IN RE: A.T., A MINOR (FAMILY)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

Standard of review and writ jurisdiction. The court reviewed statutory interpretation de novo, citing Hobbs v. State, 127 Nev. 234, 237, 251 P.3d 177, 179 (2011). Mandamus is available to compel a duty or control a manifest abuse of discretion (We the People Nev. ex rel. Angle v. Miller, 124 Nev. 874, 879, 192 P.3d 1166, 1170 (2008)); certiorari lies where a lower court "has exceeded its jurisdiction" (Zamarripa v. First Jud. Dist. Ct., 103 Nev. 638, 640, 747 P.2d 1386, 1387 (1987)). Writ relief requires the absence of a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law (NRS 34.170; NRS 34.020(2)) and may be appropriate where an important legal question requires clarification (Clay v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 129 Nev. 445, 450, 305 P.3d 898, 901 (2013)). The court exercised original jurisdiction because NRS Chapter 432B orders are not appealable (Clark Cnty. Dist. Atty., Juv. Div. v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 123 Nev. 337, 342, 167 P.3d 922, 925 (2007); see also NRAP 3A(b)). Statutory framework. NRS 432B.530(2) provides that "[a]t the hearing, the court shall inform the parties of the specific allegations in the petition and give them an opportunity to admit or deny them. If the allegations are denied, the court shall hear evidence on the petition." Petitioners argued this language confines a party to two binary options, contrasting it with NRS 174.035(1)'s explicit listing of nolo contendere as a criminal-plea option, and invoking the canon that legislative omission in one statute, where similar language appears in another, evidences intent to exclude. Ambiguity analysis. The majority found the statute "susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation" because it confers an "opportunity" to admit or deny rather than mandating one of those two responses. Where ambiguous, the court looks beyond plain language to "spirit, subject matter, and public policy" (Hobbs, 127 Nev. at 237, 251 P.3d at 179 (quoting Butler v. State, 120 Nev. 879, 893, 102 P.3d 71, 81 (2004))). Legislative purpose. The court relied on legislative history (Hearing on A.B. 199 Before the Joint S. & Assemb. Judiciary Comms., 63d Leg., 570-71 (Nev., Feb. 27, 1985); 1985 Nev. Stat., ch. 455, § 52, at 1382) showing the provision was enacted to permit swift resolution without an evidentiary hearing where the party does not deny the allegations. The expedited-proceedings policy is reinforced throughout NRS Chapter 432B - including NRS 432B.490(1)(b) (10-day petition deadline), NRS 432B.530(1) (30-day adjudicatory hearing), and NRS 128.055 (six-month best-efforts target for TPR proceedings) - and by caselaw stressing prompt resolution (In re Parental Rts. as to M.M.L., 133 Nev. 147, 150, 393 P.3d 1079, 1082 (2017); In re Parental Rts. as to Weinper, 112 Nev. 710, 716, 918 P.2d 325, 330 (1996), overruled on other grounds by In re Termination of Parental Rts. as to N.J., 116 Nev. 790, 8 P.3d 126 (2000)). Because a no-contest plea functions identically to an admission for purposes of moving the dependency case forward (citing prior cases where such pleas had been accepted: In re Parental Rts. as to J.D.N., 128 Nev. 462, 466, 283 P.3d 842, 844-45 (2012); In re Parental Rts. as to L.L.S., 137 Nev. 241, 242, 487 P.3d 791, 794 (2021)), it advances the statute's purpose. Constitutional considerations. Allowing a no-contest plea also avoids forcing a parent to choose between admitting potentially criminal conduct - implicating U.S. Const. amend. V - and forcing an evidentiary hearing that delays the child's case. Separation of powers. The court distinguished Righetti v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 133 Nev. 42, 46, 388 P.3d 643, 647 (2017), which held that the executive branch "maintains almost exclusive control" over charging decisions. Here, the district court did not negotiate, did not modify the petition's allegations, did not extend immunity, and did not accept a partial plea; Bellamy pleaded no contest to the entire petition with no concessions from the District Attorney. Acceptance of the plea therefore did not encroach on prosecutorial functions. Holding. NRS 432B.530(2) does not confine parties to admission or denial; a district court may accept a no-contest plea with or without the district attorney's agreement, provided the court does not negotiate plea conditions on behalf of the prosecution. The plea operates as an admission for purposes of the Chapter 432B proceeding. The district court neither manifestly abused its discretion nor exceeded its jurisdiction. Dissent. Justice Stiglich, joined by Chief Justice Herndon and Justice Pickering, would hold the statute unambiguous under Sonia F. v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 125 Nev. 495, 499, 215 P.3d 705, 707 (2009): a party may admit or deny, period. The Legislature knows how to authorize no-contest pleas (citing NRS 174.035(1)) and did not do so here. The dissent would grant the writ.

In plain language

This case arises from a child-welfare proceeding in Clark County. After 19-month-old K.T. died of head trauma and a leg fracture, the mother's boyfriend was arrested and charged with murder and child abuse. The mother, Tautiana Bellamy, told investigators she had witnessed the boyfriend abuse K.T. but did not protect the child. Concerned about Bellamy's ability to protect her surviving 4-year-old daughter, A.T., DFS took protective custody of A.T. and the District Attorney filed a petition alleging A.T. was an abused or neglected child. When the case came before the district court, Bellamy entered a "no-contest" plea to the petition. A no-contest plea means the person does not admit the allegations are true but agrees not to fight them; the court then proceeds as if the allegations were admitted. The District Attorney objected, saying Nevada's child-welfare statute (NRS 432B.530) only allows a parent to either admit or deny the allegations, not plead no contest, unless the prosecutor agrees as part of a negotiation. The district judge accepted the plea anyway, made clear there was no deal attached to it (the District Attorney was not giving up the right to use Bellamy's statements in any future criminal case), and treated the plea as the equivalent of an admission for the dependency case. DFS, the District Attorney, and the child asked the Nevada Supreme Court to step in by writ - an extraordinary order used when there is no ordinary appeal available. The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case because rulings under NRS Chapter 432B are not appealable, and the question of whether courts may accept no-contest pleas in these cases is an important legal issue. A majority of the Supreme Court ruled against the petitioners and denied the writ. The majority concluded that NRS 432B.530 says the court must give parties an "opportunity to admit or deny" the allegations, but does not strictly limit them to only those two responses. The majority found the statute ambiguous and looked to its purpose. Because Nevada's child-protection laws are designed to resolve cases quickly - delays harm children waiting for permanency - the majority held that allowing a no-contest plea serves that goal. A no-contest plea avoids a contested evidentiary hearing, lets DFS move forward with services and a reunification plan, and lets a parent avoid admitting to potentially criminal conduct (which could implicate the parent's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination). The majority also rejected the argument that accepting the plea over the prosecutor's objection violated separation of powers. Charging decisions and plea negotiations belong to the executive branch, but here the district court was not negotiating, not dropping charges, and not giving Bellamy any assurances about a future criminal case. Bellamy pleaded no contest to the entire petition as filed. Three justices dissented. They read the statute as plainly limiting parents to admitting or denying the allegations - nothing more - and would have granted the writ.