HAWS VS. HAWS (DIVORCE PROPERTY & ALIMONY)

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The Court (Batjer, J.) reversed a Nevada property-and-support judgment and directed that full faith and credit be given to a California interlocutory judgment of dissolution. After the parties (long-time California domiciliaries) separated in 1973 and the husband moved to Nevada, competing divorce actions were filed. The husband was personally served in California and chose not to appear; California entered an interlocutory judgment providing spousal support and an even division of community property, without knowledge of the wife's 1971 property-division letter. The husband obtained a Nevada default divorce that did not address property or support; the parties then stipulated to a Nevada evidentiary hearing on property and support, after which the district court divided the community per the 1971 letter (awarding the husband his entire pension) and denied permanent alimony. The Court held that a California interlocutory judgment rendered with subject-matter and personal jurisdiction over both spouses is a final judgment entitled to full faith and credit, except as to marital status. Mizner v. Mizner, 84 Nev. 268, 439 P.2d 679, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847 (1968); U.S. Const. art. IV, sec. 1; Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908); Summers v. Summers, 69 Nev. 83, 241 P.2d 1097 (1952). Under California law, res judicata bars relitigation of property rights adjudicated in prior litigation, Sutphin v. Speik, 99 P.2d 652 (Cal. 1940); Henn v. Henn, 605 P.2d 10 (Cal. 1980), so relitigation of property and support in Nevada should have been precluded. The husband's fraud defense (the wife's failure to disclose the 1971 letter) failed: extrinsic fraud is a basis for relief and a defense to full faith and credit, but intrinsic fraud is not. Colby v. Colby, 78 Nev. 150, 369 P.2d 1019, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 888 (1962). Any fraud here was intrinsic because the husband was not prevented from knowing his rights or from appearing and presenting them. McCarroll v. McCarroll, 96 Nev. 455, 611 P.2d 205 (1980); Muscelli v. Muscelli, 96 Nev. 41, 604 P.2d 1237 (1980). Having been served, he could have appeared and introduced the letter himself, and he neither appealed nor timely moved to set aside the judgment. The Court further noted that California law governed the division (California being the marital domicile and the wife's residence at dissolution), and that under Cal. Civ. Code sec. 5118 the husband's post-separation acquisitions were his separate property. The Court reversed and remanded with instructions to give full faith and credit to the California judgment.

In plain language

Leola and William Haws married in 1939 and lived in California for many years. In 1971 Leola wrote William a letter proposing how to divide their community property, telling him he could keep all of his United Airlines pension. They separated in 1973, and William moved to Nevada. Both spouses then filed for divorce at nearly the same time in different states. Leola filed in California and had William personally served there; he chose not to participate. William filed in Nevada and had Leola served; she did not participate in Nevada. The California court entered a full divorce judgment in 1976 that ordered spousal support and split the community property evenly - the California judge did not know about the 1971 letter. Meanwhile, William obtained a default divorce in Nevada that did not divide property or set support. Leola moved to set aside the Nevada divorce, and the parties agreed to let the Nevada court hold a hearing on property and support. The Nevada judge then divided the property according to the 1971 letter (giving William his entire pension), awarded Leola some back temporary support and attorney's fees, and denied permanent alimony. Leola appealed, arguing the Nevada court should have honored the earlier California judgment. The Nevada Supreme Court agreed and reversed. It held that the California divorce judgment, entered by a court with power over both spouses, was a final judgment entitled to full faith and credit in Nevada (except as to marital status), and that California's rules on finality barred relitigating the property division that California had already decided. William's argument that the California judgment was obtained by fraud (because Leola never told the California court about the 1971 letter) failed, because that kind of fraud is 'intrinsic' - William was the person who received the letter, was served, and could have shown up and presented it, but chose not to appear or appeal. The court also noted that California law governed the property division and that under California law each spouse's earnings after separation are that spouse's separate property. It sent the case back with instructions to give the California judgment full faith and credit.