GARCIA RODRIGUEZ VS. LEON-YANEZ

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

**Standard of review.** The court reviewed the distribution of community property, orders concerning omitted assets, child support, alimony, and attorney fees each for abuse of discretion. See Kogod v. Cioffi-Kogod, 135 Nev. 64, 75, 439 P.3d 397, 406 (2019); Doan v. Wilkerson, 130 Nev. 449, 453, 327 P.3d 498, 501 (2014); Miller v. Miller, 134 Nev. 120, 125, 412 P.3d 1081, 1085 (2018); Miller v. Wilfong, 121 Nev. 619, 622, 119 P.3d 727, 729 (2005). Orders resolving NRCP 60(b) motions are also reviewed for abuse of discretion. Willard v. Berry-Hinckley Indus., 139 Nev., Adv. Op. 52, 539 P.3d 250, 255 (2023). Factual findings are upheld unless clearly erroneous or unsupported by substantial evidence, Ogawa v. Ogawa, 125 Nev. 660, 668, 221 P.3d 699, 704 (2009), with substantial evidence being that which a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to sustain a judgment, Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 149, 161 P.3d 239, 242 (2007). An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision is not supported by substantial evidence, Otak Nev., LLC v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 129 Nev. 799, 805, 312 P.3d 491, 496 (2013), but "deference is not owed to legal error, or to findings so conclusory they may mask legal error." Davis v. Ewalefo, 131 Nev. 445, 450, 352 P.3d 1139, 1142 (2015). **Community property.** Under NRS 125.150(1)(b), the district court must equally divide community property unless it finds a compelling reason for an unequal distribution and sets forth its reasons in writing. Addressing the decree's ambiguous reference to Ashton and Pine Street "properties," the court held that the decree's statement that the "properties" shared the same legal description demonstrated the district court intended to award Leon-Yanez only the single P&A Street property, consistent with her prove-up testimony. See Holt v. Regl Tr. Servs. Corp., 127 Nev. 886, 895, 266 P.3d 602, 608 (2011) (appellate court may consult the record to construe an ambiguous order). As to the Division Street property - not expressly mentioned in the decree and not covered by the decree's personal-property catchall provision - the court construed the post-decree order as awarding it to Garcia Rodriguez. It reasoned that the district court could properly adjudicate that omitted, non-litigated asset under NRS 125.150(3), citing Doan, 130 Nev. at 456, 327 P.3d at 503 (inquiry is whether the asset was litigated and adjudicated, i.e., mentioned in court documents, disclosed, and considered). The resulting one-to-one distribution of real property matched what Garcia Rodriguez contended was required. Because he offered no cogent argument as to how he was aggrieved by the allocation of remaining property, the court affirmed. See NRAP 3A(a); Valley Bank of Nev. v. Ginsburg, 110 Nev. 440, 446, 874 P.2d 729, 734 (1994); Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006). **Child support.** Under NRS 125B.145(4), the district court has discretion to modify child support at any time on a showing of changed circumstances. The initial obligation had been set on Garcia Rodriguez's April 2021 FDF (GMI of $4,028: $3,828 employment plus $700 rental). His July 2022 amended FDF showed GMI decreased to $3,298, entirely from employment. The district court declined to modify child support based solely on the incomplete June 2022 FDF, without addressing the complete July 2022 amended FDF it had granted him leave to file. The court rejected Leon-Yanez's default/deemed-admissions theory (EDCR 2.69(c); Estate of Lomastro v. Am. Fam. Ins. Grp., 124 Nev. 1060, 1068 n.14, 195 P.3d 339, 345 n.14 (2008)), noting the district court never found willful underemployment - distinguishing Minnear v. Minnear, 107 Nev. 495, 498, 814 P.2d 85, 86-87 (1991). Because the district court failed to consider whether the alleged change in circumstances warranted review, see Rivero v. Rivero, 125 Nev. 410, 431-32, 216 P.3d 213, 228 (2009) (overruled on other grounds by Romano v. Romano, 138 Nev. 1, 6, 501 P.3d 980, 984 (2022), abrogated on other grounds by Killebrew v. State ex rel. Donohue, 139 Nev., Adv. Op. 43, 535 P.3d 1167, 1171 (2023)), it abused its discretion. See Miller, 134 Nev. at 125, 412 P.3d at 1085. The court reversed and remanded for consideration of the July 2022 amended FDF. **Alimony.** Leon-Yanez's failure to file a cross-appeal barred her challenge to the modification itself. Ford v. Showboat Operating Co., 110 Nev. 752, 755, 877 P.2d 546, 548 (1994). The only question properly before the court was whether the obligation should have been reduced below $700; insofar as Garcia Rodriguez challenged the decree's original $1,500 obligation, that portion was moot. Personhood Nev. v. Bristol, 126 Nev. 599, 602, 245 P.3d 572, 574 (2010). In modifying alimony under NRS 125.150(8), the district court relied on paystubs attached to the June 2022 FDF and assumed continued $700 monthly rental income, while ignoring the July 2022 amended FDF - the most current form - which showed an employer change, employment income of $3,298, and no rental income. That failure was an abuse of discretion. Kogod, 135 Nev. at 66, 439 P.3d at 400. Because it was unclear whether the district court would have reduced the obligation below $700 based on the July 2022 FDF, the court reversed and remanded. **Attorney fees.** In family law cases, the court must consider the Brunzell factors, Brunzell v. Golden Gate National Bank, 85 Nev. 345, 349, 455 P.2d 31, 33 (1969), and the disparity in the parties' income under Wright v. Osburn, 114 Nev. 1367, 1370, 970 P.2d 1071, 1073 (1998). See Miller, 121 Nev. at 623-24, 119 P.3d at 730. The court rejected Garcia Rodriguez's challenge to the Sargeant-based (Sargeant v. Sargeant, 88 Nev. 223, 226-27, 495 P.2d 618, 620-21 (1972)) income-disparity rationale, since his reliance on the July 2022 FDF reflected a post-decree income change while the disparity was assessed as of the period leading up to the decree. It also held he could not obtain reversal of the fee award insofar as it rested on his failure to appear at calendar call (EDCR 2.69(c)), because he failed to revisit whether his justification supported NRCP 60(b) relief. See Hung v. Genting Berhad, 138 Nev., Adv. Op. 50, 513 P.3d 1285, 1287 (Ct. App. 2022); Bd. of Gallery of History, Inc. v. Datecs Corp., 116 Nev. 286, 289, 994 P.2d 1149, 1150 (2000). However, because Leon-Yanez only summarily addressed two Brunzell factors and the district court neither analyzed nor mentioned the factors, the record did not demonstrate the factors were considered, requiring reversal. Logan v. Abe, 131 Nev. 260, 266, 350 P.3d 1139, 1143 (2015).

