DIMICK VS. DIMICK (DIVORCE PROPERTY & ALIMONY)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

Per Curiam. In this divorce appeal governed by a prenuptial agreement, the court addressed four assignments of error and affirmed in part and reversed in part. Attorney's fees. The agreement shifted fees to the 'non-prevailing party' where a party 'is required to take legal action to enforce the provisions of this agreement.' The court held Charles was not entitled to fees: he did not sue to enforce the agreement but filed for divorce seeking property division under an agreement he had already breached, and Claudette - who stipulated to the agreement's validity before any evidentiary hearing - could not be deemed a 'non-prevailing party.' Relying on Works v. Kuhn, 103 Nev. 65, 68, 732 P.2d 1373, 1375-76 (1987), the court reiterated that a party cannot be a 'prevailing party' where the action has not proceeded to judgment, and reasoned that fee-shifting provisions exist to encourage settlement and would be undermined by penalizing abandonment of a claim. Spousal support credit. The court held the district court correctly refused to credit mortgage payments made during the pendency of the action against Charles's separate $10,200 contractual, post-divorce support obligation. The temporary-support order (satisfied by mortgage payments) was distinct from the contractual obligation, which the agreement described as providing 'additional spousal support to [Claudette] in the event of dissolution of marriage.' Fort Apache property. The court reversed. Under NRS 111.105, a conveyance of land must be by delivered deed; merely signing a purchase agreement is insufficient to convey a property interest, and no deed was ever delivered. The district court therefore erred in finding Claudette had an interest in the Fort Apache lot, in awarding her seventy-five percent of the assignment proceeds, and in imposing a $2,000 sanction on Charles for signing Claudette's name to the assignment. Separate personal property. The court reversed the order leaving each party the personal property in their possession insofar as it left Claudette with a bed that was Charles's separate property brought to the marriage. Although NRS 125.150(4) permits awarding one spouse's separate property to the other for support, nothing indicated the district court intended such an award; absent a finding that the property must be awarded as support, the separate personal property of each party should be returned. Remanded for modification consistent with the opinion.

In plain language

Charles and Claudette Dimick signed a prenuptial agreement the day before their 1989 wedding. It said that if they divorced, Charles would pay $200 per month of spousal support for each month of the marriage, that their community property would be split seventy-five percent to Claudette and twenty-five percent to Charles, and that whoever lost a fight over the agreement would pay the other side's attorney's fees. Charles filed for divorce in 1992. Claudette at first denied the agreement was valid, but before any hearing on that question she agreed it was valid. Charles appealed four rulings. First, he said he should get his attorney's fees as the 'prevailing party' under the agreement. The Supreme Court disagreed. Charles had not sued to enforce the agreement - he filed for divorce and asked that property be split under an agreement he himself had already broken. And because Claudette gave up her challenge before any hearing, she was not a 'non-prevailing party.' The Court explained that a party cannot be a 'prevailing party' where the case never goes to judgment, and that penalizing someone for dropping a claim would discourage settlements. Second, Charles argued he should get credit toward his $10,200 contractual spousal-support obligation for the mortgage payments he made during the divorce. The Court rejected this too. The mortgage payments were ordered as temporary support during the case; the contract support was a separate, post-divorce obligation, so the two could not be mixed. Charles won on the last two points. On the 'Fort Apache' lot, the Court held Claudette had no property interest in it because no deed was ever delivered - simply signing a purchase agreement does not transfer land under Nevada law - so the district court was wrong to give her a share and to fine Charles $2,000 for signing her name on the assignment. Finally, on a bed Charles brought into the marriage, the Court held the district court should have returned each party's separate personal property unless it specifically found the property had to be awarded as support. The Court affirmed the attorney's-fee and spousal-support rulings, reversed the Fort Apache and separate-property rulings, and sent the case back.