DE NOTO VS HILTON (CHILD CUSTODY)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The Court of Appeals reviewed the physical-custody determination for abuse of discretion. Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 149, 161 P.3d 239, 241 (2007). A district court abuses its discretion when its decision is not supported by substantial evidence or is clearly erroneous. Bautista v. Picone, 134 Nev. 334, 336, 419 P.3d 157, 159 (2018). Substantial evidence is "evidence that a reasonable person may accept as adequate to sustain a judgment." Ellis, 123 Nev. at 149, 161 P.3d at 242. The court reiterated that it does not reweigh evidence or reassess witness credibility on appeal. Ellis, 123 Nev. at 152, 161 P.3d at 244; Roe v. Roe, 139 Nev. 163, 171, 535 P.3d 274, 285 (Ct. App. 2023). The district court applied the best-interest factors under NRS 125C.0035(4), finding most neutral and finding factors (4)(e) (ability to cooperate to meet the child's needs) and (4)(g) (physical, developmental, and emotional needs) in Hilton's favor. Factor (4)(c) (which parent is more likely to allow frequent associations and a continuing relationship with the noncustodial parent): The court accepted that DeNoto's point was "well taken" that the district court's neutral finding was inconsistent with its own findings that the travel agreement contemplated a defined return window, that Hilton's vehicle shipment raised concerns about her true intentions, that she became evasive and went "radio silence" during the return period, that she enrolled T.D. in school without DeNoto's consent, and that she "reneged on the agreement." However, the court found the record showed the district court considered that conduct and weighed it against the parties' history of co-parenting without court intervention, their prior ability to communicate across states, DeNoto's telephone access, and his extended parenting time. The court concluded any error in weighing (4)(c) as neutral did not affect DeNoto's substantial rights. See Wyeth v. Rowatt, 126 Nev. 446, 465, 244 P.3d 765, 778 (2010). Factor (4)(d) (level of conflict): The district court identified Hilton's nonreturn as the turning point, finding the parties "got along well up until July 2024 when [Hilton] reneged on the agreement," but also found the parents had historically co-parented well, stayed out of court, remained cordial, reached agreements while living apart, and continued to communicate after July 2024. Because that finding was supported by substantial evidence, the court treated DeNoto's challenge as a request to reweigh evidence, which it declined. Ellis, 123 Nev. at 152, 161 P.3d at 244; Roe, 139 Nev. at 171, 535 P.3d at 285. Factor (4)(e) (ability to cooperate to meet the child's needs): The district court noted the parties' homeschooling and joint-custody discussions changed when Hilton unilaterally enrolled T.D. in school, but also found that DeNoto historically deferred to Hilton on medical care and education, relied on her for school information and childcare during work travel, and had provided minimal financial support while T.D. was in Hawaii. As to DeNoto's safety allegations regarding Hilton's husband, RJ Hilton, the court addressed the alleged Shriners Hospital incident under the domestic-violence factor, see generally NRS 125C.0035(4)(k), found no supporting evidence, and found no other incidents in the record. The (4)(e) findings were supported by substantial evidence, and the challenge again amounted to a request to reweigh evidence. Ellis, 123 Nev. at 152, 161 P.3d at 244; Roe, 139 Nev. at 171, 535 P.3d at 285. Credibility findings: DeNoto argued the order failed to resolve conflicting testimony about Hilton's intent, timing of school enrollment, communication gaps, and hospital statements. The court rejected the authorities DeNoto proffered. Druckman v. Ruscitti, 130 Nev. 468, 327 P.3d 511 (2014), does not require specific credibility findings whenever credibility plays a central role. Rico v. Rodriguez, 121 Nev. 695, 701, 120 P.3d 812, 816 (2005), addressed the narrower issue of whether immigration status alone may control a custody determination. Bluestein v. Bluestein, 131 Nev. 106, 113, 345 P.3d 1044, 1049 (2015), requires specific findings before modifying a custodial arrangement to designate a primary custodian but does not require resolving every factual dispute or credibility conflict. The court noted the district court expressly found both parties credible in some respects and accepted several of DeNoto's criticisms of Hilton, so it did not "silently credit Hilton and reject DeNoto." See Nance v. Ferraro, 134 Nev. 152, 158, 418 P.3d 679, 685 (Ct. App. 2018). Because the family division is better positioned to assess credibility and weigh evidence, the argument did not support reversal. In re J.D.N., 128 Nev. 462, 477, 283 P.3d 842, 852 (2012); Schwartz v. Schwartz, 126 Nev. 87, 91, 225 P.3d 1273, 1276 (2010); In re Parental Rights as to C.J.M., 118 Nev. 724, 732, 58 P.3d 188, 194 (2002). Catchall / overlooked evidence: The court found the order addressed most of the evidence DeNoto claimed was overlooked (homeschooling and joint-custody discussions, Hilton's possible intent to remain, and the unilateral school enrollment). Nevada law does not require a district court to discuss every evidentiary detail so long as its findings permit meaningful appellate review. Sowers v. Forest Hills Subdivision, 129 Nev. 99, 109, 294 P.3d 427, 434 (2013) (quoting Las Vegas Novelty, Inc. v. Fernandez, 106 Nev. 113, 118, 787 P.2d 772, 775 (1990)). Sufficiency of the evidence overall: Applying the highly deferential standard, Hayes v. Gallacher, 115 Nev. 1, 4, 972 P.2d 1138, 1140 (1999), the court emphasized that DeNoto did not meaningfully challenge the NRS 125C.0035(4)(g) findings regarding T.D.'s physical, developmental, and educational