GABROY VS. GABROY

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

**Standard of review — community property.** The court reviewed the district court's disposition of community property for abuse of discretion, citing Kogod v. Cioffi-Kogod, 135 Nev. 64, 75, 439 P.3d 397, 406 (2019). Factual findings are upheld if supported by substantial evidence, Ogawa v. Ogawa, 125 Nev. 660, 668, 221 P.3d 699, 704 (2009), where substantial evidence "is evidence that a reasonable person may accept as adequate to sustain a judgment," Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 149, 161 P.3d 239, 242 (2007). **Framework — marital waste/dissipation.** Under NRS 125.150(1)(b), a court must make an equal disposition of community property absent a "compelling reason." Kogod, 135 Nev. at 75, 439 P.3d at 406. Dissipation or waste may supply that compelling reason. Lofgren v. Lofgren, 112 Nev. 1282, 1283, 926 P.2d 296, 297 (1996). Dissipation "generally" refers to "one spouse's use of marital property for a selfish purpose unrelated to the marriage in contemplation of divorce or at a time when the marriage is in serious jeopardy or is undergoing an irretrievable breakdown." Kogod, 135 Nev. at 75-76, 439 P.3d at 406-07 (quoting 24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce & Separation § 524 (2018)); see also Dissipation, Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). **Application — waste finding.** The district court identified several credibility problems: the incongruity between a $5,000 monthly salary and an $800,000 lump sum, the failure to report the $800,000 loss on James's federal tax return despite reporting other employee-related losses, and James's shifting testimony (asserting on direct that he reported the loss, then conceding on cross that he did not). Deferring to the district court's credibility determinations under Ellis, 123 Nev. at 152, 161 P.3d at 244 ("will not reweigh credibility on appeal"), the court held substantial evidence supported the waste finding, citing persuasive authority Covelli v. Covelli, 718 N.W.2d 260, 268 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006), and In re Marriage of Thomas, 608 N.E.2d 585, 587 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). The court distinguished the lump-sum payment from "long-standing and regular" expenditures under Eivazi v. Eivazi, 139 Nev., Adv. Op. 44, 537 P.3d 476, 487 (Ct. App. 2023), and Kogod, 135 Nev. at 77, 439 P.3d at 408. **JPI reliance — harmless error.** A JPI restrains both parties during a pending divorce and remains effective until a decree or final judgment, or until dissolved or modified. Nelson v. Nelson, 136 Nev. 335, 338, 466 P.3d 1249, 1252 (2020). Former EDCR 5.517 (now EDCR 5.703) requires issuance of a JPI upon a party's request, and the record contained Pamela's request. Pamela conceded no JPI was ever issued. Applying harmless-error principles (cf. NRCP 61) and Khoury v. Seastrand, 132 Nev. 520, 539, 377 P.3d 81, 94 (2016), the court held James had not shown that, but for the district court's belief that a JPI existed, a different result might reasonably have been reached, because the waste finding rested independently on James's lack of credibility and the timing of the expenditure relative to the irretrievable breakdown. Kogod, 135 Nev. at 75-77, 439 P.3d at 406-07. **Alimony.** District courts have wide discretion over whether and how much alimony to award. Buchanan v. Buchanan, 90 Nev. 209, 215, 523 P.2d 1, 5 (1974). The court must form a judgment about what is just and equitable, Heim v. Heim, 104 Nev. 605, 609, 763 P.2d 678, 680 (1988), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 116 Nev. 993, 994-96, 13 P.3d 415, 416-17 (2000), and must consider the factors in NRS 125.150(9). The court held the district court adequately evaluated the NRS 125.150(9) factors, made minimally adequate findings on seven of them, and appropriately declined to make specific findings as to Pamela's pre-marriage career and homemaker contributions because neither party presented evidence on those points, deeming them neutral or inapplicable. See Schaefer v. White, No. 87866-COA, 2024 WL 4249070, *3 (Nev. Ct. App. Sept. 19, 2024) (Order of Affirmance). The court concluded the $1,150-per-month, five-year award was supported by substantial evidence and complied with NRS 125.150(9). **Waived arguments.** James's contention that the court improperly modified the $2,500 pretrial support award was belied by the July 2020 order reflecting the parties' stipulation, and was inadequately supported. His challenge to the exclusion of offshore-account evidence was not considered because he cited no record documents and offered no cogent argument or relevant authority. Both rulings invoked Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006).

