Gonzales-Alpizar v. Griffith

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The court resolved two issues of first impression: (1) whether a Costa Rican spousal and child support order is enforceable in Nevada under UIFSA, codified at NRS Chapter 130, and (2) whether it may be enforced under the doctrine of comity. **UIFSA.** UIFSA governs multiple-jurisdiction involvement in child support issues and aims to ensure that only one child support order is effective at any given time. See Vaile v. Porsboll, 128 Nev. __, __, 268 P.3d 1272, 1274 (2012). Under NRS 130.10179(2), a foreign country qualifies as a "state" if one of three conditions is met: (1) it has been declared a foreign reciprocating country under federal law; (2) the Attorney General has declared it a "state" because it has reciprocal provisions ensuring enforcement of support orders, NRS 130.035(1); or (3) it has enacted law or established procedures for enforcing support orders substantially similar to UIFSA. The parties did not dispute that Costa Rica has not been declared a foreign reciprocating country under federal law, see NRS 130.10179(2)(b), and the Attorney General has not made a declaration under NRS 130.035(1); the court also noted the Nevada Department of Health and Human Services Child Support Enforcement Manual, which does not list Costa Rica among reciprocating countries. As to the third method, the court held that Gonzales-Alpizar's comparison of Nevada's and Costa Rica's substantive child support laws "is not the relevant inquiry." A foreign country may be considered a "state" only if it has laws or procedures allowing a foreign judgment to be recognized - i.e., laws on reciprocity - that are "substantially similar" to UIFSA. See NRS 130.10179(2); Haker-Volkening v. Haker, 547 S.E.2d 127, 131 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001). Because Gonzales-Alpizar did not establish that Costa Rica was a "state," the 2005 order is not enforceable under UIFSA. **Comity.** Comity is a principle by which "the courts of one jurisdiction may give effect to the laws and judicial decisions of another jurisdiction out of deference and respect." Mianecki v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 99 Nev. 93, 98, 658 P.2d 422, 424-25 (1983). The court adopted Section 482 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1987) to analyze whether a foreign spousal and child support award should be recognized under comity, noting the Ninth Circuit's adoption of the Restatement approach in Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 810 (9th Cir. 1997), state-court decisions including Office of Child Support v. Sholan, 782 A.2d 1199, 1203-04 (Vt. 2001), and consistency with Nevada's Full Faith and Credit jurisprudence, under which Nevada courts will refuse to recognize a sister-state judgment upon "a showing of fraud, lack of due process, or lack of jurisdiction in the rendering state." Rosenstein v. Steele, 103 Nev. 571, 573, 747 P.2d 230, 231 (1987). **Due process.** Due process in relation to comity encompasses the idea that the order was granted after "proper service or voluntary appearance of the defendant." Wilson, 127 F.3d at 811; see Browning v. Dixon, 114 Nev. 218, 217, 954 P.2d 741, 743 (1998) (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)). The record showed Griffith was reasonably made aware he was being served with legal papers, personally handed to him in an attorney's office, despite his inability to understand Spanish. Substantial evidence supported the district court's finding of proper service, and factual findings supported by substantial evidence will not be disturbed. Bedore v. Familian, 122 Nev. 5, 9-10, 125 P.3d 1168, 1171 (2006). **Fraud / premarital agreement.** Griffith argued the spousal support award was procured through fraud because Gonzales-Alpizar failed to disclose the premarital agreement, which precluded spousal support. Gonzales-Alpizar contended the agreement was unenforceable because she did not execute it knowingly or voluntarily and because it was unconscionable. See NRS 123A.080(1)(a) and (b). The validity of a premarital agreement is reviewed de novo. Fick v. Fick, 109 Nev. 458, 463, 851 P.2d 445, 449 (1993); Sogg v. Nev. State Bank, 108 Nev. 308, 312, 832 P.2d 781, 783 (1992); see also NRS 123A.080(3). The court found Gonzales-Alpizar knowingly and voluntarily signed the agreement and failed to demonstrate unconscionability; the district court did not commit reversible error in concluding the agreement was enforceable. See NRS 123A.080(1) and (2). Because the agreement is enforceable, the court declined to recognize the spousal support order under comity where a spouse purposefully failed to provide the governing premarital agreement to the foreign court. **Child support.** The nondisclosure of the premarital agreement would not necessarily bar enforcement of the child support portion, because the agreement contained no provision concerning child support. But the district court made no specific findings on Griffith's claims that Gonzales-Alpizar misrepresented his parental relationship with Nicolle and misrepresented his income and properties, instead deferring those issues to Costa Rica. The Supreme Court remanded for findings of fact and conclusions of law under the Restatement (Third) approach and a determination whether the child support portion should be enforced as a matter of comity. The court reversed the portion of the district court's order concluding it may have to enforce the spousal support provision if determined valid in Costa Rica, and affirmed in all other respects.

