HILDAHL VS. HILDAHL (CHILD SUPPORT)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The court affirmed a judgment for support arrearages and a contempt order against a father who unilaterally reduced fixed monthly support-and-maintenance payments when a child came to live with him. Accrued alimony and child support payments become vested rights that cannot thereafter be modified or voided, per Day v. Day, 82 Nev. 317, 417 P.2d 914 (1966), and Norris v. Norris, 93 Nev. 65, 560 P.2d 149 (1977). The court held that, absent credible evidence of an agreement between the parties to modify support or compelling circumstances requiring a change in custody before judicial approval is sought, a parent making expenditures for a child of whom he does not have custody is not entitled to a setoff against his support obligation; the statutory scheme (NRS 125.140(2); NRS 125.150(5)) provides for orderly judicial modification. Under NRS 125.180(1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the arrearages, and the coercive contempt sanction (suspended sentence conditioned on payment) was proper under NRS 22.010(3) and NRS 22.110.

In plain language

Roger and Glenda Hildahl divorced under a decree that incorporated their settlement agreement. Glenda had custody of the three children, and Roger owed a fixed monthly payment for the support of Glenda and the children, plus he was to convey the family home to her. When their son Mark moved into Roger's home for the summer, Roger unilaterally cut his monthly payments for June, July, and August, reasoning he was now supporting Mark. He also delayed transferring the home. Glenda went to court for a judgment for the amounts Roger held back and asked that he be held in contempt. The district court ruled for Glenda, entered judgment for the arrearages, and held Roger in contempt (with a suspended two-day jail sentence conditioned on paying up). The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. The court explained that support payments, once they come due, become vested rights that cannot be retroactively reduced or erased. A parent cannot simply decide on his own to reduce court-ordered payments. Roger claimed he had actually taken custody of Mark with Glenda's consent, but there was no real evidence of that - filing for arrearages showed Glenda had not consented. The court refused to allow an "equitable setoff" for what Roger spent on Mark, because there was neither a genuine agreement to change custody nor a compelling emergency that forced a change before court approval could be sought. Finally, the court upheld the contempt finding as a proper, coercive tool to enforce the decree.