GOODMAN VS. GOODMAN (CHILD SUPPORT)

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The mother appealed the denial of her motion to modify a divorce decree to increase child support from $25 to $100 per week. The 1948 decree, granting her custody of the parties' six-year-old son, had approved an agreement for $25 weekly support. The sole question was whether the denial was an abuse of discretion. The affidavit evidence established the $25 was insufficient, the father able to pay more, and some pertinent change of circumstances. The mother argued modification had become a matter of right rather than discretion. After an extended discussion of the nature of judicial discretion (Bouvier; Pound; Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738; Norris v. Clinkscales, 47 S.C. 488) - that discretion must not be arbitrary or capricious but guided by applicable legal principles - the court held that under sec. 9462, N.C.L. 1929, Supp. 1943-1949, provision for the children's support is committed to the trial court's discretion. The statutory command to make provision 'most expedient under all the circumstances' and 'as may seem necessary or proper' embraces all circumstances bearing on the necessity for or propriety of modification, including the father's voluntary payments exceeding $2,000 per year beyond the decree. The trial court could reasonably conclude the child was not suffering present inadequacy, that modification was not necessary, and that a failure to modify was not improper; considering the voluntary payments was proper. No abuse of discretion appeared, and the order was affirmed.

In plain language

When the parties divorced in 1948, the mother received custody of their young son, and the decree approved an agreement for the father to pay $25 a week in child support. In late 1950 the mother asked the court to raise the payment to $100 a week, arguing the $25 was not enough, the father could easily afford more, and circumstances had changed. The trial court denied the request, and she appealed. The only question was whether the denial was an abuse of the judge's discretion. The evidence (all by affidavit) showed the $25 was insufficient, the father could pay more, and some circumstances had changed. The mother argued that, given those facts, increasing support was no longer a matter of discretion but a matter of right for the child. The Nevada Supreme Court disagreed. It explained at length that judicial discretion is not arbitrary will, but must be guided by legal principles - yet within its proper area, reasonable judges may disagree about the best result. A key fact was that, on top of the required $25 a week, the father had voluntarily paid over $2,000 a year for the boy's support and education. The statute directs the court to make provision for children as appears most expedient 'under all the circumstances,' which the court held includes those voluntary payments. The trial judge could reasonably conclude the child was not currently suffering, that a formal increase was not necessary, and even that the child might benefit more from the continued voluntary arrangement. That was not an abuse of discretion, so the order was affirmed.