GOLDSTEIN VS. GOLDSTEIN

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The Court of Appeals reviewed the attorney fee award for abuse of discretion. Logan v. Abe, 131 Nev. 260, 266, 350 P.3d 1139, 1143 (2015). An abuse of discretion "can occur when the district court bases its decision on a clearly erroneous factual determination or disregards controlling law." LVMPD v. Blackjack Bonding, Inc., 131 Nev. 80, 89, 343 P.3d 608, 614 (2015). A district court generally may not award attorney fees absent authority under a statute, rule, or contract. Liu v. Christopher Homes, LLC, 130 Nev. 147, 151, 321 P.3d 875, 878 (2014). In family law matters, courts must consider the disparity in the parties' income, Wright v. Osburn, 114 Nev. 1367, 1370, 970 P.2d 1071, 1073 (1998), and fees may be awarded in a divorce action so a party is "able to meet [their] adversary in the courtroom on an equal basis," Sargeant v. Sargeant, 88 Nev. 223, 227, 495 P.2d 618, 621 (1972). The district court grounded its award on NRS 125.150(1)(b), treating the parties' litigation attorney fees as a community obligation subject to unequal disposition upon a finding of improper litigation tactics wasting community assets, citing Lofgren v. Lofgren, 112 Nev. 1282, 1283, 926 P.2d 296, 297 (1996). The Court of Appeals rejected this basis. Relying on Barry v. Lindner, 119 Nev. 661, 671, 81 P.3d 537, 543 (2003) (superseded by rule on other grounds as stated in LaBarbera v. Wynn Las Vegas, LLC, 134 Nev. 393, 395, 422 P.3d 138, 140 (2018)), and Franklin v. Franklin, No. 84334, 2024 WL 3085490, at *5 (Nev. June 20, 2024), the court reasoned that debt incurred after separation and not for the benefit of the community is not community debt. Because the litigation fees were acquired after the parties separated and were not for the community's benefit, they were not a community obligation, and the district court could not award fees on that basis. Liu, 130 Nev. at 151, 321 P.3d at 878. The court nevertheless affirmed on the alternative ground Sandy had asserted below: NRS 18.010(2)(b). Under that provision, a court may award fees to a prevailing party when "the court finds that the claim ... of the opposing party was brought or maintained without reasonable ground or to harass the prevailing party." The statute is to be liberally construed in favor of awarding fees "in all appropriate situations to punish for and deter frivolous or vexatious claims and defenses." NRS 18.010(2)(b). There must be record evidence supporting the proposition that a claim was brought or maintained without reasonable grounds. Chowdhry v. NLVH, Inc., 109 Nev. 478, 486, 851 P.2d 459, 464 (1993). "For purposes of NRS 18.010(2)(b), a claim is frivolous or groundless if there is no credible evidence to support it." Rodriguez v. Primadonna Co., 125 Nev. 578, 588, 216 P.3d 793, 800 (2009). The court found the district court's detailed written findings—as to Adam's bad-faith opposition to relocation, his unsubstantiated alcoholism claim, his withholding of the children, and his improper influence on a child's trial testimony (which necessitated additional motion practice and a second child interview)—were supported by substantial evidence. See Allianz Ins. Co. v. Gagnon, 109 Nev. 990, 996, 860 P.2d 720, 724 (1993). Adam did not appeal the underlying custody and relocation order, and no one disputed Sandy was the prevailing party. See Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't, 131 Nev. at 90, 343 P.3d at 615 ("[a] party prevails if it succeeds on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit it sought in bringing suit"). Because Adam conceded in his reply brief that those findings are the basis outlined in NRS 18.010(2)(b) to support a fee award, the court treated the point as conceded and affirmed under the right-result/wrong-reason doctrine. Saavedra-Sandoval v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 126 Nev. 592, 599, 245 P.3d 1198, 1202 (2010); Ozawa v. Vision Airlines, Inc., 125 Nev. 556, 563, 216 P.3d 788, 793 (2009). The court also cited NRS 125.150(4) and NRS 125C.250 as authorities permitting fee awards. The court found no abuse of discretion in finding fees warranted. See Bergmann v. Boyce, 109 Nev. 670, 675, 856 P.2d 560, 563 (1993). The court rejected Adam's Sargeant and Wright disparity-of-income arguments, noting the district court found the parties had essentially the same net income after accounting for Sandy's rental and travel expenses and Adam's minimal housing expenses, and that there was parity given Adam's alimony award. On reasonableness, the court found the district court applied the Brunzell v. Golden Gate National Bank, 85 Nev. 345, 349, 455 P.2d 31, 33 (1969), factors and provided sufficient reasoning, including reductions of certain fees and omission of certain billing entries. In a footnote, the court rejected Adam's argument regarding fees tied to his efforts to preserve separate property, finding the awarded categories did not include such fees and that Adam failed to show any error was prejudicial rather than harmless. See Wyeth v. Rowatt, 126 Nev. 446, 465, 244 P.3d 765, 778 (2010); cf. NRCP 61.

In plain language

Adam and Sandy Goldstein married in April 2011 and went through divorce and child custody proceedings beginning in 2019 after Sandy filed for divorce and custody. The case was split into two parts (a "bifurcated" trial): a custody trial in May 2021 and a financial trial in September 2021. In May 2022, the district court awarded Sandy primary physical custody and permission to move with the children to Colorado, finding that Adam had opposed the relocation in bad faith. The court also found that Adam had made unsubstantiated claims that Sandy was an alcoholic, withheld parenting time from Sandy, influenced one of the children's testimony, and made an unsubstantiated claim of educational neglect to gain an advantage. The court issued a separate divorce decree on financial issues that included alimony for Adam. Adam did not appeal any of those orders. After those rulings, both parties asked for attorney fees. Sandy requested fees under a Nevada statute and argued that Adam's bad-faith conduct drove up the cost of the litigation. The district court denied Adam's request and granted Sandy's. The court reasoned that the attorney fees were a "community obligation" (a shared marital debt) and that it could divide that debt unequally because Adam had engaged in improper litigation tactics that wasted shared marital assets. After Sandy submitted billing records seeking $194,861.25, the court reduced that figure—cutting certain "block billing" entries it could not allocate, reducing the custody-trial fees by 30 percent, and reducing the total by another 20 percent for time spent supervising a junior attorney—and awarded $124,627.12. On appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed with Adam on one point: the attorney fees should not have been treated as a community obligation. Drawing on prior Nevada cases, the court explained that debt incurred after spouses separate, and not for the benefit of the marriage, is not community debt. Because these fees were incurred after separation and did not benefit the community, the district court could not use that as the basis for the award. However, the Court of Appeals affirmed anyway. Under the rule that an appellate court will uphold a lower court's decision if it reached the right result even for the wrong reason, the court looked to a different legal basis that Sandy had raised below: a statute allowing fees against a party who brings or maintains claims without reasonable grounds or to harass the other party. The district court had already made detailed written findings that Adam pursued frivolous and bad-faith positions—on relocation, the alcoholism allegation, withholding the children, and influencing a child's testimony. Importantly, the Court of Appeals noted that Adam, in his reply brief, conceded that those findings were the type that would support a fee award under that statute. Because Sandy was the prevailing party and the findings supporting a fee award were backed by substantial evidence, the court held the fee award could stand. The court also rejected Adam's arguments that the district court ignored the income disparity between the parties and that the amount awarded was unreasonable. The record showed the court did consider income—finding the parties had essentially equal net income after accounting for Sandy's rental and travel costs versus Adam's low housing expenses, and noting Adam received alimony—and that the court applied the established factors for setting a reasonable fee amount and explained its reductions.