HENDRICKSON VS. WHITNEY

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The Court of Appeals reviewed the fee award under the abuse-of-discretion standard. See Mack-Manley v. Manley, 122 Nev. 849, 860, 138 P.3d 525, 533 (2006). It reaffirmed that "the district court may not award attorney fees absent authority under a statute, rule, or contract." Albios v. Horizon Cmtys., Inc., 122 Nev. 409, 417, 132 P.3d 1022, 1028 (2006). The district court's order recited general fee authorities — NRS 18.010, NRS 18.020, and NRCP 11 — in a boilerplate fashion, and the panel perceived "no specific findings as to bases for awarding fees and costs under the cited statutes and rule." The court separately made detailed findings under Brunzell v. Golden Gate National Bank, 85 Nev. 345, 455 P.2d 31 (1969), and Miller v. Wilfong, 121 Nev. 619, 119 P.3d 727 (2005), but did not tie those findings to a particular authorizing provision. The panel also flagged that the district court failed to explicitly find that Hendrickson's motions were "maintained without reasonable ground or to harass" Whitney under NRS 18.010(2)(b). Notwithstanding those concerns, the panel affirmed by identifying an independent statutory basis: NRS 125C.250, which provides that "in an action to determine legal custody, physical custody or visitation with respect to a child, the court may order reasonable fees of counsel and experts and other costs of the proceeding to be paid in proportions and at times determined by the court." Applying the principle that "[t]his court will affirm a district court's order if the district court reached the correct result, even if for the wrong reason," Saavedra-Sandoval v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 126 Nev. 592, 599, 245 P.3d 1198, 1202 (2010), the panel held the district court always has discretion to award fees in custody and parenting-time matters under NRS 125C.250, and did not abuse that discretion given the protracted custody litigation. The panel declined to reach Hendrickson's argument that the district court failed to rule on her motion for primary custody or issue best-interest findings, noting that the custody and relocation order was not appealed — only the fee order was. It nonetheless observed that both of Hendrickson's motions were explicitly denied, that best-interest findings were issued in a combined section, and that the court reasonably viewed all three motions as "inextricably linked." See Monahan v. Hogan, 138 Nev., Adv. Op. 7, 507 P.3d 588, 596 (Ct. App. 2022). The panel also noted that Hendrickson had failed to satisfy the first relocation factor under NRS 125C.007(1)(a), which requires a "sensible, good-faith reason for the move." The panel added a directive to district courts "to apply relevant legal authority and make specific findings when awarding attorney fees and costs in advance of possible appellate review."

In plain language

Amy Hendrickson and Eric Whitney share custody of their minor child. In August 2020, Whitney asked the family court to change the physical custody and child support arrangement set by a 2013 order, essentially seeking to formalize the shared custody the parents had been informally following since about 2017. In response, Hendrickson filed a single document that both opposed Whitney's request and asked for primary physical custody so she could relocate with the child. Because a local court rule (Washoe District Court Rule 10(3)(a)) requires that a motion, opposition, and reply each be filed as a separate document unless pleaded in the alternative, Hendrickson withdrew that combined countermotion, with the court's permission, and refiled her request for primary physical custody as its own separate motion. Less than a month later, she also filed a separate motion for permission to relocate with the child. Whitney filed oppositions to both new motions and, in each, asked the court to make Hendrickson pay his attorney fees, noting that he effectively had to respond to a request for primary custody twice and had to oppose three motions over just a few months. After a hearing, the district court found that Hendrickson did not clear even the first requirement a parent must meet to relocate — a "sensible, good faith reason for the move" — and denied her relocation request. The court decided Whitney was entitled to fees. In its written order, the court listed several general fee-and-cost authorities (such as NRS 18.010, NRS 18.020, and NRCP 11) in a boilerplate way, and made detailed findings about the amount of fees under the standards from two Nevada cases (Brunzell and Miller v. Wilfong), but it never clearly tied the fee award to a specific legal basis. On appeal, Hendrickson's only argument was that because the district court did not set out a proper legal basis for the fees, the award should be reversed. She did not dispute the amount of the fees or the reasonableness of the request. The Court of Appeals agreed with some of Hendrickson's concerns about the specific authorities the district court cited, but affirmed anyway. It explained that a separate statute, NRS 125C.250, gives family courts discretion to award reasonable attorney fees and costs in cases about legal custody, physical custody, or visitation of a child. Because a court can be affirmed when it reaches the right result even for the wrong reason, and because this was a drawn-out custody dispute, the Court of Appeals concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding fees.