CARLSON VS. CARLSON

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The Court of Appeals reviewed the award of attorney fees and costs for an abuse of discretion. See Miller v. Wilfong, 121 Nev. 619, 622, 119 P.3d 727, 729 (2005); Cadle Co. v. Woods & Erickson, LLP, 131 Nev. 114, 120, 345 P.3d 1049, 1054 (2015). A district court ordinarily may not award attorney fees or costs absent authority under a statute, rule, or contract. U.S. Design & Constr. Corp. v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 118 Nev. 458, 462, 50 P.3d 170, 173 (2002); Liu v. Christopher Homes, LLC, 130 Nev. 147, 151, 321 P.3d 875, 878 (2014). Generally, a court abuses its discretion when it awards fees without stating a basis for the decision. Henry Prods. Inc. v. Tarmu, 114 Nev. 1017, 1020, 967 P.2d 444, 446 (1998). However, reversal is not required even when the court fails to cite relevant authority if the basis for the award is readily apparent. Panicaro v. Robertson, 113 Nev. 667, 668, 941 P.2d 485, 485-86 (1997). Nonetheless, "deference is not owed to legal error or to findings so conclusory they may mask legal error." Davis v. Ewalefo, 131 Nev. 445, 450, 352 P.3d 1139, 1142 (2015). On the threshold waiver issue, the court applied Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown, 97 Nev. 49, 52, 623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981), and found Matthew's appellate arguments properly before it insofar as they addressed the clarity of the district court's order and matters not specifically argued in Chelsea's motion. The district court cited NRS 18.010(2)(a) and (b) and EDCR 7.60(b)(1), (3), and (4). Aside from finding Chelsea the prevailing party on the summary judgment and school selection issues, the only substantive finding relevant to any provision concerned EDCR 7.60(b)(3), which authorizes sanctions against a party who "[s]o multiplies the proceedings in a case as to increase costs unreasonably and vexatiously." The court found that Matthew's behavior - particularly attempting to withdraw requests only after Chelsea moved for summary judgment - multiplied the litigation. The Court of Appeals identified two problems. First, a fees sanction must be proportionate to the misconduct. Emerson v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 127 Nev. 672, 681-82, 263 P.3d 224, 230 (2011). Chelsea sought $54,098.69 for counsel's work over roughly 10 months spanning discovery, the summary judgment motion, the evidentiary hearing, and preparation of the settlement, yet the court awarded $45,503.17 (approximately 84 percent) without explaining the reduction, so the award did not appear proportionate to the conduct specifically identified under EDCR 7.60(b)(3). Second, because the court also cited EDCR 7.60(b)(1) (authorizing sanctions for "frivolous, unnecessary or unwarranted" motions and oppositions) and NRS 18.010(2)(b) (authorizing fees where a party maintains a claim or defense "without reasonable ground or to harass the prevailing party"), the relative merit of Matthew's requests may have factored in, but the court made no findings to that effect. Under Rivero v. Rivero, 125 Nev. 410, 441, 216 P.3d 213, 234 (2009), when awarding fees as a sanction under NRS 18.010(2)(b) or EDCR 7.60(b)(1), the court "must determine if there was any credible evidence or reasonable basis for the claim at the time of filing." The court further observed that although the district court cited NRS 18.010(2)(a) and EDCR 7.60(b)(4), it did not find Chelsea prevailed on any issue applicable to that NRS provision, nor that Matthew violated any specific EDCR provision as required for an EDCR 7.60(b)(4) sanction. The court acknowledged that Matthew's decision to settle the school selection issue mid-hearing may have factored in, given the court's prior oral caution, citing Pease v. Taylor, 86 Nev. 195, 197, 467 P.2d 109, 110 (1970) (findings may be implied where the record is clear and supports the judgment), but concluded this again implicated timing and the same lack of clarity. Unable to discern the precise basis for the award, the court reversed and remanded for additional findings. See Henry Prods., 114 Nev. at 1020, 967 P.2d at 446; Davis, 131 Nev. at 450, 352 P.3d at 1140. In doing so, the court noted Chelsea had not yet supported her motion with a counsel affidavit attesting the fees were actually and necessarily incurred and reasonable. See NRCP 54(d)(2)(B)(v).

In plain language

Matthew and Chelsea Carlson divorced under a stipulated (agreed-upon) divorce decree. Afterward, disputes arose. Matthew filed a motion asking for several things, including a request to change the school the couple's two minor children attended. Chelsea opposed that motion and made her own requests, including asking to be reimbursed for some of the children's medical expenses. Chelsea then asked the court for summary judgment - a ruling deciding claims without a full trial - on all the claims raised in the parties' motions. Matthew tried to withdraw several of his requests, but the district court granted summary judgment for Chelsea on those requests anyway, reasoning that Matthew did not withdraw them in time and that Chelsea should not have had to file for summary judgment. The court let the school-selection and medical-expenses issues, which Matthew still contested, go forward to an evidentiary hearing. On the second day of that hearing, the parties settled. They agreed the children would stay in their current school zone and that Matthew would pay Chelsea $700 to resolve the medical expenses. Turning that settlement into a written order proved difficult, with disagreements and delays, so Chelsea eventually asked the court to enter the stipulation and order without Matthew's signature, which the court did without objection from Matthew. Because that order left the question of attorney fees and costs for the court to decide later, Chelsea asked for $54,098.69 in fees and costs. The district court awarded her $45,503.17. On appeal, the Court of Appeals said it could not tell exactly why the district court awarded the fees. The trial court cited several legal provisions but made only one substantive finding - that Matthew's behavior, especially trying to withdraw requests only after Chelsea moved for summary judgment, multiplied the litigation. The appellate court noted that a fees award used as a sanction is supposed to be proportionate to the misconduct, and it was not clear how a $45,503.17 award (about 84 percent of what Chelsea sought) matched up with the specific conduct the court identified. The court also could not tell whether the trial judge was concerned only with the timing of Matthew's withdrawal or believed the requests were meritless from the start - a distinction that matters because some of the cited provisions require a finding that a claim lacked any reasonable basis when filed, and the district court made no such finding. Because the reasons for the award were unclear, the Court of Appeals reversed the order and sent the case back (remanded) for the district court to make additional findings. The court also noted that Chelsea had not yet supported her fee request with an affidavit from her counsel confirming the fees were actually and necessarily incurred and were reasonable.