COOLMAN VS. COOLMAN (DIVORCE)

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

By the Court, McNamee, C.J. On the husband's appeal from a decree of divorce granted to the wife for extreme cruelty, the sole issue was whether the evidence sufficed to show the husband's conduct injured the wife's health or created a reasonable apprehension of such injury. The court held the wife's testimony - detailing humiliating and degrading conduct, false accusations of infidelity, being "under terrific pressure all the time," and resulting near-constant migraine headaches - was, following Leland v. Leland, 71 Nev. 346, 291 P.2d 905 (1955), sufficient in itself to support the finding that her health was injured. Reaffirming that extreme cruelty may exist without personal violence (Ormachea v. Ormachea, 67 Nev. 273, 217 P.2d 355 (1950)), the court noted the conduct must result in danger to life, limb, or health, or reasonable apprehension of such danger, and that the court must consider the character and refinement of the parties, the conclusion depending on the particular facts of each case (Kelly v. Kelly, 18 Nev. 49, 1 P. 194 (1883)). Because the trial judge observed the parties and could evaluate their character and the wife's sensibilities, it was proper to infer the requisite findings, and the judgment was affirmed.

In plain language

The wife was granted a divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty after a trial without a jury. The husband appealed, arguing only that there was not enough evidence to show that his conduct - even if cruel - had actually injured his wife's health or put her in fear for her health. The wife had testified in detail about her husband's conduct, including acts that humiliated and degraded her and his false accusations that she had been unfaithful. She said she was "under terrific pressure all the time," and that by the time they separated she was suffering almost constant migraine headaches caused by the conditions of living with her husband. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. It explained that this kind of testimony from the injured spouse can, by itself, be enough to support a finding that her health was harmed. The court reaffirmed that extreme cruelty does not require physical violence, but the conduct must cause danger to life, limb, or health, or a reasonable fear of such danger. In deciding whether that line was crossed, a trial judge must consider the character and refinement of the particular people involved, and every case turns on its own facts. Because the trial judge had both parties in front of him and could judge their character and the wife's sensibilities firsthand, it was proper to infer that he found the required harm to her health. The judgment was affirmed.