GORDEN VS. GORDEN (DIVORCE PROPERTY & ALIMONY)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The court (Breen, D.J.) affirmed a divorce property division despite the district court's failure to make express findings classifying each asset. Where express findings are absent, the Supreme Court will imply findings that the evidence clearly supports. Hardy v. First National Bank of Nevada, 86 Nev. 921, 478 P.2d 581 (1970); Pease v. Taylor, 86 Nev. 195, 467 P.2d 109 (1970). The record clearly supported the judgment, so the necessary findings were implied. Two presumptions governed. First, when separate funds of a spouse are used to acquire property in the names of both spouses as joint tenants, it is presumed a gift of one-half the value was intended, and the presumption is overcome only by clear and convincing evidence. Giorgi v. Giorgi, 77 Nev. 1, 358 P.2d 115 (1961); Weeks v. Weeks, 72 Nev. 268, 302 P.2d 750 (1956); Peardon v. Peardon, 65 Nev. 717, 201 P.2d 309 (1948). The record did not clearly and convincingly rebut the presumption. Second, the expenditure of separate funds to improve a spouse's separate property raises a presumption that the husband intended to benefit the wife's property. Hopper v. Hopper, 80 Nev. 302, 392 P.2d 629 (1964); Lombardi v. Lombardi, 44 Nev. 314, 195 P. 93 (1921). Nothing rebutted that presumption, so Douglas could claim no reimbursement. The court also upheld a $2,100 payment expressly ordered as a further division of property and not as alimony, reaffirming that a court may use a spouse's separate property to make an equitable adjustment of the parties' property, including as a set-off against an indivisible or impractical-to-divide asset. Johnson v. Johnson, 76 Nev. 318, 353 P.2d 449 (1960); Thorne v. Thorne, 74 Nev. 211, 326 P.2d 729 (1958). Douglas's challenge to the constitutionality of NRS 125.150 (the alimony statute) could not be reached because the district court had denied alimony. Affirmed.

In plain language

When Douglas and Janet Gorden divorced, the trial judge granted the divorce and divided their property, but wrote only that the various items 'might be classified as either community property, joint tenancy property or separate property' and should be equitably divided. Douglas complained that because the judge never spelled out exactly which items were separate, community, or joint tenancy, he was denied a fair chance to appeal. The couple owned a residence (which Janet had brought from a prior marriage and kept in her name), a lot in Fallon, a nine-acre parcel by the river, two secured promissory notes, small bank accounts, cars, and other personal property. Douglas had used money from an inheritance - his separate property - to remodel the residence and to buy the other real estate and notes, most of which were placed in joint tenancy. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. It explained that when a trial court does not make express findings, the Supreme Court will imply the findings needed to support the judgment if the evidence clearly supports it. Two long-standing presumptions controlled. First, when a spouse uses separate funds to buy property titled in both spouses' names as joint tenants, the law presumes he intended to make a gift of half its value, and that presumption can be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence. The record did not clearly rebut it. Second, when a spouse spends separate funds to improve the other spouse's separate property (here, the residence), the law presumes he intended to benefit that property; again, nothing rebutted it, so Douglas could not claim reimbursement for the improvements. The court also upheld a $2,100 payment the judge ordered Douglas to make to Janet, which the decree expressly called a further division of property rather than alimony - a court may use one spouse's separate property to make an equitable adjustment of the parties' property. Douglas also challenged the constitutionality of the alimony statute, but because the court had denied alimony, that question could not be reached. Affirmed.