needs — findings that Hilton historically handled his medical and educational needs, that DeNoto deferred to her, that Hilton had insurance available while DeNoto did not, that T.D. had by trial undergone 12 surgeries, needed one more, continued physical therapy, and received school medical accommodations, and that Hilton remained the only parent with vision, dental, and medical insurance for T.D. The court noted the statutory scheme does not mandate that any factor be given controlling weight and leaves weighting to the district court's discretion. NRS 125C.0035(1); Monahan v. Hogan, 138 Nev. 58, 62, 507 P.3d 588, 592 (Ct. App. 2022). Harmless-error framework: To the extent the best-interest analysis was incomplete or imprecise, most notably under factor (4)(c), the court held such error did not warrant reversal. Cf. NRCP 61 (courts "must disregard all errors and defects that do not affect any party's substantial rights"). An error affects substantial rights if "but for the alleged error, a different result might reasonably have been reached." Wyeth, 126 Nev. at 465, 244 P.3d at 778. The court distinguished Davis v. Ewalefo, 131 Nev. 445, 452, 352 P.3d 1139, 1143 (2015), noting that here the district court tied its findings to its conclusion, so the custody determination "was made for appropriate legal reasons." Ellis, 123 Nev. at 149, 161 P.3d at 241-42.

In plain language

Ricky DeNoto and Alisha Babbe Hilton, who were never married, share one child, T.D., born in 2017. After both moved to Nevada, they split parenting time evenly, one week on and one week off. Although both parents stayed involved, Hilton generally handled T.D.'s medical care, insurance, appointments, and school matters, and DeNoto usually deferred to her on those issues. In early 2024, Hilton took a temporary surgical-technologist job in Hawaii. The parents, representing themselves, signed a written "Permission to Travel" agreement letting T.D. stay in Hawaii from June 6, 2024, until sometime between July 8 and July 13, 2024. According to the opinion, Hilton did not present the trip as a permanent move, though she shipped her car to Hawaii before leaving. As the return date approached, DeNoto asked for travel details; Hilton first responded, then became evasive, and then stopped communicating. T.D. never came back and has remained in Hawaii. That August, DeNoto learned from T.D. that Hilton had enrolled him in a Hawaii school without DeNoto's knowledge or consent. The next month, T.D. was struck by a vehicle in the front yard of Hilton's Hawaii home. He suffered serious injuries, was placed in a medically induced coma for three days, hospitalized until late October, treated in the ICU, and underwent major surgery. By the time of trial, T.D. had undergone multiple surgeries, resumed some activity, and been cleared to travel, but still needed ongoing care, including one more surgery. DeNoto filed a paternity case in October 2024, and Hilton answered and counterclaimed. There were no prior custody or support orders. At trial, the district court decided Nevada had jurisdiction because T.D. had lived in Nevada for years before the June 2024 departure and because DeNoto filed within months of that departure. The parents agreed to share legal custody (the right to make major decisions), and the court entered detailed rules requiring them to consult on decisions, share medical and school information, and support T.D.'s relationship with the other parent. The contested question was physical custody — where T.D. would primarily live. The court worked through the statutory "best interest of the child" factors. It found most factors neutral. It found two factors favored Hilton: the parents' ability to cooperate to meet the child's needs (because Hilton historically handled medical, insurance, and school matters and had supported T.D. financially in Hawaii), and the child's physical, developmental, and emotional needs (because of his serious injuries, ongoing medical and therapy needs, school accommodations, and Hilton's ability to keep him on medical, dental, and vision insurance). The court awarded Hilton primary physical custody in Hawaii, gave DeNoto parenting time over school breaks and long weekends plus phone contact, and set child support and related financial terms. On appeal, DeNoto argued the court mishandled several best-interest factors, downplayed Hilton's failure to return T.D. and her unilateral school enrollment, failed to resolve conflicting testimony with credibility findings, and reached conclusions unsupported by the evidence. The Court of Appeals explained that it reviews custody decisions only for "abuse of discretion" — a deferential standard that does not allow the appeals court to re-weigh evidence or re-judge witness credibility. The court agreed with DeNoto on one point: the district court's finding that one factor (whether a parent would allow the child a continuing relationship with the other parent) was "neutral" seemed inconsistent with the trial court's own findings that Hilton had "reneged on the agreement," become evasive, gone "radio silence," and enrolled T.D. in school without consent. But the appeals court concluded the trial court did not ignore that conduct — it acknowledged the conduct and weighed it against other evidence, such as the parents' long history of co-parenting, DeNoto's phone access, and his extended visits. The appeals court held that even if that factor was weighed improperly, it would not change the result, because DeNoto did not meaningfully dispute the finding about T.D.'s serious medical and educational needs, which strongly supported placing him with Hilton. Because the district court considered the required factors, made findings adequate for review, and reached a decision supported by evidence a reasonable person could accept, the Court of Appeals affirmed.