GROVES VS. JOHNSON (CHILD CUSTODY)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The Court of Appeals reviewed both the custody determination and the relocation ruling for abuse of discretion. Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 149, 161 P.3d 239, 241 (2007); Flynn v. Flynn, 120 Nev. 436, 440, 92 P.3d 1224, 1227 (2004). Factual findings are affirmed if supported by substantial evidence — "that which a reasonable person may accept as adequate to sustain a judgment." Ellis, 123 Nev. at 149, 161 P.3d at 242. The sole consideration in custody determinations is the best interest of the child. NRS 125C.0035(1); Davis v. Ewalefo, 131 Nev. 445, 451, 352 P.3d 1139, 1143 (2015). The court presumed the district court properly exercised its discretion. Flynn, 120 Nev. at 440, 92 P.3d at 1226-27. On the relocation-without-consent issue, the court applied NRS 125C.0065(1), which requires a parent with court-ordered joint physical custody who intends to relocate outside Nevada to first attempt to obtain written consent from the non-relocating parent or to petition the court for primary custody for relocation purposes. A parent who relocates without a court order is subject to NRS 200.359 under NRS 125C.0065(3). NRS 200.359(4) criminalizes such relocation by a joint-custody parent without proper permission, but NRS 200.359(2) excuses removal undertaken with the intent to protect the child or oneself from domestic violence. The court cited Monahan v. Hogan, 138 Nev. 58, 58, 507 P.3d 588, 589 (Ct. App. 2022), recognizing relocation as "one of the most difficult issues a court must resolve." Although it was undisputed that Johnson relocated before obtaining consent or a court order, the district court found she did not intend to relocate without permission and acted out of fear of domestic violence. The district court also declined to apply the rebuttable presumption under NRS 125C.0035(7), having not found by clear and convincing evidence that an act of abduction occurred. It found credible Johnson's belief — though "legally incorrect" — that Groves' written statement that he no longer wished contact with the children authorized her relocation, and found credible her testimony of fear arising from Groves' pattern of abuse. The court cited NRS 200.359(2) regarding the "specific intent to frustrate" the other parent's relationship and the domestic-violence exception. The Court of Appeals found substantial evidence supported these determinations and discerned no abuse of discretion. On the relocation merits, the court applied the threshold standard of NRS 125C.007(1): a good faith, sensible reason for relocating; that the move is not intended to deprive the non-relocating parent of parenting time; that the child's best interests are served; and that the relocation will result in an actual advantage to the child and relocating parent. The district court found Johnson had a good-faith reason, that remaining in Iowa served the children's best interests, and that actual advantages existed — better job opportunities, a more reasonable cost of living, improved mental health, and a three-bedroom home, citing Trent v. Trent, 111 Nev. 309, 316, 890 P.2d 1309, 1313 (1995) (improved economic situation creates an actual advantage). The court then considered the secondary factors under NRS 125C.007(2) and the best interest factors under NRS 125C.0035(4), finding the children's best interests served by remaining with Johnson. It found Johnson's motives honorable, that she would comply with court orders, and that she was a fit parent more aware of the children's needs. By contrast, Groves' criminal history, methamphetamine use without professional assistance, domestic-violence history, recent incarceration, and motel residence weighed in favor of relocation and Johnson's primary physical custody. On modification, the court applied the two-prong Romano standard: "(1) there has been a substantial change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the child, and (2) the child's best interest is served by the modification." Romano v. Romano, 138 Nev. 1, 5, 501 P.3d 980, 983 (2022), abrogated in part on other grounds by Killebrew v. State ex rel. Donohue, 139 Nev. 401, 404-05, 535 P.3d 1167, 1171 (2023); see also Ellis, 123 Nev. at 150-51, 161 P.3d at 242-43. Groves did not challenge the substantial-change prong, contesting only the best-interest analysis and the parenting-time award. The court found the district court evaluated the NRS 125C.0035(4) factors, citing subparts (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (j), and (k), and addressed domestic violence consistent with Castle v. Simmons, 120 Nev. 98, 105, 86 P.3d 1042, 1047 (2004) ("The court must hear all information regarding domestic violence in order to determine the child's best interests."). The Court of Appeals declined to reweigh credibility or re-resolve conflicting evidence. Grosjean v. Imperial Palace, Inc., 125 Nev. 349, 366, 212 P.3d 1068, 1080 (2009). Regarding the sole legal custody award, addressed in a footnote, the court found no relief warranted because the award rested on the parties' inability to communicate cooperatively, Groves' domestic-violence history, long-term drug use, and the children's significant medical needs — findings supported by substantial evidence. The court also upheld the supervised-video-visitation award (one weekly call through the Family Peace Center, plus in-person supervised parenting time in Iowa at Johnson's discretion on 30 days' notice) as the least restrictive parenting time supported by substantial evidence given the district court's best-interest findings.

In plain language

Matthew Groves and Sarah Johnson married in 2019 and have two children, born in 2018 and 2019. Groves filed for divorce in 2022, and in September 2023 the court granted them joint legal and physical custody. While Groves was incarcerated from August to December 2023, the court temporarily gave Johnson primary physical custody, with the arrangement set to return to joint custody 30 days later. According to the opinion, after his release Groves had little if any contact with the children, who lived with Johnson. Johnson then moved with the children to Iowa. In March 2024, Johnson asked the court for full permanent custody and notified the court of her move. She said Groves had threatened her, had sent messages from jail saying it was best if he gave up his rights to the children, and had a history that included domestic violence against her. Groves opposed her request, saying she relocated without his consent. The court told Johnson to file a formal motion to relocate and told Groves to file a motion to modify custody if he wanted the children placed with him. Both did, and the court held an evidentiary hearing — a hearing where both sides testify and present evidence. At the hearing, Johnson testified that she relocated because she believed Groves' messages meant he wished to give up his parental rights, that Groves had threatened her and shown up at her Iowa home (leading her to obtain a protection order), and that the children were thriving in Iowa, where their medical needs were being treated. Groves testified that Johnson had a history of neglect and had been investigated by Child Protective Services. He also acknowledged that he had used methamphetamine for 25 years, was not seeking medical help for it, was living in a weekly motel, and did not know the children's needs because he had not been around them for over a year. After the hearing, the court granted Johnson's motion to relocate and denied Groves' request to modify custody. It found that staying in Iowa with Johnson was in the children's best interest, gave Johnson primary physical custody and sole legal custody, and awarded Groves one supervised video call per week for a year, which it found was the least restrictive parenting time available because it concluded Groves was not fit to have custody. On appeal, the Court of Appeals explained that custody and relocation decisions are reviewed for "abuse of discretion," meaning the appellate court does not substitute its own judgment but checks whether the trial court's findings are supported by "substantial evidence" — evidence a reasonable person would accept as adequate. The court noted that Johnson did move before getting consent or a court order, which ordinarily can expose a parent to consequences. But the district court found that Johnson credibly believed she had permission based on Groves' written statements, and that she was acting out of fear of domestic violence. The court found this did not amount to an abduction. The Court of Appeals concluded that the district court properly worked through the legal factors governing relocation and the best-interest factors, and that its findings were supported by substantial evidence. It pointed to the children thriving in Iowa, Johnson's improved circumstances, and Groves' criminal history, drug use, recent incarceration, and unstable living situation. Because the appellate court does not reweigh credibility or re-decide conflicting evidence, it affirmed the district court's decision in full.