CAMBRA VS. LANDINO (CHILD CUSTODY)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The Court of Appeals reviewed the custody and relocation determinations for abuse of discretion (Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 149, 161 P.3d 239, 241 (2007); Flynn v. Flynn, 120 Nev. 436, 440 n.6, 92 P.3d 1224, 1227 n.6 (2004)), declining to disturb factual findings unless clearly erroneous or unsupported by substantial evidence (Ogawa v. Ogawa, 125 Nev. 660, 668, 221 P.3d 699, 704 (2009)). Substantial evidence is that which a reasonable person may conclude is adequate to sustain a judgment (Ellis, 123 Nev. at 149, 161 P.3d at 242). The sole consideration in a custody determination is the best interest of the child (NRS 125C.0035(1); Davis v. Ewalefo, 131 Nev. 445, 451, 352 P.3d 1139, 1143 (2015)), and the court presumed the district court properly exercised its discretion (Flynn, 120 Nev. at 440, 92 P.3d at 1226-27). The court found the district court entered a detailed 17-page order analyzing the best interest factors under NRS 125C.0035(4), finding they favored Landino or were neutral, unproven, or inapplicable (see Lewis v. Lewis, 132 Nev. 453, 459-60, 373 P.3d 878, 882 (2016)). Characterizing Cambra's core argument as a request to reweigh conflicting evidence, the court declined to reweigh evidence or reassess witness credibility on appeal (Quintero v. McDonald, 116 Nev. 1181, 1183, 14 P.3d 522, 523 (2000); Ellis, 123 Nev. at 152, 161 P.3d at 244), and instead applied deferential review focused on whether the district court "reached its conclusions for the appropriate legal reasons" and whether its factual findings were "supported by substantial evidence" (Ellis, 123 Nev. at 149, 161 P.3d at 241-42). On the domestic violence question, the court noted the district court found Cambra failed to establish domestic violence by either a preponderance or clear and convincing evidence (Mack v. Ashlock, 112 Nev. 1062, 1066, 921 P.2d 1258, 1261 (1996) (preponderance standard governs civil matters, including custody); but see NRS 125C.0035(5) (clear and convincing evidence of domestic violence creates a rebuttable presumption against sole or joint custody with the perpetrator)). The court acknowledged two factual inaccuracies - misdescribing the child's half-brother as a stepbrother (relevant to NRS 125C.0035(4)(i)) and an incorrect finding about disclosure of a prior dissolved TPO (relevant to NRS 125C.0035(4)(k)) - but held the overall domestic violence determination was supported by substantial evidence notwithstanding these minor inaccuracies, and that Cambra had not shown the overall custody determination was incorrect (Flynn, 120 Nev. at 440, 92 P.3d at 1226-27). The court also required specific findings and adequate explanation for custody determinations under Davis, 131 Nev. at 452, 352 P.3d at 1143. Cambra's evidentiary and scheduling arguments were rejected as inadequately developed under Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006). Regarding SCR 251's six-month rule, the court noted the trial was continued by stipulation for psychological evaluations and that, although the district court did not make contemporaneous findings, it later explained the continuance and rescheduled to adhere to SCR 251's policies; the court discerned no prejudice (cf. NRCP 61). Cambra's judicial-bias argument failed under Canarelli v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 138 Nev. 104, 107, 506 P.3d 334, 337 (2022), In re Petition to Recall Dunleavy, 104 Nev. 784, 789, 769 P.2d 1271, 1275 (1988), and Roe v. Roe, 139 Nev., Adv. Op. 21, 535 P.3d 274, 291 (Ct. App. 2023), because she did not show extrajudicial bias or deep-seated favoritism or antagonism rendering fair judgment impossible. On relocation, the court held the district court acted within its discretion in deferring the relocation motion to trial (cf. MDB Trucking, LLC v. Versa Prods. Co., 136 Nev. 626, 630, 475 P.3d 397, 403 (2020)), and that Cambra failed to present pertinent evidence at trial under the Druckman framework (Druckman v. Ruscitti, 130 Nev. 468, 473-74, 327 P.3d 511, 515 (2014); see also Shahrokhi v. Burrow, Nos. 81978, 82245, & 83726, 2022 WL 1509740, at *8 (Nev. May 12, 2022)). By awarding joint physical custody, the district court effectively denied the relocation request (Druckman, 130 Nev. at 473, 327 P.3d at 515). The court rejected Cambra's Indian Child Welfare Act argument, holding the ICWA's definition of "child custody proceeding" does not apply to a custody dispute between the parents (25 U.S.C. § 1911; 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1); Mitchell v. Preston, 439 P.3d 718, 723 (Wyo. 2019); Starr v. George, 175 P.3d 50, 54 (Alaska 2008)). The court added that in almost all relocation cases the district court should analyze the appropriate relocation factors whether the issue is governed by NRS 125C.007 or Druckman. On child support, reviewed for abuse of discretion (Edgington v. Edgington, 119 Nev. 577, 588, 80 P.3d 1282, 1290 (2003)), with factual findings undisturbed if supported by substantial evidence (Miller v. Miller, 134 Nev. 120, 125, 412 P.3d 1081, 1085 (2018); Ellis, 123 Nev. at 149, 161 P.3d at 242), the court found Landino's testimony and financial disclosure form constituted substantial evidence for the $7,001 gross monthly income finding. The downward adjustment for medical insurance was authorized under NAC 425.100(3)(a)-(b), with the base obligation of $780 per month correctly calculated under NAC 425.140 and NAC 425.115(3), and the $102 adjustment (one-half of the $204 monthly medical insurance payment) supported by NAC 425.150(1). On arrears, the court applied Hung v. Genting Berhad, 138 Nev., Adv. Op. 50, 513 P.3d 1285, 1288 (Ct. App. 2022): because the district court gave independent alternate grounds (the $45,000 withdrawal and Landino's voluntary support payments) and Cambra challenged only one, the ruling was affirmed. However, the court flagged that the $45,000 finding must be revisited on remand in connection with the property disputes. On the dependency tax exemption, reviewed for abuse of discretion (Sertic v. Sertic, 111 Nev. 1192, 1197, 901 P.2d 148, 151 (1995)), the court explained that under 26 U.S.C. § 152(e)(4)(A) the custodial parent is "the parent having custody for the greater portion of the calendar year," but 26 U.S.C. § 152(e)(2) permits