COLBY VS. COLBY (DIVORCE)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

On appeal from a summary judgment vacating a 1955 Nevada default divorce decree, the court held the complaint stated no claim for relief. First, an independent action to set aside a divorce decree lies only for extrinsic fraud (Confer v. District Court, 49 Nev. 18, 234 P. 688; Chamblin v. Chamblin, 55 Nev. 146, 27 P.2d 1061; Calvert v. Calvert, 61 Nev. 168, 122 P.2d 426; Murphy v. Murphy, 65 Nev. 264, 193 P.2d 850). The alleged fraud - the Maryland court's finding that Sarah lacked bona fide domiciliary intent - was intrinsic, not extrinsic, and thus not a basis for an independent action under NRCP 60(b). The court found no basis to distinguish Confer and Chamblin. The argument that the prior decree was rendered void by the Maryland decree was rejected; unlike La Potin v. La Potin, 75 Nev. 264, 339 P.2d 123, the Nevada court had jurisdiction and afforded due process, and the decree was not void on the face of the record. Second, the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, NRS 30.010-30.160, afforded no relief; under NRS 30.030 and Kress v. Corey, 65 Nev. 1, 189 P.2d 352, a controversy must be ripe, and the marital status question had been ripe and determined in 1955, with no justiciable controversy remaining (citing Colby v. Colby, 120 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 1960)). Third, full faith and credit did not require Nevada to give the Maryland decree greater effect than its own prior valid decree within Nevada; the court distinguished Sutton v. Leib, 342 U.S. 402, and relied on the discussion in Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226. The court held the 1955 default decree a valid, final, and conclusive determination of the parties' marital status in Nevada.

In plain language

Sarah Colby obtained a Nevada divorce from Benjamin Colby in 1955 by default (Benjamin did not appear, though he was served in Washington, D.C.). Two years later, Benjamin got a limited divorce (separation from bed and board) in Maryland, where both parties appeared, and the Maryland court declared the Nevada divorce "null, void and of no effect." After more litigation in Florida, Benjamin came back to Nevada and asked a Nevada court to vacate and set aside its own 1955 divorce decree, arguing the later Maryland ruling had to be honored under the U.S. Constitution's full faith and credit clause. The Nevada trial court agreed and set aside its 1955 decree. Sarah appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It held Benjamin had no valid claim. First, an independent action to undo a divorce for fraud requires "extrinsic" fraud (fraud that prevents a fair trial). The only "fraud" here was the Maryland court's later finding that Sarah had not truly intended to make Nevada her home, which is intrinsic, not extrinsic, fraud. Benjamin had simply chosen not to appear in the Nevada case. Second, the declaratory judgment statute did not help, because the parties' Nevada marital status had already been decided in 1955 and no live controversy remained. Third, full faith and credit did not require Nevada to treat the Maryland decree as overriding Nevada's own valid, final divorce decree within Nevada's borders. In effect, Benjamin was asking Nevada to give the Maryland ruling more respect than Nevada's own valid judgment, which the Constitution does not require.