HALBROOK VS. HALBROOK (CHILD CUSTODY)
114 Nev. 1455, 971 P.2d 1262 (1998) · 30880, 31441 · Nevada Supreme Court · December 31, 1998
Disposition:Reversed and remanded for reevaluation of the relocation motion; attorney's fees award reversed.Custody & RelocationPosture Valerie Halbrook appealed from a district court order denying her NRS 125A.350 motion to relocate the parties' daughter to Texas (awarding physical custody to respondent Greg Halbrook in the event she relocated) and from a separate order awarding Greg attorney's fees and costs. The parties shared joint legal and physical custody under the divorce decree.
Statutes cited
Key holdings
Practitioner summary
Applying Schwartz v. Schwartz, 107 Nev. 378, 382-83, 812 P.2d 1268, 1270-71 (1991), and its progeny, the court held the district court erred in finding the moving parent lacked a sensible, good-faith reason to relocate. A good-faith reason is one not designed to frustrate the noncustodial parent's visitation, Gandee v. Gandee, 111 Nev. 754, 757, 895 P.2d 1285, 1286-87 (1995); career advancement is a recognized good-faith reason. Trent v. Trent, 111 Nev. 309, 315-16, 890 P.2d 1309, 1313 (1995); Jones v. Jones, 110 Nev. 1253, 1260-61, 885 P.2d 563, 568-69 (1994). The evidence (a documented income decline, a less competitive Dallas market, a managerial track, and a relocation package confirmed by her supervisor) established a good-faith reason, making the contrary finding clearly erroneous. The court held the district court improperly weighted the loss of weekly contact and failed to seriously consider alternative visitation. A district court may not deny a removal petition solely to maintain the existing visitation pattern, and improper emphasis on the shift away from weekly contact is 'problematic.' Gandee, 111 Nev. at 761, 895 P.2d at 1289; Jones, 110 Nev. at 1266, 885 P.2d at 572. The district court also erroneously assumed the sole issue was the child's best interest, contrary to McGuinness v. McGuinness, 114 Nev. 1431, 970 P.2d 1074 (1998). The court found Valerie's proposed visitation plan more generous and financially feasible than plans previously approved, and held the failure to evaluate it under Schwartz was clearly erroneous. Because the merits were reversed, the attorney's fees award was also reversed, though fees may be appropriate on reevaluation. The court held that under NRS 125.150(3) attorney's fees may be awarded in post-divorce proceedings, consistent with Leeming v. Leeming, 87 Nev. 530, 532, 490 P.2d 342, 343 (1971), and overruled Duff v. Foster, 110 Nev. 1306, 885 P.2d 589 (1994), to the extent it does not recognize that fees may be awarded in post-divorce proceedings under NRS 125.150(3).
In plain language
Valerie and Greg Halbrook divorced and shared joint legal and physical custody of their daughter, Erica, splitting each week roughly in half. Valerie, a Sprint sales representative whose Las Vegas income was dropping due to market changes, was offered a career-advancing position in Plano, Texas. When Greg refused to consent, Valerie asked the district court for permission to move Erica to Texas. The district court found Valerie's request was not made in good faith, denied the move, awarded Greg physical custody if Valerie relocated, and later awarded Greg his attorney's fees. The Supreme Court reversed. It held the district court was wrong to find Valerie lacked a good-faith reason. Career advancement has repeatedly been recognized as a good-faith reason to relocate, and the evidence (a documented income decline in Las Vegas, a less competitive Dallas market, a targeted managerial track, and a relocation package, all confirmed by her supervisor) showed a sensible, good-faith reason. The Court also held the district court improperly focused on the loss of Greg's weekly contact and failed to seriously consider alternate visitation, which is exactly what Nevada law forbids: a court may not deny a move solely to preserve the existing visitation pattern. The Court found Valerie's proposed visitation plan (eight weeks each summer, holidays, breaks, and long weekends) was more generous than plans previously approved. It repeated its concern that district courts were misusing the relocation statute to 'chain' custodial parents, most often women, to Nevada. Finally, the Court reversed the attorney's fees award as a consequence of its ruling, but clarified that fees may be appropriate on remand. In doing so, the Court overruled Duff v. Foster to the extent that case failed to recognize that attorney's fees may be awarded in post-divorce proceedings under NRS 125.150(3). The case was remanded for reevaluation of the relocation request under the correct standard.
This summary is independently verified against the source opinion. It is an informational research aid, not legal advice, and no substitute for reading the decision.