CLARK VS. HARRIS

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

Standard of review: "We review decisions regarding child support for an abuse of discretion." Romano v. Romano, 138 Nev. 1, 7, 501 P.3d 980, 985 (2022), abrogated in part on other grounds by Killebrew v. State ex rel. Donohue, 139 Nev., Adv. Op. 43, 535 P.3d 1167, 1171 (2023). An abuse of discretion occurs when findings are not supported by substantial evidence, Miller v. Miller, 134 Nev. 120, 125, 412 P.3d 1081, 1085 (2018), defined as evidence a reasonable person may accept as adequate to sustain a judgment, Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 149, 161 P.3d 239, 242 (2007). Framework: "A district court may modify a child-support order if there has been a change in circumstances and the modification is in the child's best interest." Romano, 138 Nev. at 7, 501 P.3d at 985. A change of 20 percent or more in gross monthly income "shall be deemed to constitute changed circumstances requiring a review." NRS 125B.145(4). Although parents may stipulate to a support order, child support implicates public policy and the child's best interest, and provided the applicable criteria are satisfied, the district court "always has the power to modify an existing child support order, either upward or downward, notwithstanding the parties' agreement to the contrary." Fernandez v. Fernandez, 126 Nev. 28, 34, 222 P.3d 1031, 1035 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). Application: Clark bears "a duty to provide the child necessary maintenance, health care, education and support." NRS 125B.020(1). Because her gross monthly income increased from $2,166.67 to $4,290 - more than 20 percent - review of Harris' modification request was appropriate under NRS 125B.145(4), and Harris' prior waiver did not deprive the court of authority to modify. The district court found Harris entitled to support as the primary physical custodian, see NAC 425.115(2), calculated a standard-formula obligation of $686.40 per month, see NAC 425.140(1)(a), and applied downward adjustments, see NAC 425.150(1): $117 per month for the child's travel expenses, $100 per month for Clark's financial responsibility for another minor child, and a limitation of payments to ten months per year to reflect the child's two-month annual residence with Clark, yielding $469.40 per month for ten months. The Court of Appeals held these findings were supported by substantial evidence and the modification was not an abuse of discretion. Judicial bias: The court rejected Clark's bias claim because she did not demonstrate that the district court's decisions rested on knowledge acquired outside the proceedings, nor did the decisions reflect "a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible." Canarelli v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 188 Nev. 104, 107, 506 P.3d 334, 337 (2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). Rulings made during official judicial proceedings generally "do not establish legally cognizable grounds for disqualification," In re Petition to Recall Dunleavy, 104 Nev. 784, 789, 769 P.2d 1271, 1275 (1988), and the burden is on the party asserting bias to establish sufficient factual grounds for disqualification, Rivero v. Rivero, 125 Nev. 410, 439, 216 P.3d 213, 233 (2009), overruled on other grounds by Romano, 138 Nev. at 6, 501 P.3d at 984. In a footnote, the court stated that it had considered Clark's remaining arguments not specifically addressed and concluded they did not present a basis for relief. Panel: Gibbons, Bulla, and Westbrook, JJ.

In plain language

Lindsay Marie Clark and Johnathan Matthew Harris share one minor child. After Harris filed for custody, the district court initially gave both parents joint legal and physical custody. Later, each parent asked to move out of state with the child - Harris to North Carolina, Clark to Colorado. After a hearing, the court decided it was in the child's best interest to live with Harris in North Carolina and gave him primary physical custody. At that time, the court calculated that Clark, whose gross monthly income was $2,166.67, would have owed $347 per month in child support, but Harris agreed to waive support because he earned more than Clark, so the court did not order Clark to pay anything. Clark later asked the court to set aside the order allowing Harris to relocate. Harris opposed that request and filed his own motion asking the court to modify the child support order, arguing that Clark's income had gone up substantially. Clark's updated financial disclosure showed her gross monthly income had increased to $4,290 - a jump of more than 20 percent from what she was earning when the earlier order was entered. Under Nevada law, an income change of 20 percent or more is treated as a changed circumstance requiring a review of the support order. The court found that modification was warranted and that Harris, as the parent with primary physical custody, was entitled to support. Using the standard formula, Clark's obligation would have been $686.40 per month. But the court reduced that figure for several reasons: $117 per month for Clark's expenses related to the child's travel between the parents' homes, $100 per month because Clark is financially responsible for another minor child, and a further adjustment because the child lives with Clark two months each year, during which she supports the child directly. The final result: Clark was ordered to pay Harris $469.40 per month for ten months of the year. On appeal, Clark made two main arguments. First, she said the court should not have ordered child support after Harris had waived it. The Court of Appeals rejected this, explaining that even when parents agree about child support, a district court "always has the power to modify an existing child support order, either upward or downward, notwithstanding the parties' agreement to the contrary," because child support involves public policy and the child's best interest. Since Clark's income had risen by more than 20 percent, the court was required to review the support arrangement, and its findings were supported by substantial evidence. Second, Clark argued the district court judge was biased against her. The Court of Appeals concluded relief was unwarranted because Clark did not show that the judge's decisions were based on knowledge acquired outside the proceedings, and the decisions did not reflect "a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible." The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment.