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FRYE VS. FRYE (CHILD SUPPORT)

103 Nev. 301, 738 P.2d 505 (1987) · 17650 · Nevada Supreme Court · June 25, 1987

Disposition:Affirmed.Child Support

Posture Charles Frye appealed from a divorce decree of the district court that, on a theory of equitable adoption, ordered him to pay $150 per month in child support for his wife's daughter, whom he had not legally adopted. His sole contention on appeal was that equitable adoption should not extend to child support obligations.

Key holdings

- The doctrine of equitable adoption may be used to impose a duty to pay child support on the facts of this case. - Equitable adoption requires a promise to adopt; where a child, in reasonable and foreseeable reliance on that promise, is placed in a position where harm will result if the promise is repudiated, equity will supply a remedy. - Consistent with Sargeant v. Sargeant, one who merely stands in loco parentis, without a promise to adopt, may terminate that status at will. - Not every equitable adoption confers all the rights and obligations of a full legal adoption. - A district court's application of equitable adoption and choice of remedy are reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Practitioner summary

The court addressed whether the doctrine of equitable adoption may impose a duty to pay child support, holding that on these facts it may. Building on Sargeant v. Sargeant, 88 Nev. 223, 495 P.2d 618 (1972), the court reiterated that equitable adoption requires a promise to adopt; absent such a promise, one who places himself in loco parentis may terminate that status at will. Where, however, there is a promise to adopt and, in reasonable and foreseeable reliance on that promise, a child is placed in a position where harm will result if the promise is repudiated, Nevada courts will provide such remedies as equity requires. The father's intent to adopt, his promise, and his voluntary termination of the natural father's parental rights (leaving the child without recourse for support under State ex rel. Welfare Div. v. Vine, 99 Nev. 278, 662 P.2d 295 (1983)) supported the equitable adoption finding. Review was for abuse of discretion, and none was shown in either finding the doctrine applicable or in fashioning the remedy.

In plain language

Charles Frye married Cynthia in 1982. Cynthia had a young daughter, Amanda, from a prior marriage; Amanda was less than a year and a half old when the couple married, was treated as Charles's own child throughout the marriage, and came to see Charles as her only father. The couple discussed Charles adopting Amanda. Charles hired an attorney to handle the adoption and, to make it possible, took steps that terminated the parental rights of Amanda's biological father, knowing this would leave Amanda with no legal father unless he completed the adoption. Charles then signed a petition to adopt her. Before the adoption was finalized, the marriage fell apart and Charles filed for divorce, denying he owed any duty to support Amanda. The trial court ruled that Charles owed child support on a theory of "equitable adoption" and ordered him to pay $150 per month. Charles appealed, arguing the equitable adoption doctrine should not be stretched to create a child support obligation. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. The court explained that equitable adoption can apply where there is a promise to adopt and a child is harmed by reasonable reliance on that promise. Charles had shown a clear intent to adopt, backed by a promise, and had personally caused the termination of the biological father's rights, leaving Amanda without any father to look to for support. Allowing him to walk away would harm an innocent child who had justifiably relied on the promise that a new father would replace the old one. The court stressed it was not holding that every equitable adoption carries all the duties of a full legal adoption, only that on these particular facts equity required Charles to provide support.

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