CAMPBELL VS. CAMPBELL (DIVORCE PROPERTY & ALIMONY)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

Per Curiam. On appeal and cross-appeal from a divorce decree, the court addressed the characterization and division of marital assets. It held that under NRS 125.150(1)(b)(2), a district court may equitably (unequally) divide only property placed in joint tenancy on or after July 1, 1979; property placed in joint tenancy before that date is subject to equal division unless necessary for the support of a spouse or children under NRS 125.150(4). Because the parties took title to the residence as joint tenants in 1977, no children issued, and neither sought alimony, the district court erred in dividing the house 60/40. On the down-payment claim, the court applied the rule that separate funds used to acquire jointly titled property are presumed a gift of one-half, rebuttable only by clear and convincing evidence (Gorden v. Gorden, 93 Nev. 494, 569 P.2d 397 (1977)); the wife's uncorroborated testimony did not rebut it. On the certificate of deposit, substantial evidence showed pre-marriage acquisition, so the community-property presumption of NRS 123.220 never operated (cf. Burdick v. Pope, 90 Nev. 28, 518 P.2d 146 (1974)). On costs, the court reaffirmed that costs in a divorce and property-division proceeding are discretionary under NRS 18.050 (cf. Ormachea v. Ormachea, 67 Nev. 273, 217 P.2d 355 (1950)) and found no abuse of discretion. The court reversed the house division and remanded to allow reconsideration of the travel-agency division, affirming in all other respects.

In plain language

Thelma and Max Campbell married in Las Vegas in 1977. After about six and a half years, Thelma filed for divorce. The two main assets to divide were the couple's house and a travel agency. The trial court treated the house as if it could be split unevenly and awarded it 60/40 in Thelma's favor. On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court reversed that part of the decision. Nevada law only allows a court to divide property held in joint tenancy unequally if the property was put into joint tenancy on or after July 1, 1979. The Campbells bought and titled their house as joint tenants in 1977 - before that cutoff - so it could only be split equally (50/50), unless it was needed to support a spouse or children. There were no children and neither spouse asked for alimony, so the equal-division rule applied. The court rejected Thelma's other money claims. She wanted to be repaid for half of the $69,000 down payment she made on the house from her own funds, but the law presumes that when one spouse uses separate money to buy property held jointly, half of it was a gift to the other spouse. That presumption can only be overcome with clear and convincing evidence, and Thelma's own testimony (that Max was supposed to pay her back) was not enough - especially since she knew Max had reinvested the money from selling his California home into the couple's travel agency. She also claimed a $20,000 certificate of deposit was community property, but there was solid evidence it was acquired before the marriage, so it was correctly awarded to Max as his separate property. Max's cross-appeal argued the trial court should have made Thelma pay the cost of her deposition. The Supreme Court held that awarding costs in a divorce/property case is left to the trial judge's discretion, and Max showed no abuse of that discretion. Because the uneven split of the travel agency might have been influenced by the (now-reversed) uneven split of the house, the court sent the case back so the trial court could adjust its order.