FOLLETT VS. FOLLETT (FAMILY)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The Court of Appeals reviewed the district court's divorce-related decisions for an abuse of discretion, citing Williams v. Williams, 120 Nev. 559, 566, 97 P.3d 1124, 1129 (2004), and Davitian-Kostanian v. Kostanian, 139 Nev. 247, 252, 534 P.3d 700, 705 (2023). It recognized the district court's "inherent authority to interpret and enforce its decrees" under Byrd v. Byrd, 137 Nev. 587, 590, 501 P.3d 458, 462 (Ct. App. 2021), and NRS 125.240. Factual findings are reviewed deferentially and conclusions of law de novo. See Kilgore v. Kilgore, 135 Nev. 357, 359-60, 449 P.3d 843, 846 (2019). The court first disposed of Robert's challenge to the post-evidentiary-hearing findings on record-deficiency grounds. Robert did not request transcripts of the evidentiary hearing, as required by NRAP 9(a)(1), (2). The court noted that the supreme court had issued a notice citing NRAP 9 instructing Robert to file either a rough draft transcript request form or a certificate that no transcripts were being requested within 14 days, and that he filed neither. Applying Cuzze v. Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. of Nev., 123 Nev. 598, 603, 172 P.3d 131, 135 (2007), the court presumed the missing transcript supported the district court's findings and concluded substantial evidence supported the decision to grant clarification. The court declined to reweigh evidence or credibility determinations. See Grosjean v. Imperial Palace, Inc., 125 Nev. 349, 365-66, 212 P.3d 1068, 1080 (2009). The court treated as forfeited Robert's challenge to the denial of his NRCP 60(b)(3) motion to set aside the decree, because he presented no argument on that issue on appeal. See Palmieri v. Clark County, 131 Nev. 1028, 1033 n.2, 367 P.3d 442, 446 n.2 (Ct. App. 2015). The court likewise declined to address whether the district court erred in interpreting the decree to contain a five-year alimony duration, finding that Robert did not cogently argue the point. See Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006). On the substantive framework, the court reasoned that because Robert agreed to pay $1,000 per month in alimony in the joint petition, the alimony amount became final upon entry of the decree under NRS 123.080(4) (ratification and adoption of contracts between spouses into divorce decrees). Robert did not later seek modification based on changed circumstances under NRS 125.150(8), and Lisa sought clarification rather than modification. Drawing on the clarification-versus-modification distinction in Mizrachi v. Mizrachi, 132 Nev. 666, 674, 385 P.3d 982, 987 (Ct. App. 2016), the court held that because the district court was neither determining whether to award alimony nor setting the amount, it was not required to make findings under NRS 125.150(9). The district court instead "merely clarified and enforced the existing alimony award that the parties had previously agreed to." Citing Mizrachi, 132 Nev. at 671, 385 P.3d at 985, and Rennels v. Rennels, 127 Nev. 564, 569, 257 P.3d 396, 399 (2011), the court emphasized that parties may contract regarding their family-law obligations and that courts encourage voluntary resolution and recognize the preclusive effect of final agreements. Finding no abuse of discretion, the court affirmed, citing Davitian-Kostanian, 139 Nev. at 252, 534 P.3d at 705.

In plain language

Robert and Lisa Follett filed a joint petition for divorce in February 2025. In that petition, Robert agreed to pay Lisa $1,000 per month in alimony (financial support paid by one ex-spouse to the other) on the first of each month. The petition did not say how long these payments would last or when they would start. The district court granted the divorce and adopted the alimony terms exactly as written in the joint petition. Soon after, Lisa asked the court to clarify the decree. She argued that the decree left out how long the alimony would last, and she said the parties had intended a ten-year period of payments starting March 1, 2025. Robert responded by asking the court to set aside (cancel) the divorce decree. He claimed fraud: he said the version of the joint petition he reviewed and signed actually stated that neither spouse would pay the other alimony, and that Lisa had changed the petition before filing it. He wanted the court to vacate the decree and enter a new one saying neither spouse owed alimony. The district court held an evidentiary hearing, where both sides gave testimony and presented evidence, including Robert's paystub. The court then granted Lisa's request to clarify the decree and denied Robert's request to set it aside. The court found that the evidence showed the parties intended Robert to pay $1,000 per month for a five-year period, and that Robert had not proven the alimony award was obtained by fraud. On appeal, Robert argued the district court misread his paystub and failed to consider certain statutory factors. But there was a significant problem with his appeal: he never ordered transcripts of the evidentiary hearing, even after the supreme court specifically sent him a notice telling him he had 14 days to either request a transcript or file a certificate saying he was not requesting one. He did neither. Because the appellate court did not have a transcript of the hearing, it presumed the missing transcript supported what the district court decided. The Court of Appeals also explained that the district court was not deciding whether to award alimony or setting the amount for the first time — those terms were already final because Robert had agreed to them in the joint petition and they were incorporated into the divorce decree. Neither party had asked to change the alimony based on a change in circumstances. Instead, Lisa only asked the court to clarify an alimony award that already existed. For that reason, the court was not required to make the statutory findings that apply when a court is actually awarding or setting alimony. The Court of Appeals concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion and affirmed the decision.