In plain language

Edwin Griffith, a Reno resident, married Gabriela Gonzales-Alpizar, a citizen of Costa Rica, in Costa Rica in 1999. Before the wedding, the couple signed a premarital agreement that, among other things, waived any claim for alimony (spousal support) unless a divorce would leave one spouse eligible for public assistance. The couple lived in Reno with Gonzales-Alpizar's daughter Nicolle and their son Anthony, but the marriage deteriorated. In 2003, during a family trip to Costa Rica, Gonzales-Alpizar refused to return to Reno, and Griffith came home alone. In 2005, while Griffith was in Costa Rica to discuss a divorce settlement, he was allegedly served with a "Demand for Alimony," which under Costa Rican law covers both spousal and child support. The parties tell very different stories about what happened - Gonzales-Alpizar says Griffith understood he was being served and angrily threw the papers to the floor; Griffith says a stranger read something aloud in Spanish that he could not understand and he left with no paperwork. When Griffith did not respond, a Costa Rican court entered a default judgment ordering him to pay $180 per month in spousal support and $235 per month in child support for each of the two children. Gonzales-Alpizar never told the Costa Rican court about the premarital agreement. In 2007, a Costa Rican court granted Gonzales-Alpizar a divorce, with service made only by publication in Costa Rica even though she knew Griffith lived in Nevada. Griffith also filed for divorce in Nevada. The Nevada district court decided the parties had already been effectively divorced in Costa Rica, refused to enforce the spousal support and child custody provisions of the 2007 Costa Rican decree because service in that proceeding was invalid, but found that Griffith had been served in the 2005 support proceeding. The district court said the 2005 support order could be enforced if it was valid under Costa Rican law, and directed the parties to litigate Griffith's defenses in Costa Rica. Both sides appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court addressed two questions of first impression. First, it examined the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), a law codified in NRS Chapter 130 that lets Nevada courts enforce support orders from other "states," including foreign countries in certain circumstances. The court held that Costa Rica does not qualify as a "state" under any of the three methods in the statute: it has not been declared a foreign reciprocating country under federal law; Nevada's Attorney General has not declared it a "state"; and Gonzales-Alpizar failed to show that Costa Rica has procedures for enforcing foreign support orders that are "substantially similar" to UIFSA. Comparing how Nevada and Costa Rica calculate child support, the court explained, is not the relevant inquiry - what matters is whether Costa Rica has laws allowing foreign judgments to be recognized (that is, reciprocity). Second, the court considered "comity" - a principle of courtesy under which one jurisdiction's courts may give effect to another jurisdiction's judgments out of deference and respect. The court adopted Section 482 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, which lists reasons a foreign judgment may or must be refused recognition, such as lack of due process, lack of jurisdiction, or fraud. Applying that framework, the court held that substantial evidence supported the finding that Griffith was properly served with the Demand for Alimony, so due process did not bar enforcement. But because Gonzales-Alpizar purposefully failed to tell the Costa Rican court about the premarital agreement - which the court concluded was enforceable and which governed spousal support - the court declined to recognize the spousal support award as a matter of comity. The child support award, however, was a different matter, because the premarital agreement said nothing about child support. Griffith claimed the child support award was procured through fraud - that Gonzales-Alpizar misrepresented his parental relationship with Nicolle (who is not his biological child, with a dispute over whether he adopted her under Costa Rican law) and misrepresented his income and properties. The district court had made no findings on those claims, instead saying Costa Rica was the only forum for resolving them. The Supreme Court remanded for the district court to make findings under the Restatement approach and decide whether the child support portion of the order should be enforced as a matter of comity.