GRYBOWSKI VS. GRYBOWSKI

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

Standard of review: The court reviews the denial of a motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion, citing Saticoy Bay, LLC, Series 34 Innisbrook v. Thornburg Mortg. Sec. Tr. 2007-8, 138 Nev. 335, 343, 510 P.3d 139, 146 (2022). District court decisions concerning divorce proceedings are reviewed for abuse of discretion, citing Williams v. Williams, 120 Nev. 559, 566, 97 P.3d 1124, 1129 (2004) (quoting Shydler v. Shydler, 114 Nev. 192, 196, 954 P.2d 37, 39 (1998)). Factual findings are reviewed for abuse of discretion and will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous or unsupported by substantial evidence, citing Ogawa v. Ogawa, 125 Nev. 660, 668, 221 P.3d 699, 704 (2009); see also Davis v. Ewalefo, 131 Nev. 445, 450, 352 P.3d 1139, 1142 (2015) ("[D]eference is not owed to legal error."). An abuse of discretion "can occur when the district court bases its decision on a clearly erroneous factual determination or it disregards controlling law," citing MB Am., Inc. v. Alaska, Pac. Leasing Co., 132 Nev. 78, 88, 367 P.3d 1286, 1292 (2016). Doctrinal framework - modification versus clarification/enforcement: The court noted that while a district court lacks continuing jurisdiction to modify provisions of a divorce decree regarding property rights except as provided by statute or rule, Kramer v. Kramer, 96 Nev. 759, 761, 610 P.2d 395, 397 (1980) ("A decree of divorce cannot be modified or set aside except as provided by rule or statute."), the district court retains inherent authority to interpret and enforce its prior orders, Byrd v. Byrd, 137 Nev. 587, 590, 501 P.3d 458, 462 (Ct. App. 2021); see also NRS 125.240 ("The final judgment and any order made before or after judgment may be enforced by the court by such order as it deems necessary."). Applying Vaile v. Porsboll, 128 Nev. 27, 33, 268 P.3d 1272, 1276 (2012), the court reiterated that "in the family law context, a modification occurs when the district court's order alters the parties' substantive rights, while a clarification involves the district court defining the rights that have already been awarded to the parties." Application: The court was not persuaded that the district court modified the prior judgments; rather, it concluded the district court had the authority to review the record (prior orders, proof of payments, the correct amount of arrears, and outstanding payments) and to enforce those judgments and implement a payment plan, citing Byrd, 137 Nev. at 590, 501 P.3d at 462, and Schlotfeldt v. Schlotfeldt, No. 69094, 2016 WL 3418695, at *1 (Nev. June 16, 2016) (Order of Reversal and Remand). On the change from $2,800 to $3,800 per month, the court relied on the district court's discretion to schedule judgment payments "in any manner the district court deems proper under the circumstances," Reed v. Reed, 88 Nev. 329, 331, 497 P.2d 896, 897 (1972); see also Kennedy v. Kennedy, 98 Nev. 318, 320, 646 P.2d 1226, 1227 (1982). The court found the $3,800 figure supported by the record: a $1,800 monthly alimony obligation plus two separate attorney-fees judgments with monthly obligations of $1,000 each. It rejected Jay's timeliness argument, noting the district court's authority to enforce prior orders and that Debra timely moved for reconsideration of the February 27, 2020 order, citing NRS 125.240 and EDCR 2.24 (motion for reconsideration must be filed within 14 days). Factual findings and credibility: The court declined to reweigh the district court's resolution of factual issues supported by substantial evidence, or to reweigh witness credibility, citing Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 152, 161 P.3d 239, 244 (2007). The district court found Debra more credible based on the financial evidence, and Jay failed to demonstrate otherwise. The court noted Jay failed to cite the record for his assertion that Debra admitted he had paid her in full for the HP settlement share, citing NRAP 28(e)(1) and Eivazi v. Eivazi, 139 Nev., Adv. Op. 44, 537 P.3d 476, 495 n.21 (Ct. App. 2023) (declining to consider contentions unaccompanied by appropriate citations to the record). Finding the record supported the district court's findings, the court concluded there was no abuse of discretion and affirmed. Sanctions: The court denied Debra's request for NRAP 38 sanctions because it did not appear Jay's appeal was solely brought for purposes of delay. See NRAP 38(a).

In plain language

Jay and Debra Grybowski were married for 26 years. During the marriage, Jay was the primary wage earner while Debra was out of the work force for over 18 years due to a medical illness. In 2014, Debra filed for divorce, and the district court entered a decree of divorce in December 2016. The divorce decree and later orders created several financial obligations for Jay. Among them: $1,800 per month in alimony, half of the community property share of funds from Jay's wrongful termination settlement with Hewlett Packard (HP), an equalization payment of $114,740.59 (partly to offset a finding of "marital waste"), and three separate attorney-fees judgments. Two of those attorney-fees judgments each required $1,000 per month in payments. Over the following years, the case moved through multiple judges and several rounds of proceedings, including a finding in 2018 that Jay was in contempt for willfully failing to pay alimony and attorney fees during three months in 2017, even though the court found he had the ability to pay. A key dispute arose over exactly how much Jay owed each month. A February 2020 order stated that Jay should pay a total of $2,800 per month ($1,800 alimony plus $1,000 toward attorney fees). Debra asked the court to reconsider, arguing this was a computation error that accidentally changed prior orders, which had actually required $1,800 in alimony plus $2,000 in attorney-fee payments (two separate $1,000 obligations). After Judge Nadin Cutter took over the case and held an evidentiary hearing, the court concluded in August 2022 that the $2,800 figure was a clerical error and that the correct total was $3,800 per month. The court also determined that Jay owed a large outstanding balance and set up a plan requiring him to pay $10,000 per year for 13 years to satisfy three additional judgments (Debra's HP settlement share, the equalization payment, and the third attorney-fees judgment). The court found Jay had the financial ability to make these payments. In weighing the evidence, the court found Debra more credible because she provided more proof of payments than Jay did. Jay asked the court to reconsider that August 2022 decision, and the court denied his request in December 2022, confirming the $3,800 monthly amount. Jay then appealed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rejected Jay's arguments. The court explained that there is a difference between "modifying" a divorce order (changing the parties' substantive rights, which a court generally cannot do to a divorce decree except as allowed by rule or statute) and "clarifying" or enforcing an order (defining rights already awarded, which a court retains inherent authority to do). The court concluded the district court had merely clarified and enforced the existing judgments, not modified them. It also held the district court had discretion to set up a payment schedule, that the record supported the $3,800 monthly figure, and that it would not reweigh the district court's factual findings or its assessment of which party was more credible. The court therefore affirmed. It also declined to sanction Jay, because it did not appear his appeal was brought solely to cause delay.