HEDLUND VS. HEDLUND (CHILD SUPPORT)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

Per Curiam. The court affirmed the dismissal of a district-attorney-initiated motion to modify child support, holding that NRS 125B.150 does not authorize a district attorney to represent a custodial parent in an action to modify an existing support order where the obligor parent is current. The Hedlunds divorced in California (Sandra with custody); after Vincent fell behind and moved to Nevada, Sandra obtained a $6,050 URESA arrearage judgment under NRS Chapter 130, and Vincent later became current and stipulated to $375/month. The Washoe County District Attorney then registered the order under NRS 130.320 and moved to modify support to conform to NRS 125B.070. The district court dismissed for lack of authority. Applying plain-meaning construction (State, Dep't of Mtr. Vehicles v. McGuire, 108 Nev. 182, 184, 827 P.2d 821, 822 (1992)), the court held that NRS 125B.150(1) requires district attorneys, on appropriate request, to take legal action against a deserting or nonsupporting parent to establish parentage, establish the obligation of support, and enforce payment, but confers no authority to represent custodial parents in actions to modify the amount of support after the obligation is established. NRS 125B.150(3) confirms the district attorney does not represent the parent or child but renders a public service as a representative of the State. That public service is to ensure nonsupported children do not become an economic burden on the State; because Vincent was current and the children received no state aid, the district attorney's representation would burden rather than relieve state resources. Sandra could proceed pro se or retain private counsel. Affirmed.

In plain language

The question in this case was narrow: may a district attorney represent a custodial parent in a lawsuit to increase existing child support when the paying parent is fully current on his payments? The Supreme Court said no. Sandra and Vincent Hedlund divorced in California; Sandra had custody of their three children and Vincent was ordered to pay support. Vincent later moved to Nevada and fell behind, and Sandra used the interstate support-enforcement process (URESA) to collect the arrears - eventually obtaining a $6,050 judgment. Over the next two years Vincent caught up, became current, and stipulated to keep paying $375 per month. After that, the Washoe County District Attorney registered Sandra's support order in Nevada and moved to modify (increase) the support to match Nevada's formula. The district court dismissed the motion, holding the district attorney had no authority to represent a custodial parent to modify support when the noncustodial parent is current. The Supreme Court affirmed. Reading NRS 125B.150 by its plain language, the Court explained that the statute directs district attorneys to take action against a 'deserting or nonsupporting parent' - to establish parentage, establish the support obligation, and enforce payment. Nothing in it authorizes a district attorney to represent custodial parents in actions to modify the amount of support once the obligation is established. The statute also expressly says the district attorney represents the State, not the parent or child. The purpose of that public service is to keep nonsupported children from becoming an economic burden on the State - and here Vincent was current and the children were not receiving state aid, so using the district attorney would burden state resources rather than relieve them. If Sandra wanted to increase support, she could file the action herself or hire private counsel.