolves the marriage and terminates the community; the cut-off date for disposing of community property is the date the written decree is issued. Kogod, 135 Nev. at 79, 439 P.3d at 409. Kogod's discussion of intermediary-period appreciation - between an oral pronouncement and the later written decree - did not apply because the district court here entered a written decree on November 21, 2021, locking in each property's characterization and appraised value. The district court therefore did not err in declining to consider Billie's post-decree appraisals.

In plain language

Reginald and Billie Buck married in 2010 and acquired a number of real estate holdings during their marriage. When they divorced, the trial court had to decide which properties were "community property" (jointly owned by both spouses and split equally on divorce) and which were the "separate property" of one spouse. The trial court ruled that three properties - referred to in the opinion as Tomnitz, Roping 1, and Roping 2 - were community property to be divided equally. For several other properties, the court applied a Nevada formula (from a case called Malmquist) that mathematically apportions the community's and the separate owner's shares when separate-property real estate has been improved or paid down with marital funds. The court also awarded Billie her entire 401(k) retirement account and denied spousal support to either spouse. Both spouses appealed. Reginald argued that he had put his own pre-marital money into Tomnitz, Roping 1, and Roping 2 and should get a separate-property share of each. The Nevada Supreme Court rejected this, explaining that property bought during marriage is presumed to belong to the community, and that Reginald's separate funds had been so thoroughly mixed into the couple's joint bank accounts that he could not trace them out. Reginald also disputed the math on three other properties (Ocean Harbor, Horizon, and Durango); the Supreme Court found the trial court's calculations supported by the evidence. On Reginald's challenge to the 401(k) award, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that Reginald had spent down community funds and his own retirement account to support a new family before the divorce was final. Nevada law allows a judge to make an unequal property split when one spouse has wasted marital assets, and the Court held that rule was properly applied here. On Billie's cross-appeal, she argued that some properties Reginald had been given by quitclaim deed during the marriage should still be treated as community property. The Court explained that under Nevada law, when one spouse signs a deed transferring property to the other spouse, the law presumes a gift, and only clear and convincing evidence can defeat that presumption. The trial court found no such evidence here. Billie also argued she should get spousal support, but the Court held that because both spouses had similar earning capacity and could each cover their own needs, denying support was within the trial court's discretion. Finally, Billie wanted the trial court to use new property appraisals done after the divorce decree was entered. The Court explained that under Nevada law, the marriage and the community both end when the written divorce decree is issued, so the values fixed at that date control. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court in all respects.