In plain language

This case arose from a divorce between Joseph Raul Garcia Rodriguez and Zoila Leon-Yanez. Their disputes centered on how to divide their shared property, how much Garcia Rodriguez should pay in child support and alimony (spousal support), and whether he should pay Leon-Yanez's attorney fees. Early in the case, Garcia Rodriguez was representing himself. He did not file a required document (a pre-trial memorandum) and did not show up to a court date called "calendar call." Because of that, the court treated him as being in "default" - meaning it proceeded without his participation - and held a hearing where only Leon-Yanez testified. Based on her testimony, the court entered a divorce decree that gave Leon-Yanez a piece of real estate (a corner building with two units, one on Pine Street and one on Ashton Street, called the "P&A Street property"), ordered Garcia Rodriguez to pay $1,500 per month in alimony for 10 years, set his child support at $1,128 per month, and required him to pay $5,500 of Leon-Yanez's attorney fees. Garcia Rodriguez then hired a lawyer and asked the court to undo the decree. He argued he did not understand the court's procedural requirements, that the support amounts did not match his actual income, that the property was divided unequally, and that the attorney fee award was not properly justified. He also raised a concern that a second property - one on Division Street - had accidentally been swept into the award to Leon-Yanez. The district court refused to set the decree aside but treated part of his request as a motion to change (modify) his support obligations. It refused to lower child support, saying a financial disclosure form (FDF) he filed in June 2022 was missing a page. But it did lower alimony to $700 per month. Notably, Garcia Rodriguez had filed a corrected, complete FDF in July 2022, and the district court never discussed that updated form when deciding these issues. On appeal, the Court of Appeals sorted out the property question first. It concluded that, reading the decree together with the record, Leon-Yanez received only the P&A Street property (not two separate properties), and that the court's later order effectively awarded the Division Street property to Garcia Rodriguez. That produced a one-for-one split of the two real properties - exactly the equal division Garcia Rodriguez said was required. Because he did not explain how he was harmed by the rest of the property allocation, the court affirmed the property decisions. On child support, the appeals court found the district court made a mistake by refusing to consider the more recent July 2022 FDF, which showed his income had dropped. On alimony, the court found the same mistake: the district court relied on older figures and an assumption that Garcia Rodriguez still received rental income, without considering the July 2022 form showing he no longer did. On attorney fees, the court held that the district court failed to analyze the required factors (known as the Brunzell factors) before ordering him to pay $5,500. The result: the appeals court affirmed the property division but reversed the child support, alimony, and attorney fee rulings and sent the case back to the district court to reconsider those issues in light of the July 2022 amended FDF and the required legal factors.