DAVIS VS. DAVIS (DIVORCE)
66 Nev. 164, 207 P.2d 240 (1949) · 3565 · Nevada Supreme Court · June 17, 1949
Disposition:Appeal dismissed.Divorce, Property & AlimonyPosture Appeal by the defaulted defendant husband solely from the district court's order denying his motion to set aside his default in the wife's Clark County action for divorce and disposition of community property; the respondent wife moved to dismiss the appeal for want of an appealable order.
Key holdings
Practitioner summary
The respondent wife filed for divorce and disposition of community property in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, on February 26, 1948; the appellant husband was personally served at Las Vegas on March 3, 1948, and his default was entered March 15, 1948. His motion to set aside the default on the ground of excusable neglect was heard and denied on June 24, 1948; judgment granting the divorce and disposing of the community property was rendered June 25, 1948. The husband's notice of appeal, filed September 9, 1948, sought review only of the order denying his motion to set aside the default. On the wife's motion to dismiss, the court held that section 9385.60, N.C.L. 1929, designates the judgments and orders from which an appeal may be taken, and no statutory authority confers a right of appeal from an order refusing to set aside a default, citing Johns-Manville, Inc. v. Lander County, 48 Nev. 244, and Perry v. Edmonds, 59 Nev. 60. The appeal was dismissed.
In plain language
A wife sued for divorce and division of community property in Clark County. Her husband was served in Las Vegas but never responded, and his default was entered. He then moved to set aside the default, claiming excusable neglect; the district court denied the motion, and judgment was entered granting the wife a divorce and disposing of the community property. The husband appealed - but only from the order denying his motion to set aside the default. The Nevada Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits. Nevada's statute listed exactly which judgments and orders could be appealed, and an order refusing to set aside a default was not on the list. Because no statute authorized such an appeal, the court had no jurisdiction to review it.
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