GUERIN VS. GUERIN (DIVORCE)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The court consolidated three matters. In the direct appeal (Docket No. 27042), the court held the default divorce decree's property division must be set aside under NRCP 60(b) because the decree was void. NRCP 55(b)(2) requires at least three days' written notice to a party who has appeared before a default judgment hearing; a formal appearance is unnecessary. Gazin v. Hoy, 102 Nev. 621, 624, 730 P.2d 436, 438 (1986). Tracy gave Harold's known local counsel only 24 hours' notice and proceeded over his special-appearance objection, rendering the default judgment void; the court reversed and remanded with instructions to grant Harold's motion to set aside the decree. In the writ matter (Docket No. 28354), the court declined to entertain the writ as to the injunction, receiver, and contempt issues because those orders were independently appealable under NRAP 3A(b)(2). See Awad v. Wright, 106 Nev. 407, 794 P.2d 713 (1990). It entertained the writ only on the jurisdiction-over-the-trust issue. Applying Gladys Baker Olsen Family Trust v. District Court, 110 Nev. 548, 553-54, 874 P.2d 778, 781-82 (1994), the court held that district court orders affecting the rights of an indispensable party not properly joined are void as to that non-party; joinder, not knowledge and an opportunity to intervene, subjects a party to the court's jurisdiction. See NRCP 19(a). Because the Hill Family Trust was not joined until April 15, 1996, the court's April 8, 1996 order was void insofar as it affected the trust, and the court directed issuance of a writ of prohibition against enforcing that order as to the trust. Writs of prohibition and mandamus are governed by NRS 34.320, NRS 34.330, NRS 34.160, and NRS 34.170. In the direct appeal from the injunction, receivership, and contempt orders (Docket No. 29297), the court affirmed. Preliminary injunctions are reviewed for abuse of discretion and upheld when supported by substantial evidence, Franklin v. Bartsas Realty, 95 Nev. 559, 562, 598 P.2d 1147, 1149 (1979); given evidence Tracy was hiding assets and the reversal on the decree, the injunction was proper. Courts have inherent power to enforce their decrees through contempt, Noble v. Noble, 86 Nev. 459, 463, 470 P.2d 430, 432 (1970), and Tracy's clear noncompliance supported the contempt finding.

In plain language

This is the first Supreme Court decision in the long Guerin divorce dispute; the Court consolidated three related matters. Tracy Guerin (later Tracy Hill) filed for divorce from Harold Guerin. Harold did not defend, and Tracy obtained a default divorce decree dividing more than $2.7 million in assets, including assets in the couple's 'Guerin Family Trust.' Harold later sued Tracy and moved to set aside the decree, claiming the property division was unfair. The district court refused to set aside the decree, imposed an injunction and a receiver to protect the former trust assets, and later held Tracy in contempt (and ordered assets transferred from the 'Hill Family Trust,' created by Tracy and her new husband) when she disobeyed. The Supreme Court ruled on three matters. First, on Harold's appeal, the Court reversed the refusal to set aside the divorce decree. Under NRCP 55(b)(2), a party who has appeared must get at least three days' written notice before a default judgment hearing. Tracy gave Harold's attorney only 24 hours' notice, and his attorney objected at the hearing. When a party who has appeared does not get the required notice, the resulting default judgment is void. So the Court reversed and ordered the decree set aside. Second, on Tracy's writ petition, the Court held the district court lacked authority, at the time of its April 8, 1996 order, to transfer assets from the Hill Family Trust because the trust had not yet been made a party to the case (it was joined a week later). Under the Olsen rule, court orders affecting the rights of an indispensable party who has not been properly joined are void as to that non-party. The Court issued a writ preventing enforcement of that order against the Hill Family Trust. Third, the Court affirmed the injunction and the contempt finding against Tracy, because there was evidence she was hiding assets and she clearly disobeyed the court's orders.