CARLSON VS. CARLSON

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The court reviewed the district court's award of attorney fees and costs for abuse of discretion, citing Logan v. Abe, 131 Nev. 260, 266-67, 350 P.3d 1143-44 (2015), noting that where eligibility for a fee award turns on interpretation of a statute or court rule, review is de novo, id. at 263, 350 P.3d at 1141. The court identified the governing authority. NRS 18.010(2)(b) permits a prevailing party to recover fees and costs but requires a finding that "the claim . . . or defense of the opposing party was brought or maintained without reasonable ground or to harass the prevailing party." EDCR 7.60(b)(3) permits sanctions, including fees and costs, where a party, "without just cause," "multiplies the proceedings in a case as to increase costs unreasonably and vexatiously." Applying that framework, the court held the district court did not err in awarding fees under EDCR 7.60(b) based on findings that Matthew multiplied the proceedings and unreasonably increased litigation costs — specifically by continuing to propound discovery on issues concerning the minor children's church and boy scouts even though he intended to withdraw those claims. The district court also found that certain of Matthew's requests (regarding the location of the children's church records, an accounting of previously disclosed Social Security Disability payments, modification of child support, and a "first right of refusal") were inherently meritless and should never have been brought, citing Navratil v. Navratil, No. 72956-COA, 2018 WL 3227321, at *2 (Nev. Ct. App. May 16, 2018). The court noted the district court was in the best position to weigh the evidence and that an appellate court will not reweigh evidence on appeal, citing Quintero v. McDonald, 116 Nev. 1181, 1183, 14 P.3d 522, 523 (2000). The court rejected Matthew's contention that the district court equated the summary judgment award with a finding of frivolousness, noting the record showed Chelsea prevailed on four of the five claims in her summary judgment motion, and defining "prevailing party" under Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't v. Blackjack Bonding, Inc., 131 Nev. 80, 90, 343 P.3d 608, 615 (2015) (quoting Valley Elec. Ass'n v. Overfield, 121 Nev. 7, 10, 106 P.3d 1198, 1200 (2005)). The court also rejected Matthew's argument that fees were improperly awarded under NRS 18.010(2)(a), which requires a money judgment of less than $20,000. Although the district court quoted the entire section of NRS 18.010(2), the court found the award rested on NRS 18.010(2)(b), based on findings that Matthew's requests were brought without reasonable grounds and solely to harass Chelsea, and that sufficient findings supported the award, citing Roe v. Roe, 139 Nev., Adv. Op. 21 (Ct. App. 2023). Because the district court's decision complied with EDCR 7.60(b) and properly analyzed the Brunzell factors, the court affirmed, citing Rivero v. Rivero, 125 Nev. 410, 441, 216 P.3d 213, 234 (2009), overruled on separate grounds by Romano v. Romano, 138 Nev. 1, 6, 501 P.3d 980, 985 (2022), and Brunzell v. Golden Gate Nat'l Bank, 85 Nev. 345, 349-50, 455 P.2d 31, 33 (1969). In a footnote, the court addressed Matthew's argument that Chelsea's affidavit did not comply with NRCP 54(d)(2)(B)(v), finding the record showed Chelsea expressly averred in her subsequent affidavit that her fees and costs were reasonable and warranted. The court also rejected the argument that Chelsea should not have been permitted to file a proper NRCP 54 affidavit after remand, noting its prior order in Docket No. 81460-COA observed Chelsea "had yet" to file an affidavit and did not prohibit either party from submitting one on remand.

In plain language

Matthew and Chelsea Carlson were divorced. After the divorce, they continued to fight in court over issues involving their two minor children, including custody, support, medical expenses, and which school the children would attend. Matthew filed a motion asking the court to address several of these issues. At a September 2018 hearing, Matthew told the court that the only issue he actually wanted to take to an evidentiary hearing (a hearing where evidence and testimony are presented) was his request to change the children's school. Even so, according to the opinion, he kept pursuing discovery — the formal process of gathering information and documents — on other issues he no longer intended to litigate. Chelsea eventually asked the court to rule in her favor without a trial (a motion for summary judgment) on all the claims. Matthew then tried to withdraw several of his requests, but the district court found he had not done so in time, which forced Chelsea to spend money filing her summary judgment motion to get those requests dismissed. The court ruled in Chelsea's favor on those requests but allowed the school-choice issue to go forward to the evidentiary hearing. On the second day of that hearing, the parties settled, and Matthew ultimately agreed to the school Chelsea had wanted. Chelsea then asked the court to make Matthew pay her attorney fees and costs. The court awarded her $45,503.17. Matthew appealed. The first time, the appellate court sent the case back because it could not tell exactly why the district court awarded the fees. On remand, the district court explained its reasoning more fully and again awarded the same amount. In this second appeal, Matthew argued the district court made several mistakes: that it wrongly treated Chelsea's summary judgment win as proof his claims were frivolous; that fees to a "prevailing party" are only allowed in cases involving money judgments; that filing his withdrawals late was not the same as frivolous litigation; and that Chelsea's original sworn statement supporting her fee request was defective. The Court of Appeals disagreed with each point and affirmed the fee award.