IBANEZ VS. CHAISAWANG (CHILD CUSTODY)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The Court of Appeals reviewed the child custody and relocation determinations for abuse of discretion, affirming factual findings supported by substantial evidence, "which is evidence that a reasonable person may accept as adequate to sustain a judgment." Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 149, 161 P.3d 239, 241-42 (2007). On the abduction/evidentiary-standard issue, the court reaffirmed that when a district court makes an initial permanent custody determination, it must consider a pending relocation motion (McGuinness v. McGuinness, 114 Nev. 1431, 1435, 970 P.2d 1074, 1077 (1998)) and base its decision on the child's best interest (Druckman v. Ruscitti, 130 Nev. 468, 473-74, 327 P.3d 511, 515 (2014)). The sole consideration is the child's best interest under NRS 125C.0035(1) (Davis v. Ewalefo, 131 Nev. 445, 451, 352 P.3d 1139, 1143 (2015)), with the district court required to consider the factors in NRS 125C.0035(4) (Ellis, 123 Nev. at 152, 161 P.3d at 243). The applicable standard for the best-interest factors is preponderance of the evidence, and failure to apply the correct evidentiary standard constitutes reversible error. Soldo-Allesio v. Ferguson, 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 9, 565 P.3d 842, 849-50 (Ct. App. 2025). By contrast, the rebuttable presumption against awarding sole or joint physical custody or unsupervised parenting time applies only where an act of abduction is established by clear and convincing evidence. NRS 125C.0035(7). The court presumes the district court properly exercised its discretion. Flynn v. Flynn, 120 Nev. 436, 440, 92 P.3d 1224, 1226-27 (2004). Ibanez argued the district court's reference to NRS 125C.0035(8) (setting forth acts constituting conclusive evidence of abduction for the presumption under NRS 125C.0035(7)) demonstrated application of the clear-and-convincing standard to the abduction best-interest factor. The court rejected this reading, noting the district court made findings throughout the order that no abduction occurred, separately analyzed the abduction factor under NRS 125C.0035(4)(l), and issued a clarifying order confirming it applied a preponderance standard. The court addressed Ibanez's contention that appellate review should be limited to the initial order by noting he specifically identified the July 10, 2025, reconsideration order in his notice of appeal and opening brief, citing Arnold v. Kip, 123 Nev. 410, 417, 168 P.3d 1050, 1054 (2007), and NRAP 3(e)(1)(B), (2). On the sufficiency of the evidence, the court held the district court's findings—based on party testimony and documentary evidence including text messages showing Chaisawang sought a custody agreement that Ibanez refused—rested on substantial evidence. The court reiterated that "credibility determinations and the weighing of evidence are left to the trier of fact," which the appellate court is not at liberty to reweigh. Grosjean v. Imperial Palace, Inc., 125 Nev. 349, 366, 212 P.3d 1068, 1080 (2009). On relocation, the court applied the Druckman framework, which governs where no prior custody order finally establishing custody exists. Druckman, 130 Nev. at 473-74, 327 P.3d at 515; see also Shahrokhi v. Burrow, Nos. 81978, 82245, & 83726, 2022 WL 1509740, at *3 (Nev. May 12, 2022). The court noted NRS 125C.007 did not govern because there had been no prior permanent custody order (Druckman, 130 Nev. at 472-73, 327 P.3d at 514, addressing NRS 125C.200 as the predecessor), but the district court properly used NRS 125C.007 as a guide. The district court first found a "sensible, good faith reason for the move" (a better school with speech-delay services, family nearby, and Chaisawang's flexible remote work schedule) and then addressed the enumerated relocation factors, all supported by substantial evidence. Regarding the post-relocation argument, the court noted the district court clarified on reconsideration that it did not find wrongful removal and relied on prospective, "forward-looking, objective evidence" of anticipated benefits rather than accrued benefits. On child support, reviewed for abuse of discretion (Edgington v. Edgington, 119 Nev. 577, 588, 80 P.3d 1282, 1290 (2003)), the court will not disturb factual findings supported by substantial evidence (Miller v. Miller, 134 Nev. 120, 125, 412 P.3d 1081, 1085 (2018)). Applying NAC 425.025(1)(a), (n), and (o), the court held the district court's gross-monthly-income finding of $9,116.67—comprising the $6,516.67 disclosed, plus at least $1,500 in regular transfers from Ibanez's grandmother and $1,100 in rental income—was supported by substantial evidence. See Ginsbach v. Ginsbach, Nos. 59568 & 61578, 2013 WL 3291458, at *2 (Nev. May 16, 2013). The court noted the district court awarded the $250 transportation downward adjustment Ibanez requested under NAC 425.150(1)(e), consistent with the requirement that transportation costs not be imposed separately without determining the impact on the overall obligation. Martinez v. Martinez, 140 Nev., Adv. Op. 73, 559 P.3d 863, 867 (2024). On attorney fees, reviewed for abuse of discretion (Gunderson v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 130 Nev. 67, 80, 319 P.3d 606, 615 (2014)), the court held that because it had upheld the custody determination and the finding of no abduction, Ibanez failed to demonstrate abuse of discretion in the denial of his fee request.

