HOODENPYLE VS. HOODENPYLE (FAMILY)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

• -A defendant may move to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction in a responsive pleading, like an answer, or a timely NRCP 12(b) motion, and a motion arguing that neither party resided in Nevada was sufficient to preserve a challenge to the court's jurisdiction over the defendant.
• -A district court's determination of personal jurisdiction is reviewed de novo.
• -A one-time marriage in Nevada, without actual residency in the state, does not establish personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.
• -Evidence of a family business's out-of-state formation and multistate sales, without a showing of the defendant's personal involvement in Nevada, does not establish minimum contacts, because the unilateral activity of those claiming a relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the contact requirement, and a contract alone does not automatically provide the required minimum contacts.
• -It is within a district court's discretion to resolve a fully briefed motion regarding personal jurisdiction without holding an evidentiary hearing.

Practitioner summary

The Court of Appeals reviewed the district court's personal jurisdiction determination de novo. Fulbright & Jaworski LLP v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 131 Nev. 30, 35, 342 P.3d 997, 1001 (2015). As a threshold matter, the court rejected Dana's contention that Manuela waived the personal jurisdiction defense by not raising it in her motion to set aside the clerk's entry of default. Citing Hansen v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 116 Nev. 650, 656-57, 6 P.3d 982, 986 (2000), the court noted that a defendant may move to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction in a responsive pleading, like an answer, or a timely NRCP 12(b) motion. Although Manuela had referenced only subject matter jurisdiction in her motion to set aside the default, her argument was based on neither party residing in Nevada and was sufficient to preserve her challenge to the court's jurisdiction over her. The court also declined to reconsider Manuela's argument that the appeal should be dismissed as premature, noting that the Nevada Supreme Court had already rejected that argument in Hoodenpyle v. Hoodenpyle, Docket No. 90081 (Nev. Aug. 15, 2025) (Order Denying Motion to Dismiss). On the merits, the court set out the governing framework. Nevada's long-arm statute permits a court to exercise jurisdiction "on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or the Constitution of the United States." NRS 14.065(1). The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause limits a state court's power to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant. Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351, 358 (2021). The court identified the four-part test for specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant: (1) sufficient minimum contacts with the forum; (2) purposeful availment of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum; (3) a claim arising out of or relating to the defendant's contacts with the forum; and (4) an exercise of jurisdiction that does not offend notions of fair play and substantial justice. Id. at 358-59. The court also noted that general jurisdiction exists where a defendant's contacts are "so continuous and systematic as to render [the defendant] essentially at home in the forum State." Fulbright, 131 Nev. at 36, 342 P.3d at 1002. Applying the minimum contacts inquiry, the court relied on Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284 (2014), for the principle that the inquiry "focuses on the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation," and that "the defendant's suit-related conduct must create a substantial connection with the forum State." The relationship must arise out of contacts the defendant herself creates with the forum, quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985), and looks to the defendant's contacts with the forum itself, not with persons who reside there; thus "the plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum." Walden, 571 U.S. at 285. Applying these standards, the court held that Manuela's 2004 marriage in Nevada did not establish jurisdiction because she never actually resided in Nevada, citing Simpson v. O'Donnell, 98 Nev. 516, 517-18, 654 P.2d 1020, 1021 (1982), and distinguishing Wylie v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 96 Nev. 620, 621-22, 614 P.2d 12, 13 (1980) (person submitted himself to Nevada jurisdiction by living in the marital relationship within Nevada). The court further concluded that the evidence Dana submitted regarding MMP-USA LLC did not suggest Manuela's personal involvement in Nevada, citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251, 253 (1958), for the proposition that unilateral activity of those claiming a relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the contact requirement, and Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478, that a contract alone does not automatically provide the required minimum contacts. The record also did not reflect continuous and systematic contacts sufficient for general jurisdiction. Fulbright, 131 Nev. at 36, 342 P.3d at 1002. Finally, the court rejected Dana's argument that the district court erred by deciding the issue without an evidentiary hearing, holding that it is within a district court's discretion to resolve a fully briefed motion regarding personal jurisdiction without a hearing, citing Trump v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 109 Nev. 687, 692-94, 857 P.2d 740, 743-45 (1993). The court concluded that Dana did not demonstrate that the district court erred and affirmed.

In plain language

Dana and Manuela Hoodenpyle traveled to Las Vegas in May 2004 for a short vacation to get married. After the trip, they returned to Virginia to live. Nearly twenty years later, in April 2024, Dana filed for divorce in Nevada. He initially obtained a clerk's entry of default (a preliminary step a plaintiff can take when the other side does not respond in time), but Manuela asked the court to set that default aside, arguing that neither party lived in Nevada. The district court set aside the default and told Manuela to file an answer or other pleadings. Manuela then answered, filed a counterclaim, and separately moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the Nevada court had no power over her personally because she had never lived in Nevada and had not conducted business or transactions there. This concept is called "personal jurisdiction" - a court's authority to make decisions that legally bind a particular person. Dana disagreed. He argued that Manuela had enough connection to Nevada because the couple married in Nevada, because she had hired an attorney and participated in the case, and because a family-run company, MMP-USA LLC (a Virginia company), sold parts in many states, including Nevada. He attached various business documents to support this claim. The district court found that it did not have personal jurisdiction over Manuela. It noted that although the couple married in Nevada in 2004, Manuela had never lived in Nevada, and the parties' business was formed in Virginia. Because Dana himself was present in Nevada, the court granted what it called a "status divorce" - meaning it ended the marriage itself - but ruled that the couple would have to sort out their property in a court that had jurisdiction over their property. On appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed with the district court. It explained that a court can only exercise power over an out-of-state person if that person has enough meaningful connections to the state. A one-week wedding trip two decades earlier was not enough, and the business documents Dana submitted did not show that Manuela herself was personally involved in any Nevada activities. The court also rejected Dana's argument that a hearing was required before deciding the issue, explaining that a judge may decide a fully briefed personal-jurisdiction motion without holding a hearing. The court affirmed the district court's decision.