In plain language

James and Pamela Gabroy were married for eighteen years. Pamela filed for divorce in September 2019, citing incompatibility. James was an internist (a physician) who had owned and operated his own medical practice for years. He had sold that practice for $800,000 in 2016 but kept working there as an independent contractor for three more years. When his contract was not renewed, he set about reopening the office under his own name. On Pamela's recommendation, James hired a woman named Queenie Manuel around June 2019 to help him with the licensing and credentialing process. Manuel presented herself as an experienced medical credentialist with insurance-industry connections. James agreed to pay her $5,000 a month. The marriage was breaking down at the same time. Over Labor Day weekend in 2019, Pamela said James displayed a revolver during an argument. She obtained a temporary protection order and filed for divorce shortly afterward. She also asked the court for a "joint preliminary injunction" (JPI) — an order that would have frozen both spouses from moving money out of shared accounts while the divorce was pending — but the record shows the court never actually issued one. At an October 2019 hearing, the court ordered the couple to figure out a firm cost to reopen James's practice and to release community funds for that purpose. Four days after that hearing, James wrote Manuel a check for $800,000. He said the money was supposed to go toward licensing, medical equipment, and even a dental practice for low-income patients. But Manuel vanished with the money. James reported her to police, and she was never found. Notably, James did not report this $800,000 loss on his federal tax return, even though he reported other, smaller losses. James later sold his practice to another doctor for $180,000 — far less than the $800,000 he had received for it in 2016 and the same $800,000 he had just handed Manuel. In February 2020, James fell down a flight of stairs, fractured his skull, and injured his back. The court suspended his temporary spousal support because of his health, and the parties later stipulated (formally agreed) to that suspension. James spent eighteen months recovering in an assisted living facility. In October 2022, Pamela amended her divorce complaint to allege that James had committed "marital waste" — that is, wrongly wasting or destroying property belonging to the marriage. James denied it and accused Pamela of the same. After a trial, the district court found that James's $800,000 payment to Manuel was indeed marital waste and ordered him to reimburse Pamela for the community's share of that money. The court also awarded Pamela $1,150 per month in alimony for five years (ending sooner if she died or remarried). On appeal, James argued three things. First, he said the $800,000 payment simply followed the court's own order to release community funds to reopen his practice, so it could not be waste. The Court of Appeals disagreed. The trial court had found James's testimony not credible — questioning why he would pay a $5,000-per-month employee an $800,000 lump sum, and pointing out that he first testified he had written off the loss on his taxes but then admitted on cross-examination that he had not. Because appellate courts do not re-weigh a trial judge's assessment of who is believable, and because there was enough evidence to support the finding, the appeals court upheld the waste finding. James also argued the trial court wrongly relied on a violation of a JPI, since no JPI ever existed. Pamela conceded no JPI was issued but argued the mistake did no harm. The appeals court agreed it was "harmless error" — meaning the mistake would not have changed the result — because the waste finding rested on other, sufficient evidence, and because James made this unusually large payment right after Pamela filed for divorce, when the marriage was already broken. Second, James argued the court did not properly weigh the legally required factors before awarding alimony. The appeals court found the trial court had adequately considered the required factors, made findings on most of them, and treated as neutral or inapplicable the factors on which neither party presented evidence. Even while noting that "many courts would not have ordered alimony" given James's age, health, and reduced finances, the appeals court held the award was supported by the evidence and complied with the statute. Third, James argued the court wrongly excluded evidence about Pamela's alleged offshore bank accounts. The appeals court declined to consider this argument because James did not cite the record or provide adequate legal support.