HATCHER VS. HATCHER (CHILD CUSTODY)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The Court of Appeals reviewed each of Stephanie's four arguments under the abuse-of-discretion standard applicable to child custody determinations. Under that standard, the court focuses on whether the district court "reached its conclusions for the appropriate [legal] reasons" and whether its factual findings were "supported by substantial evidence." Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 149, 161 P.3d 145, 241-42 (2007); see also Sims v. Sims, 109 Nev. 1146, 1148, 865 P.2d 328, 330 (1993). Substantial evidence is "evidence that a reasonable person may accept as adequate to sustain the judgment." Ellis, 123 Nev. at 149, 161 P.3d at 242. The court presumed the district court properly exercised its discretion in determining the child's best interest. Flynn v. Flynn, 120 Nev. 436, 440, 92 P.3d 1224, 1226-27 (2004). On the physical custody issue, the court applied the framework from Roe v. Roe, 139 Nev., Adv. Op. 21, 535 P.3d 274 (Ct. App. 2023), reviewing physical custody orders for abuse of discretion (id. at 284). The court distinguished primary physical custody—where "a child spends most, but not all, of their time residing with one parent"—from sole physical custody, where "the child resides with only one parent and the noncustodial parent's parenting time is restricted to no significant in-person parenting time." Id. at 287. Under Roe, a district court may only enter a sole physical custody order if it "first finds either that the noncustodial parent is unfit for the child to reside with, or if it makes specific findings and provides an adequate explanation as to the reasons why primary physical custody is not in the best interest of the child," with such findings in writing and separate from the general best interest findings, after which the court must "order the least restrictive parenting time arrangement possible that is within the child's best interest." Id. at 288. The district court made best interest findings under NRS 125C.0035(4), found Garrett had ceased inappropriate communications in January 2023, found he complied with the behavioral order, and found unsupervised parenting time posed no safety risk. The Court of Appeals held those findings were supported by substantial evidence and declined to second-guess the district court's resolution of conflicting evidence or its credibility determinations. Grosjean v. Imperial Palace, Inc., 125 Nev. 349, 366, 212 P.3d 1068, 1080 (2009). On legal custody, the court reviewed for abuse of discretion. Ellis, 123 Nev. at 149, 161 P.3d at 241; Mack-Manley v. Manley, 122 Nev. 849, 858, 138 P.3d 525, 531 (2006). The court noted the statutory presumption that joint legal custody is in the child's best interest when a parent "has demonstrated, or has attempted to demonstrate but has had his or her efforts frustrated by the other parent, an intent to establish a meaningful relationship with the minor child." NRS 125C.002(1)(b). The court also invoked the principle that "[j]oint legal custody requires that the parents be able to cooperate, communicate, and compromise to act in the best interest of the child." Rivero v. Rivero, 125 Nev. 410, 420, 216 P.3d 213, 221 (2009), overruled on other grounds by Romano v. Romano, 138 Nev. 1, 6, 501 P.3d 980, 984 (2022), abrogated in part on other grounds by Killebrew v. State ex rel. Donohue, 139 Nev., Adv. Op. 43, 535 P.3d 1167, 1171 (2023). Because the district court found Garrett had ceased inappropriate communications and that the parties could communicate effectively for the child's best interest, the court found no abuse of discretion in rejecting the sole legal custody request. On the parenting-time modification, the court reviewed for abuse of discretion under Rivero, 125 Nev. at 428, 216 P.3d at 226, noting that "the sole consideration of the court is the best interest of the child," NRS 125C.0035(1); see also NRS 125A.045(1). The court found the district court's findings—that Garrett's inappropriate communication had ceased, that he was in compliance with the behavioral order, and that supervised time was no longer necessary because there was no safety risk—were supported by substantial evidence and declined to reweigh evidence or credibility. Grosjean, 125 Nev. at 366, 212 P.3d at 1080. The court framed the modification inquiry under Romano v. Romano, 138 Nev. at 3, 501 P.3d at 982, which requires the moving party to show "(1) there has been a substantial change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the child, and (2) the child's best interest is served by the modification," and concluded the modification was not an abuse of discretion. On the contempt issue, the court applied the principle that "[w]hether a person is guilty of contempt is generally within the particular knowledge of the district court, and the district court's order should not lightly be overturned." Detwiler v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 137 Nev. 202, 206, 486 P.3d 710, 715 (2021). Because the district court found Garrett had corrected his behavior and was in compliance with the behavioral order, and because the appellate court would not reweigh the evidence or credibility findings, the court found no abuse of discretion. The court affirmed the judgment in full.

In plain language

Stephanie and Garrett Hatcher were married and have one child together. When Stephanie filed for divorce, both parents asked for joint legal custody, and each wanted to be the parent the child primarily lives with (called "primary physical custody"). In January 2021, the district court granted the divorce and decided the custody arrangement. The court found that Garrett had communicated with Stephanie in an inappropriate manner, so it gave Stephanie primary physical custody and limited Garrett to supervised parenting time on Saturdays and Sundays from 10:00 a.m. to noon. That supervised time was to be run by an agency called Family First Services at Garrett's expense until he could show, through a communications app called Talking Parents, that he could communicate properly with Stephanie. The court also entered a "behavior order" telling both parents not to use abusive or foul language. In 2022, Stephanie asked the court to change the arrangement. She wanted sole legal custody, wanted Garrett's parenting time further restricted because he had attended few of his scheduled visits, and asked the court to hold Garrett in contempt (a finding that a person disobeyed a court order) for using inappropriate language, for claiming the child on his federal taxes, and for leaving the former marital home in poor condition. She also asked the court to make Garrett pay her attorney fees. Garrett opposed her request and filed his own motion asking for unsupervised parenting time. He explained that he had temporarily moved to California for financial reasons and could not visit in person during that period, that he tried to talk to the child by phone but said Stephanie would not help make that happen, and that after returning to Nevada the high cost of supervised sessions limited how often he could see the child. He said he wanted more time, and unsupervised time, to build his relationship with the child. After hearings in August and October 2023, the district court reviewed the parties' testimony and their Talking Parents messages. The court found that the most recent objectionable message from Garrett was in January 2023 and that his communications had been appropriate since then. Because the supervised-time requirement had been put in place due to his poor communication, and because Garrett had shown he could now communicate properly, the court found supervised visits were no longer necessary and posed no safety risk to the child. The court kept Stephanie as the primary physical custodian and kept joint legal custody, but gave Garrett unsupervised parenting time of two days per week, including one overnight. The court did not find Garrett's testimony that money was the only reason he missed visits to be credible, declined to hold him in contempt because he had improved his communication, and denied Stephanie's request for attorney fees. On appeal, the Court of Appeals explained that it does not re-decide the facts or re-weigh whether one witness was more believable than another; instead it checks whether the trial court had solid enough evidence to support its findings and whether it decided for the right legal reasons. Applying that limited review, the court concluded that the trial court's findings were supported by the evidence and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion on any of the four issues Stephanie raised. The court therefore affirmed.