HARGROVE VS. WARD

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

Standard of review: A district court's child support determination is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Miller v. Miller, 134 Nev. 120, 125, 412 P.3d 1081, 1085 (2018). Statutory construction is reviewed de novo. Id. at 122, 412 P.3d at 1083. Findings of fact are upheld if not clearly erroneous and supported by substantial evidence. Ogawa v. Ogawa, 125 Nev. 660, 668, 221 P.3d 699, 704 (2009). NRS 126.900(1) issue: NRS 126.900(1) makes "[a]ny promise in writing to furnish support for a child, growing out of a supposed or alleged parent and child relationship," enforceable according to its terms without consideration. Construing the statute as a matter of first impression, the Court held the phrase "promise in writing" is unambiguous, drawing on Black's Law Dictionary definitions of "promise" and "writing." The Court rejected Hargrove's reading that the statute reaches informal agreements, observing that the Legislature could have so provided but did not, see Ramacciotti v. Ramacciotti, 106 Nev. 529, 531, 795 P.2d 988, 989 (1990), and that the statutory phrase "enforceable according to its terms" implies specificity. Legislative history (Hearing on S.B. 294 Before the Assemb. Judiciary Comm., 60th Leg., May 2, 1979; 1979 Nev. Stat., ch. 599, § 24) confirms the focus on a parent "signing a promise to support." Applying the rule, the Court found substantial evidence supporting the district court's finding that Ward made no enforceable written promise. Banking records and Hargrove's testimony did not memorialize an expression of Ward's intent. Hargrove's May 15, 2013, text describing "this offer" of $300 monthly drew no specific response. A "Yes" to a single deposit request, while arguably a writing, did not specify amount or extent. Other messages committing to pay "as soon as i [sic] can" or in "a bit" lacked terms specific enough to be enforceable. The Court affirmed denial of relief under NRS 126.900(1). NRS 125B.030 issue: NRS 125B.030 permits a physical custodial parent to "recover not more than 4 years' support furnished before the bringing of the action," but is silent on when the action itself must be brought. The Court read NRS 125B.030 together with NRS 126.081(1) (paternity action "is not barred until 3 years after the child reaches the age of majority") and NRS 126.161(4)(a) (a paternity order "may . . . [c]ontain any other provision . . . concerning the duty of support"). Reading these provisions together, NRS Chapter 126 contemplates retroactive child support orders in paternity actions filed within three years after the child reaches majority. The Court adopted reasoning from out-of-state authority: Carnes v. Kemp, 821 N.E.2d 180 (Ohio 2004); Padilla v. Montano, 862 P.2d 1257 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993); and Campagna v. Cope, 971 So. 2d 243 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008). The Court noted that NRS 126.071(1) authorizes a parent (among others) to bring a paternity action. The Court rejected Ward's contrary statutory arguments. NRS 125B.050(1)'s reference to "minor child" was not cogently linked to NRS 125B.030, see Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006). And NRS 126.161(3)'s mandate that paternity orders include support for minors does not prohibit support orders when the child is no longer a minor; NRS 126.161(4)(a)'s permissive "may" language remains available. Holding: A parent has three years after the child reaches the age of majority to seek retroactive child support under NRS 125B.030, with recovery capped at the four years immediately preceding the filing of the action. Hargrove's filing 1 year and 3 months after G.W. turned 18 fell within that window, so the district court abused its discretion by concluding it lacked authority to award retroactive support.

In plain language

Lillian Hargrove and Thomas Ward had a son together but were never married and never went to court to set up a formal child support order while their son was growing up. After the son turned 18, Hargrove sued Ward, asking the court to order Ward to pay her back child support for the years she had primary care of the child. She made two arguments: (1) Ward had promised in writing (through text messages and a course of conduct) to pay $400 per month, and Nevada law makes such written promises enforceable; and (2) even without an agreement, Nevada law lets a parent who had physical custody recover up to four years of past child support from the other parent. The trial judge said he did not have the power to award child support after the child had already become an adult, and so he denied Hargrove's request. Hargrove appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court split the issues. On the written-promise theory, the Court agreed with the trial judge that Ward never made the kind of clear, specific written promise that the statute requires. Text messages saying things like "Yes" to a single deposit request, or promises to send money "as soon as i can," were either too narrow or too vague to count as an enforceable promise to pay ongoing monthly support. So that part of the trial court's ruling was affirmed. On the retroactive child support theory, however, the Court reversed. It held for the first time that a parent can sue for retroactive (back) child support even after the child has reached the age of majority, as long as the lawsuit is filed within three years of the child's 18th birthday - the same window Nevada gives for filing a paternity action. The recovery is still capped at four years of support immediately before the lawsuit was filed. Because Hargrove filed her case roughly 15 months after her son turned 18, her request was timely, and the trial judge was wrong to say he lacked authority to consider it. The case was sent back to the district court for further proceedings.