GRENZ VS. GRENZ (DIVORCE PROPERTY & ALIMONY)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The court first dismissed the purported appeals from the original and amended findings of fact and conclusions of law, which are not appealable determinations under NRCP 72(b) (Musso v. Triplett, 78 Nev. 355, 372 P.2d 687). On the merits, the court rejected the claim that the in-chambers conference and oral statement of the parties' agreement was error; the agreement was properly approved (Lewis v. Lewis, 53 Nev. 398, 2 P.2d 131) and, having been entered in the minutes without objection or correction under District Court Rule 24, reflected implied consent. The court sustained the modification of custody and child support under NRS 125.140 (permitting modification of custody and support during a child's minority) and noted that before its 1961 amendment NRS 125.170 permitted modification of spousal support (Folks v. Folks, 77 Nev. 45, 359 P.2d 92), while the 1961 amendment now bars modification of installment alimony judgments unless jurisdiction is expressly reserved. The bias claim, not raised below, would not be considered for the first time on appeal (Wilson v. Wilson, 66 Nev. 405, 212 P.2d 1066). As to the home-purchase provision, the court held the language unintelligible and unenforceable, making it impossible to determine whether it constituted child support, spousal support, a property settlement, or a combination; if alimony or a property settlement, it would be non-modifiable under NRS 125.170 (Schmutzer v. Schmutzer, 76 Nev. 123, 350 P.2d 142; Krick v. Krick, 76 Nev. 52, 348 P.2d 752). A court has inherent power independent of statute to remove ambiguity from its judgment (Lindsay v. Lindsay, 52 Nev. 26, 280 P. 95), so deleting the provision was proper; but if the original intent was to provide additional spousal support or settle property, the court must substitute clear, enforceable provisions. It is the province of the trial court to construe its own decrees (Murphy v. Murphy, 64 Nev. 440, 183 P.2d 632). The court remanded for that determination, struck the respondent's answering brief for failure to pay a previously ordered attorney fee, and awarded an additional fee.

In plain language

The husband won a 1958 divorce based on a three-year separation. The decree gave the wife custody of the four children, child support, alimony, and included two unusual paragraphs requiring the husband to buy the wife a home (up to $15,000) somewhere outside Nevada, with title going to the four children and the eventual sale proceeds split between the spouses. A few months later the husband asked to modify the decree. The trial court gave him limited custody time in July, relieved him of support during that month, and deleted the entire home-purchase provision. The wife appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court dismissed her attempts to appeal from findings of fact (which are not separately appealable) and rejected several claims. It found no error in the judge conferring with the parties in chambers and putting their agreement (about custody, support, and the home) into the court minutes, since the agreement was entered without objection and the district court rule allowed agreements entered in the minutes. It upheld the limited modification of custody and child support as supported by the evidence, and rejected the wife's bias claim (raised for the first time on appeal). On the home-purchase provision, the court found the language hopelessly ambiguous - it was impossible to tell whether it was meant as child support, spousal support, a property settlement, or some combination, and it raised many unanswerable questions. A court has inherent power to remove ambiguity from its own decree, so deleting the confusing provision was proper. But if the trial court had originally intended the provision to provide alimony or settle property (things generally not modifiable), it must substitute clear, enforceable provisions to accomplish that purpose. The case was sent back for the trial court to decide and clarify. The court also struck the husband's brief and awarded the wife additional attorney fees because he had ignored an earlier order to pay her fees.