In plain language

Anthony Ibanez and Patamawadee Chaisawang were never married but have a child together, born in September 2021. In June 2023, Ibanez filed a court complaint asking for sole legal and primary physical custody after Chaisawang moved from Nevada to California with the child. He argued that Chaisawang had taken the child without his permission—an "abduction"—and asked that the child be returned to Nevada. Chaisawang responded, denied taking the child improperly, and formally asked the court for permission to relocate to California with the child. After a trial where both parents testified and submitted evidence—including text messages between them and a statement Ibanez gave to police the day after Chaisawang moved—the district court gave the parents joint legal custody, gave Chaisawang primary physical custody, and allowed her to relocate to California. The court also set a child support amount. Ibanez then filed a motion asking the court to reconsider its custody decision, arguing the court used the wrong legal standard when evaluating whether an abduction occurred and improperly relied on things that happened after the move. The court denied that motion and later issued a separate order setting Ibanez's monthly child support obligation at $959.33, based on a gross monthly income of $9,116.67 and a $250 reduction for transportation costs. On appeal, Ibanez raised several arguments. First, he said the court used a stricter standard of proof ("clear and convincing evidence") when deciding whether an abduction happened, when it should have used the lower "preponderance of the evidence" standard (meaning "more likely than not"). The appeals court disagreed. It explained that while the trial court had referenced a subsection dealing with a special legal presumption against parents who commit abduction, the court also analyzed the abduction question under the ordinary best-interest factor and later clarified in writing that it had applied the "more likely than not" standard. The appeals court found Ibanez did not show the wrong standard was used. Second, Ibanez argued that the evidence proved Chaisawang abducted the child and that recognizing this would have shifted other factors in his favor. The appeals court noted that the trial court repeatedly declined to find an abduction, and that its findings—based on testimony and text messages showing Chaisawang had tried to reach a custody agreement while Ibanez refused to compromise—were supported by adequate evidence. The court emphasized that weighing evidence and judging witnesses' credibility is the trial court's job, and an appeals court does not re-weigh that evidence. Third, Ibanez challenged the decision letting Chaisawang relocate to California, saying the court improperly relied on benefits that only existed because of the move (like a California school). The appeals court explained that when there is no prior custody order, a parent still needs court permission to move a child out of state, and the court must decide what is in the child's best interest. The trial court found a "sensible, good faith reason for the move"—a better school with services for the child's speech delay, nearby family, and Chaisawang's flexible remote work. The trial court also clarified that it relied on forward-looking, prospective benefits rather than benefits that had already accrued from the move. Fourth, Ibanez challenged the child support calculation, saying the court overstated his income. The appeals court found the income figure was supported by evidence: his own disclosure form showing $6,516.67, plus regular monthly transfers of at least $1,500 from his grandmother, plus $1,100 in rental income. The court also noted Ibanez received the $250 transportation reduction he had requested. Finally, Ibanez argued the court wrongly denied him attorney fees because Chaisawang caused the litigation by abducting the child. Because the appeals court had already upheld the finding that there was no abduction and no abuse of discretion in the custody decision, it found no abuse of discretion in denying attorney fees. The court affirmed all the district court's orders.