EGGLESTON VS. CLARK CNTY. DEP'T OF FAMILY SERV.

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

**Jurisdiction / service.** The court first addressed DFS's threshold challenge to subject matter jurisdiction. Nevada's APA (NRS Chapter 233B) governs judicial review of administrative decisions. Liberty Mut. v. Thomasson, 130 Nev. 27, 30, 317 P.3d 831, 834 (2014). Under NRS 233B.130(2)(c), a petition must be served upon (1) the attorney general or a designated representative and (2) the administrative head of the named agency, and both requirements are mandatory and jurisdictional. Heat & Frost Insulators & Allied Workers Local 16 v. Labor Comm'n, 134 Nev. 1, 4, 408 P.3d 156, 159 (2018). Subject matter jurisdiction is reviewed de novo. Ogawa v. Ogawa, 125 Nev. 660, 667, 221 P.3d 669, 704 (2009). It may be raised at any time and cannot be conferred by the parties. Landreth v. Malik, 127 Nev. 175, 179, 251 P.3d 163, 166 (2011); see NRCP 12(h)(3). A petition for judicial review is a post-complaint filing, so personal service is unnecessary and an alternative method under NRCP 5(b) suffices. Dep't of Corrs. v. DeRose, 136 Nev. 339, 342, 466 P.3d 1253, 1255 (2020). Under NRCP 5(b)(2)(C), a document may be served by mailing it to the person's last known address, with service completed upon mailing. The court held that Eggleston's December 29, 2020 certificate of mailing showed he properly and timely served Tim Burch, the interim director of DFS, at the address provided in the February 2, 2015 substantiation letter, establishing jurisdiction. The court declined to resolve the appeal on a procedural point raised under NRS 233B.133(1) regarding a tardy memorandum, citing the district court's discretion, Fitzpatrick v. State, Dep't of Com., 107 Nev. 486, 488, 813 P.2d 1004, 1005 (1991), and the policy favoring merits dispositions, State, Dep't of Motor Vehicles v. Moss, 106 Nev. 866, 868, 802 P.2d 627, 628 (1990); see also Pina-Soria v. CMS Facilities Maint., Inc., No. 55415, 2011 WL 2623946, at *1 n.1 (Nev. July 1, 2011). **Standard of review.** The standard for reviewing orders on petitions for judicial review is the same for the Court of Appeals and the district court, City of Reno v. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of N. Nev., 127 Nev. 114, 119, 251 P.3d 718, 721 (2011), and the reviewing court gives no deference to the district court's order, City of N. Las Vegas v. Warburton, 127 Nev. 682, 686, 262 P.3d 715, 718 (2011). Legal determinations, including statutory interpretation, are reviewed de novo; factual findings are reviewed for clear error or arbitrary abuse of discretion and will not be overturned if supported by substantial evidence. Day v. Washoe Cnty. Sch. Dist., 121 Nev. 387, 389, 116 P.3d 68, 69 (2005). A reviewing court may imply a required factual finding where the agency's conclusion provides a proper basis for it. Warburton, 127 Nev. at 686, 262 P.3d at 718. **Statutory-violation argument (NRS 233B.135(3)(a)).** Eggleston argued the hearing officer violated NRS 233B.121(4) (opportunity to respond and present evidence and argument on all issues) and NRS 233B.123(4) (right to call and examine witnesses, introduce exhibits, cross-examine, impeach, and rebut). The court held these rights were afforded. No statute gave Eggleston the right to dictate hearing timing; DFS offered multiple dates and the hearing followed roughly five years of Eggleston-driven delays. Cf. Berger v. N.D. Dep't of Transp., 795 N.W.2d 707, 711 (N.D. 2011). The officer did not err in proceeding without Eggleston's witnesses where he gave no specific reason for their unavailability. See Kosich v. N.Y. State Dep't of Health, 854 N.Y.S.2d 551, 554 (App. Div. 2008). The record showed Eggleston intended not to participate and that he could hear the proceedings (as evidenced by his substantive interruptions), and though evidence about connectivity conflicted, the hearing officer was in the best position to evaluate his conduct, see Peterson v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., Adult Protective Servs., 534 P.3d 869, 873 (Wash. Ct. App. 2023), and the reviewing court does not reweigh evidence, Langman v. Nev. Adm'rs, Inc., 114 Nev. 203, 210, 955 P.2d 188, 192 (1998). The court concluded Eggleston willfully declined to exercise his statutory rights. **Substantial-evidence argument (NRS 233B.135(3)(e)).** The applicable substantive statutes are NRS 432B.020 and NRS 432B.140. Under NRS 432B.020(1), "abuse or neglect of a child" includes negligent treatment or maltreatment as defined in NRS 432B.140, which occurs where a child "is without proper care, control or supervision" or lacks necessary care because of the faults or habits of the responsible person or their neglect or refusal to provide it when able. A finding is "clearly erroneous" when the reviewing court "on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Unionamerica Mortg. & Equity Tr. v. McDonald, 97 Nev. 210, 211-12, 626 P.2d 1272, 1273 (1981) (quoting United States v. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). Findings supported by substantial evidence are upheld. Pandelis Constr. Co. v. Jones-Viking Assoc., 103 Nev. 129, 130, 734 P.2d 1236, 1237 (1987); NRS 233B.135(3)(e). The court rejected Eggleston's contention that physical abuse was required, holding that under NRS 432B.020 in conjunction with NRS 432B.140, neglect may be established where a child lacks proper care, control, or supervision. The investigator's testimony - concerning Rodriguez's substance abuse and mental health issues, Eggleston's absences and admissions, his failure to follow the present danger plan, the near-drowning incident, and the bathroom incident - constituted substantial evidence. The court does not reevaluate the officer's weighing of evidence or credibility determinations. Langman, 114 Nev. at 210, 955 P.2d at 192; Grosjean v. Imperial Palace, Inc., 125 Nev. 349, 366, 212 P.3d 1068, 1080 (2009). The amended decision was therefore not clearly erroneous, and the court affirmed.

