GLICKMAN VS. GLICKMAN (CHILD CUSTODY)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The Court of Appeals reviewed the district court's child custody determinations for an abuse of discretion. Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 149, 161 P.3d 239, 241 (2007). When evaluating best interest, the district court must consider all twelve factors in NRS 125C.0035(4), and the written decree must contain findings on those factors tied to the ultimate custody determination. Davis v. Ewalefo, 131 Nev. 445, 450-51, 352 P.3d 1139, 1143 (2015). The court presumes the district court properly exercised its discretion in determining the child's best interest, Flynn v. Flynn, 120 Nev. 436, 440, 92 P.3d 1224, 1226-27 (2004), but "deference is not owed to legal error, or to findings so conclusory they may mask legal error," Davis, 131 Nev. at 450, 352 P.3d at 1142. On review, the court focuses on whether the district court reached its conclusions for the appropriate legal reasons and whether its factual findings were supported by substantial evidence. Ellis, 123 Nev. at 149, 161 P.3d at 241-42; Sims v. Sims, 109 Nev. 1146, 1148, 865 P.2d 328, 330 (1993). Substantial evidence is "evidence that a reasonable person may accept as adequate to sustain a judgment." Ellis, 123 Nev. at 149, 161 P.3d at 242. The court first noted what Scott did not challenge: he did not challenge the best-interest findings, nor did he contend that he overcame NRS 125C.0035(5)'s presumption against joint physical custody based on the finding of clear and convincing evidence of domestic violence. His argument instead targeted the sufficiency of his parenting time, contending the order was sole physical custody in substance, requiring an unfitness finding the court never made. Applying Roe v. Roe, 139 Nev. 163, 174, 535 P.3d 274, 287 (Ct. App. 2023), the court explained that sole physical custody exists "where the child resides with only one parent and the noncustodial parent's parenting time is restricted to no significant in-person parenting time," with examples including restrictive supervised time, virtual contact, phone calls, letters, texts, or a very limited block of hours on a single day. Because stage one awarded Scott two weekends of in-person parenting time per month, including unsupervised overnight visits, the arrangement was not sole physical custody, and no fitness finding was required. The court next held the finding that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated Scott engaged in domestic violence was supported by substantial evidence, triggering the requirement to craft a protective parenting arrangement. See Soldo-Allesio v. Ferguson, 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 9, 565 P.3d 842, 849 (Ct. App. 2025) (a court must find clear and convincing evidence of domestic violence to apply NRS 125C.0035(5)'s presumption against joint physical custody); NRS 125C.0035(5)(b) (once domestic violence is found by clear and convincing evidence, the court must enter a parenting time arrangement that adequately protects the child and other parent). Scott presented no argument that the district court abused its discretion in limiting his parenting time as required by NRS 125C.0035(5)(b) to address safety concerns. On the constitutional claims - a Fourteenth Amendment right-to-travel challenge to the Clark County restriction and an equal-protection challenge premised on Nicole being permitted to take A.M. to Arizona - the court declined to reach the merits, holding Scott failed to cogently argue or adequately support his position. See Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006). The court nonetheless observed that the limitations rested on the child's best interest and substantial evidence, and that the domestic-violence finding required an order protecting A.M. and Nicole under NRS 125C.0035(5)(b); to the extent Scott argued the parties were similarly situated or the evidence was insufficient, the court found no abuse of discretion. See Roe, 139 Nev. at 169, 535 P.3d at 284. On the delegation argument, the court applied the principle that district courts may direct an investigation to assist in determining the appropriate custodial award, Roe, 139 Nev. at 178, 535 P.3d at 290; NRS 125C.0025(2), but must retain "the ultimate decision-making power regarding custody determinations" and cannot delegate the power "to modify[] the underlying custody arrangement," Bautista v. Picone, 134 Nev. 334, 337, 419 P.3d 157, 159 (2018). In Roe, delegation was impermissible where the court allowed a reunification therapist to determine when a parent was ready for any modification of the parenting time schedule. 139 Nev. at 178, 535 P.3d at 290. Here, the court found nothing in the order showing the district court delegated its decision-making authority by requiring a second psychological evaluation, and rejected the claim. The court also declined to address Scott's argument that the order's "WITHOUT INCIDENT" language was ambiguous, citing Edwards and noting Scott could have sought clarification from the district court but did not.

