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GRIGALANZ VS. COPAS (CHILD CUSTODY)

91619-COA · Nevada (SCOTN/COA) · July 9, 2026

Disposition:Affirmed. ("we ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.")Custody & RelocationInterstate & Jurisdiction

Posture Phillip Grigalanz appeals from an Eighth Judicial District Court order dismissing his petition for custody of three minor children for lack of standing. He also challenges the district court's denial of his motion to disqualify the judge who heard the matter. The Court of Appeals of the State of Nevada reviewed the dismissal de novo and affirmed.

Statutes cited

Key holdings

- Dismissal of a complaint for lack of standing is reviewed de novo under the same rigorous standard as a dismissal for failure to state a claim. - NRS 125A.135's definition of "person acting as a parent" does not, by its plain language, confer standing on a non-parent to seek custody in the first instance in Nevada. - The in loco parentis doctrine in Nevada primarily arises within the context of equitable adoption and does not, on the arguments presented, provide an unrelated individual standing to seek custody of minor children. - Extra-jurisdictional authorities that do not consider or analyze Nevada law were not persuasive on the standing question. - Where a custody petition is resolved on a purely legal standing question - the petitioner having conceded he is not biologically related to the children - the district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing or make best-interest findings under NRS 125C.0035 before dismissing.

Practitioner summary

This is an appeal from a district court order dismissing a custody petition for lack of standing. The Court of Appeals reviewed the dismissal de novo, applying "the same rigorous, de novo standard as dismissal for failure to state a claim," citing Citizens for Cold Springs v. City of Reno, 125 Nev. 625, 628-29, 218 P.3d 847, 849-50 (2009). On the standing question, appellant argued NRS 125A.135 conferred standing to seek custody. The court held that the statute merely "provides the definition of a 'person acting as a parent' for the purposes of NRS Chapter 125A" and that "simply providing the definition of a 'person acting as a parent' does not, by its plain language, confer standing on Grigalanz to seek custody." The court observed that the term "person acting as a parent" appears in only a handful of statutes, such as NRS 125A.325 (limitations on modifying a custody determination issued by another state's court) and NRS 125A.465(1)(c) (permitting a "person acting as a parent who has been awarded custody or visitation" to register a foreign custody determination). Given NRS 125A.465(1)'s reference to a child custody determination issued by a court of another state, the court declined to read NRS 125A.465 as suggesting NRS 125A.135 provides standing for a non-parent to seek custody in the first instance in Nevada. The court rejected appellant's reliance on the in loco parentis doctrine, noting he identified no Nevada authority using the doctrine to confer standing on an unrelated individual to seek custody. The court explained the doctrine "primarily arises within the context of equitable adoption," citing Sargeant v. Sargeant, 88 Nev. 223, 230, 495 P.2d 618, 623 (1972), and Frye v. Frye, 103 Nev. 301, 308, 738 P.2d 505, 506 (1987). The court declined to be persuaded by extra-jurisdictional authorities that did not consider or analyze Nevada law, citing Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006), and Senjab v. Alhulaibi, 137 Nev. 632, 633-34, 497 P.3d 618, 619 (2021). On the procedural argument, the court rejected the contention that the district court was required to hold an evidentiary hearing or make best-interest findings under NRS 125C.0035(4) before dismissing. The court noted a motion hearing was held and that "evidentiary hearings are designed with this purpose in mind: to resolve disputed questions of fact," quoting Myers v. Haskins, 138 Nev. 553, 558, 513 P.3d 527, 533 (Ct. App. 2022). Because the matter was resolved on a purely legal question - appellant having conceded he was not biologically related to the children - no evidentiary hearing was necessary, and because NRS 125C.0035's best-interest findings apply when adjudicating a custody dispute, the district court did not need to consider those factors absent standing. Having concluded appellant failed to demonstrate standing based on his specific arguments, the court declined to reach the arguments regarding service or judicial bias. The court noted appellant's fast track statement contained factual allegations conceded not to have been presented to the district court, and declined to consider matters outside the record, citing Carson Ready Mix, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank of Nev., 97 Nev. 474, 476, 635 P.2d 276, 277 (1981); on that basis it also denied the pending motion to supplement the record. The court addressed the notice of appeal's designation of a minute order, noting minute orders are generally not appealable, citing Div. of Child & Family Servs. v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 120 Nev. 445, 454, 92 P.3d 1239, 1245 (2004), and Brown v. MHC Stagecoach, LLC, 129 Nev. 343, 346-47, 301 P.3d 850, 852-53 (2013). It also denied appellant's emergency motion filed July 6, 2026, as moot.

In plain language

Phillip Grigalanz and Elizabeth Copas were once in a romantic relationship. During that relationship, Grigalanz lived with Copas and her three minor children, identified in the opinion as K.C., E.C., and J.G. Grigalanz admits he is not the biological father of any of the three children. After the relationship ended, he filed a petition asking the court to give him custody of all three children, alleging that Copas and Jose Enrique Gonzalez-Alba (whom he identified as J.G.'s biological and legal father) had failed to adequately care for the children and that it would be in the children's best interest for the court to place them with him. According to the opinion, Grigalanz never served the petition or any other filing on any of the parents. The district court held a hearing on his request for a temporary custody order and, at that hearing, orally dismissed his petition, finding that he lacked "standing" - meaning the legal right to bring the case at all. Before the court put its decision in writing, Grigalanz filed a motion asking the judge to step aside, arguing that during the hearing she raised her voice at him and judged him unfairly. The court denied that motion and then entered a written order dismissing the petition for lack of standing. Grigalanz appealed. On appeal, Grigalanz argued that a Nevada statute, NRS 125A.135, gave him standing because it defines a "person acting as a parent," and that authority from other states allows a "psychological" or "de facto" parent to seek custody. The Court of Appeals disagreed. It explained that the statute merely defines a term; it does not, by its plain wording, give a non-parent the right to seek custody in Nevada in the first place. The court noted that the definition is used in only a few statutes, such as ones dealing with modifying or registering custody orders that were originally issued by courts in other states. The court also rejected Grigalanz's reliance on the "in loco parentis" doctrine - a legal idea about someone standing in the place of a parent. The court said Grigalanz pointed to no Nevada authority using that doctrine to give an unrelated person standing to seek custody, and that in Nevada the doctrine mainly comes up in the context of "equitable adoption." The court further said it was not persuaded by cases from other states because those cases did not analyze Nevada law. Grigalanz also argued that the district court had to hold an evidentiary hearing and make findings about the children's best interests before dismissing his petition. The court rejected this too, explaining that the court did hold a motion hearing, that an evidentiary hearing is meant to resolve disputed questions of fact, and that this case turned on a purely legal question because Grigalanz conceded he was not biologically related to the children. The court also explained that best-interest findings come into play only when a court is actually deciding a custody dispute, and because Grigalanz never established standing, the court did not need to reach those factors. Because it concluded that Grigalanz failed to show standing, the Court of Appeals did not address his arguments about service or about judicial bias, and it affirmed the dismissal.

This summary is independently verified against the source opinion. It is an informational research aid, not legal advice, and no substitute for reading the decision.