In plain language

This case grew out of a child-welfare investigation. According to the opinion, DFS became involved with Eggleston's family after Laura Rodriguez, the mother of two of Eggleston's children, allegedly expressed suicidal thoughts in December 2014 and was hospitalized on a psychiatric hold due to substance abuse and mental health concerns. Four minor children lived in the home: Eggleston and Rodriguez's two young children (ages 4 and 2 at the time) and two of Rodriguez's children from a prior relationship (ages 11 and 8). A DFS supervisor investigated and, according to the opinion, found a history of inadequate supervision and neglect. The opinion states that Eggleston spent long hours away teaching, admitted leaving most parenting to Rodriguez, and did not actively co-parent even when home. Rodriguez struggled with heavy alcohol and cocaine use. DFS created a "present danger plan" requiring Eggleston and Rodriguez's two adult daughters to provide 24-hour supervision of Rodriguez; all three signed it. After Rodriguez was readmitted to the hospital and the adult daughters said they were returning to college and could no longer supervise, DFS removed the children. They now live with a maternal aunt and uncle in Illinois. Eggleston moved to England during the proceedings. In early 2015, DFS notified Eggleston that the maltreatment allegations against him were "substantiated" - meaning, as defined in the opinion, that a report was investigated and credible evidence of abuse or neglect exists. His name was placed on a central registry. Eggleston appealed within DFS, lost, and then requested a formal administrative hearing. The hearing was delayed for years, largely because of Eggleston's repeated continuance requests, and finally took place over WebEx in September 2020. Eggleston sought another last-minute continuance and asked the hearing officer to disqualify herself. She reserved ruling, then denied both requests. The opinion describes Eggleston frequently interrupting the proceedings, claiming he could not hear despite interruptions showing otherwise, saying he needed to leave to pick up a child, and eventually dropping off the call. The hearing officer proceeded, heard DFS's evidence, and upheld the substantiation. After the district court sent the case back once for the officer to write out the supporting facts more clearly, the officer issued an amended decision, and the district court denied Eggleston's petition. On appeal, the Court of Appeals first rejected DFS's argument that the case should be thrown out because Eggleston served his petition improperly. The court found that Eggleston properly mailed his petition to the DFS interim director at the correct address on December 29, 2020, satisfying the service rules, so the district court had authority to hear the case. The court then addressed Eggleston's two main arguments. First, it held that Eggleston was given the opportunity required by law to present and challenge evidence, but chose not to participate. The court concluded he had ample time to prepare (five years of delays), was given chances to schedule the hearing, could have presented witnesses, and appeared to understand the proceedings despite claiming connectivity problems. Second, the court held that substantial evidence supported the finding of maltreatment. It explained that under Nevada law, abuse or neglect can be established when a child lacks proper care, control, or supervision - physical abuse is not required. The investigator's testimony about Rodriguez's substance abuse, Eggleston's absences, his failure to follow the safety plan, and specific incidents (including a child's near-drowning and children hiding in a bathroom from their intoxicated mother) supported the officer's conclusion. The court therefore affirmed.