EDGINGTON VS. EDGINGTON (CHILD SUPPORT)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The primary issue was the meaning of 'handicapped' under NRS 125B.110, Nevada's handicapped child support statute. The court held a child is 'handicapped' if he or she is unable to be self-supporting because of a qualifying physical or mental impairment, and reversed and remanded the prolonged-support ruling. 119 Nev. at 579, 585-87, 80 P.3d at 1283, 1287-89. Support obligations generally cease at majority (or age nineteen if still in high school), with a presumption that a child then is capable of self-support. NRS 125B.110 requires continued support of a 'handicapped' child, defined as 'the inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment' that will result in death or last at least twelve months. Construing the ambiguous phrase 'substantial gainful activity,' the court looked to legislative history showing Nevada adopted the Social Security Administration's definition of 'disabled,' and to the CFR, concluding 'substantial gainful activity' means work activity resulting in the child being financially self-supporting, and generally excludes school attendance. 119 Nev. at 583-86, 80 P.3d at 1285-88. The phrase 'medically determinable physical or mental impairment' is plain, meaning a physical or mental structural or functional limitation established by accepted diagnostic techniques. A nexus is required: the impairment must be the cause of the inability to be self-supporting. 119 Nev. at 586-87, 80 P.3d at 1288. Because the district court did not focus on whether Matthew could be self-supporting and the record was undeveloped on that point, the court reversed the handicapped-support ruling and remanded. On the request to increase support, reviewed for abuse of discretion, the court affirmed because Donald already paid the statutory maximum and no change in circumstances warranted an increase. On attorney fees, the court held that NRS 125B.140(2)(c)(2) requires the court to award reasonable fees in a proceeding to enforce a support obligation unless it finds undue hardship; because the district court summarily denied fees without either awarding them or finding undue hardship, it abused its discretion, and the court reversed and remanded that issue. 119 Nev. at 587-89, 80 P.3d at 1289-90.

In plain language

Janice and Donald Edgington divorced in 1995 and had one son, Matthew. Donald agreed to pay child support at the statutory maximum until Matthew turned nineteen or graduated from high school. As that deadline approached, Janice asked the court to extend Donald's support obligation past majority, arguing Matthew was a 'handicapped' child who could not support himself. Matthew had a hearing impairment, attention deficit disorder, and bipolar disorder, and received special assistance in school. Janice also asked to increase the support amount and for attorney fees. Nevada's handicapped child support statute (NRS 125B.110) requires a parent to support a child beyond age eighteen if the child is 'handicapped,' which the statute defines as being unable to engage in 'any substantial gainful activity' because of a medically determinable impairment. The district court found Matthew was not handicapped under the statute, denied the extension, denied the request to increase support, and denied attorney fees. The Nevada Supreme Court clarified what 'handicapped' means. It held that a child is handicapped only if he cannot be financially self-supporting because of a qualifying physical or mental impairment. The key phrase 'substantial gainful activity' means work activity that results in the child being self-supporting - not just any activity like attending school. There must also be a connection: the impairment must be the reason the child cannot support himself. The court found the record did not focus on whether Matthew could support himself, so it reversed that part of the ruling and sent it back for the district court to apply the correct definition. The court affirmed the denial of an increase in the support amount, because Donald already paid the statutory maximum and there was no change in circumstances. But it reversed the denial of attorney fees, because the statute requires the court to either award reasonable fees in a support-enforcement matter or expressly find that paying them would cause undue hardship, and the district court had done neither.