HAMDAN VS. HAMDAN (FAMILY)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The Court of Appeals reviewed the contempt order for abuse of discretion. Lewis v. Lewis, 132 Nev. 453, 456, 373 P.3d 878, 880 (2016). Although orders of contempt are not themselves appealable, the court had jurisdiction to review the contempt findings because they were included in an otherwise independently appealable order. Vaile v. Vaile, 133 Nev. 213, 217, 396 P.3d 791, 794-95 (2017). Disobedience to a lawful court order constitutes contempt under NRS 22.010(3). An order on which a judgment of contempt is based "must be clear and unambiguous, and must spell out the details of compliance in clear, specific and unambiguous terms so that the person will readily know exactly what duties or obligations are imposed on him." Cunningham v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 102 Nev. 551, 559-60, 729 P.2d 1328, 1333-34 (1986). Applying that framework, the court noted the district court found a clear and unambiguous order requiring Rabih to pay monthly alimony, that he had not made the majority of the payments, and that he had the ability to pay based on his financial condition when the decree was entered (findings that he had millions of dollars and owned or managed several businesses) and on post-decree findings: a $400,000 business valuation, $10,823 in total monthly business income, over $300,000 in home equity, and access to a bank account containing $248,000. The court further noted the district court found Rabih failed to demonstrate a substantial change in circumstances warranting modification. On the factual challenge, the court applied the deferential standard of Eivazi v. Eivazi, 139 Nev. 408, 411, 537 P.3d 476, 482 (Ct. App. 2023) ("This court reviews the district court's factual findings deferentially and will not set them aside unless they are clearly erroneous or unsupported by substantial evidence."). The court emphasized that Rabih did not specifically challenge the enumerated financial findings or demonstrate they were clearly erroneous. The court also invoked the appellant's burden to provide an adequate record, presuming that the missing portions of the record (the divorce decree, motion practice, and financial materials) supported the district court's findings. Cuzze v. Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. of Nev., 123 Nev. 598, 603, 172 P.3d 131, 135 (2007). Because the district court found Rabih not credible, the appellate court declined to reweigh the evidence or disturb credibility determinations. Grosjean v. Imperial Palace, Inc., 125 Nev. 349, 365-66, 212 P.3d 1068, 1080 (2009). On the bias argument, the court applied the standard from Canarelli v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 138 Nev. 104, 107, 506 P.3d 334, 337 (2022): unless an alleged bias originates in an extrajudicial source, disqualification is unwarranted absent a showing that the judge formed an opinion based on facts introduced during official judicial proceedings that reflects "a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible." The court cited In re Petition to Recall Dunleavy, 104 Nev. 784, 789, 769 P.2d 1271, 1275 (1988), for the proposition that rulings made during official judicial proceedings generally "do not establish legally cognizable grounds for disqualification," and Rivero v. Rivero, 125 Nev. 410, 439, 216 P.3d 213, 233 (2009), for the burden being on the party asserting bias. The court found that the record showed the district court listened to the testimony and considered the evidence before deciding, so the record did not show the court had closed its "mind to the presentation of all the evidence." Cameron v. State, 114 Nev. 1281, 1283, 968 P.2d 1169, 1171 (1998). Accordingly, the court affirmed. The court also noted in a footnote that Rabih did not challenge the denial of his request to modify his alimony obligation and had thus forfeited any challenge related to it, citing Palmieri v. Clark County, 131 Nev. 1028, 1033 n.2, 367 P.3d 442, 446 n.2 (Ct. App. 2015).

In plain language

Rabih and Avir Hamdan divorced in April 2022. As part of the divorce, the court ordered Rabih to pay Avir $2,648 per month in alimony (court-ordered financial support to a former spouse). In April 2023, Avir asked the court to hold Rabih in contempt - that is, to find that he had disobeyed the court's order - for not paying the alimony. Rabih responded and also asked the court to lower his monthly payment. In December 2023, the district court held an evidentiary hearing (a hearing where witnesses testify and evidence is presented). After the hearing, the court found Rabih in civil contempt, ordered him to pay $45,016 in unpaid alimony, and refused to lower his monthly obligation. On appeal, Rabih made two main arguments. First, he said the court was wrong to hold him in contempt because it never made a finding that his failure to pay was willful or in bad faith, and because its conclusion that he could afford to pay rested on guesswork about his business accounts and home equity rather than on solid evidence. The Court of Appeals disagreed. It explained that disobeying a clear court order is contempt, and that the district court had found a clear order requiring Rabih to pay monthly alimony, found he had not made most of the payments, and found he had the ability to pay. The district court pointed to specific findings: Rabih's businesses were valued at $400,000 after the divorce; his financial documents showed monthly income of $10,823 from his businesses; he had more than $300,000 in equity in his home; and he had access to a bank account holding $248,000. The appeals court noted that while Rabih argued the evidence about his finances was disputed, he did not specifically attack these particular findings or show they were clearly wrong. The court also noted that Rabih's appendix on appeal contained only the hearing transcript and the district court's order - not the divorce decree, the motions, or the financial materials - so the court presumed those missing parts of the record supported the district court's findings. Because the district court found Rabih not credible, and because appellate courts do not re-weigh evidence or second-guess credibility calls, the court held the contempt finding was a proper exercise of discretion. Second, Rabih argued the contempt decision was tainted by judicial bias, claiming the judge's comments at the hearing showed she had already decided he was not credible and would hold him in contempt no matter what the evidence showed. The appeals court rejected this too. It explained that bias generally must come from a source outside the courtroom, and that comments or rulings made during the proceedings themselves usually do not show disqualifying bias unless they reflect deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. The court found the record showed the judge listened to the testimony and considered the evidence before deciding, so Rabih had not shown the judge had closed her mind to the evidence. Having rejected both arguments, the Court of Appeals affirmed.