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GRANT VS. GRANT (DIVORCE)

38 Nev. 185, 147 P. 451 (1915) · 2154 · Nevada Supreme Court · January 15, 1915

Disposition:Order denying the motion to set aside the judgment affirmed.Divorce, Property & Alimony

Posture Appeal by the plaintiff husband from an Esmeralda County district court order denying his motion, made after judgment for the defendant wife, to set aside the judgment and dismiss the proceedings without prejudice for want of jurisdiction based on his own insufficient residence.

Key holdings

- A divorce plaintiff who alleges under oath the jurisdictional residence facts, invokes the court's process, and litigates to final judgment is estopped to challenge the court's jurisdiction after judgment goes against him. - The district court, having general jurisdiction of the subject matter of divorce, has power to determine the jurisdictional facts, and its finding of statutory residence made on the plaintiff's own pleading and proof is not open to attack by the plaintiff's post-judgment motion. - Although subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent, want of jurisdiction over the person may be waived by conduct.

Practitioner summary

Appeal by the plaintiff husband from an order denying his post-judgment motion to set aside a judgment for the defendant wife and dismiss the entire divorce proceeding without prejudice for want of jurisdiction. The complaint (filed July 23, 1913, with service by publication ordered; defendant appeared and answered; trial March 27, 1914) alleged plaintiff's six-month Esmeralda County residence, and the court's findings so found; plaintiff testified he resided at the Goldfield Hotel almost continuously from January 24, 1913. McCarran, J., held the district court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and power to determine the jurisdictional facts, and its finding of residence could not be attacked by this route. A plaintiff who by verified complaint declares the jurisdictional facts, invokes the court's process, and submits the cause through final judgment is estopped from challenging jurisdiction after an adverse result, citing Gamble v. Silver Peak, 35 Nev. 319, 133 Pac. 936 (a party may by conduct be estopped to raise a jurisdictional question), In re Lipman, 201 Fed. 169, and related authority. While subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent, want of jurisdiction over the person may be waived. Order affirmed.

In plain language

A husband sued his wife for absolute divorce in Esmeralda County, swearing in his complaint that he had been a resident of the county for the six months required by law. His wife answered, the case was tried in March 1914, and the court entered judgment for the wife. Having lost, the husband then made a remarkable about-face: he asked the court to set aside the judgment and dismiss the whole case without prejudice, arguing the court never had jurisdiction because his own trial testimony showed he had not really lived in Esmeralda County for six months. The trial court refused, and he appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. The trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of divorce and had found, based on the plaintiff's own sworn complaint and evidence, that he met the residence requirement. A plaintiff who invokes a court's power, declares under oath that the court has jurisdiction, and lets the case go to final judgment cannot challenge that jurisdiction only after losing. If the judgment had gone his way he would certainly have enforced it; he is estopped from attacking the court's power now.

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This summary is independently verified against the source opinion. It is an informational research aid, not legal advice, and no substitute for reading the decision.