the custodial parent to waive the credit to the noncustodial parent. Following Sertic, the court affirmed the alternating allocation commencing with Landino in 2022 given the waiver provision and the district court's broad discretion, but directed the district court on remand to require the parties to execute the necessary waiver documentation (Sertic, 111 Nev. at 1198, 901 P.2d at 151; Miller v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 184, 196 (T.C. 2006)). On the property disputes, reviewed de novo (In re Aboud, 129 Nev. 915, 921, 314 P.3d 941, 945 (2013)), the court held the district court's determination that it lacked jurisdiction was erroneous. The Ninth Judicial District Court is a court of general jurisdiction with original jurisdiction in all cases outside the jurisdiction of justice courts (Nev. Const. art. 6, § 6(1); NRS 3.019; NRS 3.0105; Landreth v. Malik, 127 Nev. 175, 177, 185-86, 251 P.3d 163, 164, 169-70 (2011)). The court reversed and remanded for adjudication of the property disputes. The court noted that documentation in the record not part of the pre-appeal record could not be considered (Carson Ready Mix, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank of Nev., 97 Nev. 474, 476, 635 P.2d 276, 277 (1981)), and that to the extent the district court purported to reopen the property disputes after the appeal was filed, it lacked jurisdiction to do so (Mack-Manley v. Manley, 122 Nev. 849, 855, 138 P.3d 525, 529-30 (2006)).

In plain language

Two parents who were never married had a child together. The father filed a case asking a Nevada district court to give both parents shared custody and to sort out child support and some disputed property. Around the same time, the mother obtained a temporary protection order (a court order meant to protect someone from domestic violence) against the father in a separate court, based on allegations of domestic violence. That protection-order case was moved to the district court and combined with the custody case. After a two-day hearing, the district court found the mother had not proven an act or threat of domestic violence and denied her request to extend the protection order, though it said she could still try to prove domestic violence at the custody trial. The mother then filed her own claims asking for sole custody and permission to move to Oklahoma with the child. She also asked the court to give her temporary primary custody so she could relocate. The court declined to decide that before trial. The court also decided it did not have the authority ("subject matter jurisdiction") to handle the parties' property disputes in this case, so it set those aside. After a one-day trial, the district court issued a decree awarding the parents joint legal and physical custody, set the father's child support obligation, ruled the mother was not entitled to back child support ("arrears"), and directed that the parents alternate claiming the child dependency tax exemption year by year, starting with the father in 2022. The court did not resolve the property disputes. The mother appealed. The Court of Appeals upheld most of the district court's decisions but reversed one part. On custody, the appeals court explained that it reviews custody decisions for "abuse of discretion" - meaning it will not second-guess the trial judge as long as the judge used the right legal reasons and had enough evidence. The court said the trial judge wrote a detailed 17-page order analyzing the legally required "best interest of the child" factors and that the mother's real complaint was that the judge weighed the conflicting evidence against her. An appeals court does not reweigh evidence or reassess who was more believable, so the custody award stood. The appeals court noted the trial judge made a couple of minor factual mistakes (calling the child's half-brother a stepbrother and misdescribing a prior protection order) but concluded those errors did not change the outcome. The court also rejected the mother's other custody-related arguments: that certain testimony was wrongly admitted or excluded and that last-minute scheduling changes hurt her (she did not adequately explain these points); that the judge was biased against her gender and ethnicity (she did not meet the legal standard for showing bias); and that the judge failed to consider her request to move to Oklahoma (the court effectively denied that request by ordering joint custody, and she did not present relevant evidence about the move at trial). The court also addressed and rejected her suggestion that a federal law, the Indian Child Welfare Act, required the court to grant her relocation request, explaining that the law's definition of "child custody proceeding" does not cover a custody dispute like this one. On child support, the appeals court upheld the amount, finding the father's testimony and financial disclosure form supporting a roughly $7,001 monthly income were adequate, and that the downward adjustment for his payment of the child's health insurance was authorized. On back child support, the court noted the trial judge denied it for two independent reasons, and because the mother challenged only one of them, the ruling stood. On the dependency tax exemption, the court explained that although federal law generally gives the tax benefit to the parent who has the child more of the year, it allows that parent to waive it so the other parent can claim it, and Nevada courts have broad discretion to allocate it between parents sharing joint custody. The appeals court affirmed the alternating allocation starting with the father in 2022 but directed the trial court to require the parties to sign the necessary IRS waiver paperwork on remand. The one thing the appeals court reversed was the property dispute ruling. It held that the district court was wrong to conclude it lacked jurisdiction over the parties' property disputes. The Ninth Judicial District Court is a court of general jurisdiction, and district judges have authority to hear property matters even between unmarried parties. The case was sent back for the district court to actually decide the property disputes - and, because the denial of back child support was tied partly to a finding that the mother took $45,000 from a joint account, the trial court must clarify that on remand as part of resolving the property claims.