CROSIER VS. CROSIER (CHILD CUSTODY)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The Court of Appeals reviewed the custody determination for an abuse of discretion. Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 149, 161 P.3d 239, 241 (2007). Deference to the district court's discretionary determinations is not owed to legal error or to findings so conclusory as to mask legal error. Davis v. Ewalefo, 131 Nev. 445, 450, 352 P.3d 1139, 1142 (2015). The court's sole consideration in a custody determination is the best interest of the child. Ellis, 123 Nev. at 149, 161 P.3d at 242; NRS 125C.0035(1). When evaluating best interest, the district court must consider all twelve factors set forth in NRS 125C.0035(4), and a written custody decree must contain findings regarding those factors and tie the findings to the ultimate custody determination. Davis, 131 Nev. at 450-51, 352 P.3d at 1143. Here, the decree contained no best-interest findings and neither addressed nor analyzed any of the twelve factors, which the court held was an abuse of discretion and reversible error. Davis, 131 Nev. at 450, 352 P.3d at 1142. The court rejected the argument that the district court's oral findings sufficed, noting the court addressed only two statutory factors and that Davis requires the findings to be included in the written order. On domestic violence, the court noted that one of the twelve best interest factors requires the district court to consider whether either parent has engaged in an act of domestic violence. NRS 125C.0035(4)(k). For purposes of the best interest analysis under NRS 125C.0035(4), the district court need only find that domestic violence occurred by a preponderance of the evidence. Monahan v. Hogan, 138 Nev. 58, 69, 507 P.3d 588, 597 (Ct. App. 2022). Separately, NRS 125C.0035(5) provides that if, after an evidentiary hearing, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that a parent engaged in domestic violence, a rebuttable presumption arises that sole or joint physical custody with that parent is not in the child's best interest. "Domestic violence" includes the commission of any act of assault or battery against a person's minor child. NRS 125C.0035(10)(b); NRS 33.018(1). A district court "must hear all information regarding domestic violence in order to determine the child's best interests." Castle v. Simmons, 120 Nev. 98, 105, 86 P.3d 1042, 1047 (2004). Although Jennifer may not have personally introduced domestic violence evidence at the hearing, the court admitted the FMC child interview report containing abuse allegations and acknowledged those allegations, yet failed to determine whether domestic violence occurred under either the preponderance standard (for the best interest analysis) or the clear and convincing standard (for the rebuttable presumption). This was also an abuse of discretion. The court declined to make the domestic-violence factual determination in the first instance, citing Ryan's Express Transp. Servs., Inc. v. Amador Stage Lines, Inc., 128 Nev. 289, 299, 279 P.3d 166, 172 (2012). On relocation, the court explained that when no custodial order exists and both parents have equal custody rights, one parent may not relocate a child out of state over the other parent's objection without a judicial order. Druckman v. Ruscitti, 130 Nev. 468, 473, 327 P.3d 511, 515 (2014). In determining custodial rights, the court must decide whether it is in the child's best interest to live with one parent out of state or the other parent in Nevada, assessing the five factors set out in Druckman (quoting Schwartz v. Schwartz, 107 Nev. 378, 382-83, 812 P.2d 1268, 1271 (1991)). Even though NRS 125C.007 does not apply to an initial custody decree, the five Druckman factors are substantially similar to those in NRS 125C.007(2) and serve as a guide where no custodial order exists and the parents dispute out-of-state relocation. Druckman, 130 Nev. at 473, 327 P.3d at 515 (citing NRS 125C.200 (1999)). The district court abused its discretion by failing to make findings as to whether M.B.C.'s relocation to Colorado was in her best interest. Davis, 131 Nev. at 450-51, 352 P.3d at 1143. The court rejected Jennifer's argument that the district court should have addressed the threshold requirements for a custody modification, explaining that because no existing custody order existed, this was an initial custody determination as defined by the UCCJEA rather than a modification. NRS 125A.095. Concluding the errors were not harmless, the court reversed the custody decree and post-decree order and remanded. On remand, the district court must conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether domestic violence occurred and whether relocation to Colorado is in M.B.C.'s best interest; if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that Garrett committed an act of domestic violence, it must apply the rebuttable presumption under NRS 125C.0035(5); it must consider and make findings on all twelve NRS 125C.0035(4) factors and tie them to the custody determination; and it must determine whether relocation to Colorado is in M.B.C.'s best interest after considering the five Druckman factors. The court also noted that even if it does not find domestic violence by clear and convincing evidence, it must still consider whether domestic violence occurred by a preponderance of the evidence when analyzing the best interest factors. NRS 125C.0035(4)(k); Monahan, 138 Nev. at 69, 507 P.3d at 597.

In plain language

This case involves a custody dispute between two parents, Jennifer Crosier and Garrett Crosier, who married in Utah and had three children. After separating in 2017, Jennifer moved to Nevada with the children and Garrett moved to Colorado. Although they divorced in Utah in 2019, the parties agree that no Utah court ever issued a final custody decree. In April 2022, Jennifer filed a complaint in Nevada asking for sole legal and sole physical custody of all three children. In her complaint, Jennifer raised concerns about Garrett's alleged domestic violence, stating that he had a prior child abuse/neglect conviction from Utah and that the children were afraid of him. The two older children were interviewed by the Family Mediation Center (FMC) and described instances of alleged physical abuse by Garrett - one child said he slapped her and caused her to hit her head, and that he kicked the other child with a steel-toed boot; the other child said he picked her up and pulled her by her hair. Both older children said they preferred to stay with Jennifer in Nevada. At a single-day hearing in May 2023, both parents represented themselves without lawyers. The judge told the parties he would "take control of the questioning" to avoid wasting time, and the court itself questioned the parties and witnesses. The court admitted the FMC child interview report into evidence, but it never asked any questions about the abuse allegations in that report or the domestic violence claims from Jennifer's complaint. When Jennifer tried to raise the abuse issue in her closing argument, the court did not allow her to continue, stating she had offered "zero evidence" that Garrett abused the children. At the end of the hearing, the judge said he had to consider "certain factors in evaluating what is in a child's best interest," but he addressed only two of the twelve factors that Nevada law requires. The court decided the parents would share joint legal custody, that Jennifer would have primary physical custody of the two older children, and that Garrett would have primary physical custody of the youngest child in Colorado. The written custody decree that followed did not mention any of the twelve best interest factors and contained no factual findings about the children's best interest. A later post-decree order also failed to address those factors. The Court of Appeals reversed. It explained that when deciding custody, a court's only consideration is the best interest of the child, and the court must consider all twelve factors listed in the statute and put its findings in a written order that ties those findings to the custody decision. Because the decree here contained no such findings, the court found this was an abuse of discretion and reversible error. The court also held that the trial court should have addressed the domestic violence allegations - the FMC report containing those allegations was in evidence, yet the court never determined whether domestic violence occurred. Finally, the court held the trial judge should have analyzed whether moving the youngest child to Colorado was in that child's best interest, using a five-factor test from prior Nevada case law. The case was sent back for a new evidentiary hearing.