DAVITIAN-KOSTANIAN VS. KOSTANIAN

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

Standard of review. Statutory interpretation is reviewed de novo. Arguello v. Sunset Station, Inc., 127 Nev. 365, 368, 252 P.3d 206, 208 (2011). Child support and alimony rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Rivero v. Rivero, 125 Nev. 410, 438, 216 P.3d 213, 232 (2009), overruled on other grounds by Romano v. Romano, 138 Nev. 1, 501 P.3d 980 (2022); Williams v. Williams, 120 Nev. 559, 566, 97 P.3d 1124, 1129 (2004); Gilman v. Gilman, 114 Nev. 416, 422, 956 P.2d 761, 764 (1998). Adult handicapped child support. The general rule is that a parent's child-support obligation ends at the age of majority. Edgington v. Edgington, 119 Nev. 577, 582, 80 P.3d 1282, 1286 (2003); see also NRS 125C.0045(1)(b). NRS 125B.110(1) creates a statutory exception: "A parent shall support beyond the age of majority his or her child with a handicap until the child is no longer handicapped or until the child becomes self-supporting. The handicap of the child must have occurred before the age of majority for this duty to apply." The district court read NRS 125C.0045(1)(a) - which limits modifications of child support to periods while the child is a minor - to constrain NRS 125B.110. The Supreme Court rejected that reading, holding NRS 125B.110 is an independent exception that contains no time limit on when a parent or dependent adult child may seek a continuing-support order, and that a temporal gap between cessation of minor support and an adult-support request is at most a factor for the trial court (because "impairments can change over time"), not a jurisdictional bar. The Court relied on out-of-jurisdiction authority for the same proposition, including Hastings v. Hastings, 841 So. 2d 484, 486 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Stern v. Stern, 473 A.2d 56, 62-63 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984); Miller v. Ark. Office of Child Support Enf't, 458 S.W.3d 733, 738-39 (Ark. Ct. App. 2015); Koltay v. Koltay, 667 P.2d 1374, 1377 (Colo. 1983); and Fernandez v. Fernandez, 306 So. 3d 1013, 1016-17 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2020). The legislative policies of NRS 125C.0001(2) and the rationale of McKay v. Bergstedt, 106 Nev. 808, 825, 801 P.2d 617, 628 (1990) (quoted in Edgington), support that construction. Required findings on remand. Under NRS 125B.110 and Edgington, the district court must find: (1) the adult child has a handicap from an impairment that occurred before majority (NRS 125B.110(1); Edgington, 119 Nev. at 586, 80 P.3d at 1289 (defining "impairment")); (2) the child is unable to be financially self-supporting, taking into account other sources of income such as public assistance (Edgington, 119 Nev. at 585-86, 80 P.3d at 1288-89; NRS 125B.110(2)); and (3) a causal relationship between the impairment and the child's incapacity to engage in substantial gainful activity (Edgington, 119 Nev. at 585-87, 80 P.3d at 1288-89; NRS 125B.110(4)). Without such findings, meaningful appellate review is "hampered." Jitnan v. Oliver, 127 Nev. 424, 433, 254 P.3d 623, 629 (2011); Ryan's Express Transp. Servs., Inc. v. Amador Stage Lines, Inc., 128 Nev. 289, 299, 279 P.3d 166, 172 (2012). Alimony modification. NRS 125.150(8) provides that unaccrued alimony "may be modified upon a showing of changed circumstances," and NRS 125.150(12) deems a change of 20 percent or more in the paying spouse's gross monthly income to "constitute changed circumstances requiring a review for modification." The Court clarified that the 20-percent threshold triggers only a review; it does not compel modification. The decision whether to modify remains discretionary. See Siragusa v. Siragusa, 108 Nev. 987, 994-96, 843 P.2d 807, 812-13 (1992). The Court also noted, in a footnote, that a stipulated award may be set aside only "upon a showing that it was entered into through mistake, fraud, collusion, accident or some ground of like nature." Citicorp Servs., Inc. v. Lee, 99 Nev. 511, 513, 665 P.2d 265, 266 (1983). Because Noune failed to provide adequate evidentiary support and the record showed the district court considered multiple relevant factors, the denial of alimony modification was not an abuse of discretion. Statutory plain-language enforcement followed Smith v. Zilverberg, 137 Nev. 65, 72, 481 P.3d 1222, 1230 (2021).

In plain language

Noune Davitian-Kostanian and Varoujan Kostanian divorced in 2012 after more than 25 years of marriage. Their stipulated divorce decree required Varoujan to pay Noune alimony for ten years (ending October 1, 2021) and to pay child support for their youngest son, Alex, who has autism, until he turned 18 (or graduated high school at 19). Alex turned 18 in 2015, and child support stopped at that time. One day before Varoujan's last alimony payment was due, Noune filed a motion asking the family court to (1) extend or modify alimony, and (2) restart child support for Alex as a disabled adult. The district court denied both requests. On child support, the court said it had no power to act because Alex was already an adult and support had ended years earlier. On alimony, the court found Noune had not shown a "change in circumstances." The Nevada Supreme Court partly agreed and partly disagreed. On child support, the Court held the district court was wrong to say it lacked jurisdiction. Nevada has a special statute, NRS 125B.110, that requires a parent to keep supporting a handicapped child past age 18 if the handicap arose before adulthood and the child cannot become self-supporting. Nothing in that statute requires the parent seeking support to ask before the child turns 18, and nothing imposes a deadline. The fact that more than five years had passed since Alex's child support ended is just one factor for the lower court to weigh, not a bar. The Court sent the case back so the district court can make findings about whether Alex qualifies for continued support. On alimony, however, the Supreme Court affirmed. NRS 125.150(8) says alimony "may" be modified on a showing of changed circumstances, and a 20-percent change in the paying spouse's gross monthly income triggers a review - but does not force the court to actually change the alimony. The district court considered Noune's arguments and reasonably concluded she had not adequately supported her claim of changed circumstances. That decision was within the trial court's discretion.