In plain language

Scott and Nicole Glickman married in December 2019 and have one child, A.M., born in April 2021. Scott filed for divorce in July 2022, and Nicole filed a counterclaim. Both agreed to share joint legal custody (the authority to make major decisions about the child), but each wanted primary physical custody (the arrangement governing where the child mainly lives). Early in the case, Nicole asked the court for temporary primary physical custody, saying Scott had committed acts of domestic violence against her and against her son from a prior relationship. Scott opposed and made his own domestic-violence allegations against Nicole. After a hearing at which the court said it had "grave reservations" about Scott's behavior, the court temporarily gave Nicole primary physical custody and gave Scott supervised parenting time twice a week. Over the course of the litigation, the court adjusted these temporary arrangements several times, gradually giving Scott more unsupervised time. The court then held a trial over several days to decide a permanent arrangement. It heard conflicting testimony about who had committed domestic violence. Witnesses testified that on July 4, 2022, Scott placed one of Nicole's children in a headlock. Nicole testified that, in an August 2021 garage incident, Scott pushed her into moving dollies on the floor, causing bruising she documented with photographs admitted into evidence; she also testified Scott put a knee into her C-section incision and choked her on two occasions. Scott denied these accounts and said it was Nicole who had struck him - punching and scratching him - and he offered photographs of a bloody lip. Scott's son from a prior marriage testified that he had seen marks on his father's face but was unsure whether they were related to domestic violence. While the parties awaited the final written order, Nicole filed another motion alleging that during a May 29, 2024, custody exchange, Scott assaulted her. She testified that Scott did not have a suitable car seat and restrained the three-year-old with only a lap belt, leading her to open the car door to remove the child, and that Scott grabbed her arm hard enough to leave nail marks. She offered video evidence, which the court admitted. Scott said he had an adequate travel car seat, denied grabbing her arm, said he only "blocked her," but admitted touching her arm multiple times without consent and said he would "[a]bsolutely" do so again. In February 2025, the court issued its final findings. It found Nicole and her witnesses credible, found that Scott had engaged in domestic violence in several incidents, and did not find any of Scott's allegations against Nicole credible. After analyzing the statutory best-interest factors, the court awarded joint legal custody but primary physical custody to Nicole. It also found, by clear and convincing evidence, that Scott had committed domestic violence, which created a legal presumption against awarding him joint or sole physical custody - a presumption the court found Scott did not overcome. The court built a two-stage parenting plan. In stage one, Scott - who had moved to Florida during the case - would have bi-monthly weekend visits in Clark County, Nevada, from Friday afternoon to Sunday afternoon. Stage two would begin only after Scott completed six months of consistent visits without any further domestic-violence incidents and submitted to a psychological evaluation by a qualified provider who had reviewed the court's findings, following all treatment recommendations. In stage two, Scott could elect to have A.M. spend the first five days of each month with him in Florida. Both parents were given a daily video call when the child was with the other parent. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rejected each of Scott's arguments. It held that what the court ordered was primary physical custody, not sole physical custody, because Scott received two weekends of in-person parenting time per month, including unsupervised overnight visits - so the court was not required to find Scott unfit. It held that the domestic-violence finding was supported by substantial evidence, which meant the court was required to craft a parenting plan that protected both the child and Nicole. It declined to reach Scott's constitutional arguments about travel and equal protection because he did not cogently argue them, while also noting the restrictions were supported by substantial evidence. And it held the court did not improperly hand its decision-making power to an evaluator by requiring a psychological evaluation before stage two. The court affirmed.